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ABSTRACT 
Do courts matter? 
Historically, many social movements have turned to the courts to help achieve sweeping social change.  Because 
judicial institutions are supposed to be above the political fray, they are sometimes believed to be immune from 
ordinary political pressures that otherwise slow down progress.  Substantial scholarship casts doubt on this ro-
manticized ideal of courts.  This Article posits a new, interactive theory of courts and social movements, under 
which judicial institutions can legitimize and fuel social movements, but outside actors are necessary to enhance 
the courts’ social reform efficacy.  Under this theory, courts matter and can be agents of social change by educating 
the public and dislodging institutional inertia in the political branches. 
This Article addresses these competing visions of judicial capacity for social change in the context of the struggle 
for marriage equality.  Specifically, it considers the extent to which courts were responsible for Americans warming 
to LGBT rights and coming to new understandings of family, examining evidence marshaled from court rulings, 
polling data, interviews with federal and state judges, interviews with state elected officials, legislative histories, 
and media accounts.  The Article concludes that courts played a vital role in fueling the marriage equality revolu-
tion.  They were not, however, unbridled agents of social change because external forces were necessary to maximize 
the impact of courts’ actions. 
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Their insulation and the marvelous mystery of time give courts the capacity to 
appeal to men’s better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been 
forgotten in the moment’s hue and cry. 
—Alexander Bickel (1962)1 
The battle for same-sex marriage would have been better served if [same-sex 
couples] had never brought litigation, or had lost their cases. 
—Gerald N. Rosenberg (2006)2 
We draw down on a capital of trust, a deposit of trust.  We spend that capital of 
trust, and we have to rebuild that capital. 
—Anthony M. Kennedy (2015)3 
INTRODUCTION 
A substantial proportion of Americans believes courts can save us from 
ourselves.  There is a prominent strain of romanticism in American political 
discourse, particularly among progressives and legal academics, that judicial 
institutions are above the fray—that they rise above the lowbrow business of 
politics to do right by marginalized communities.4  One need look no further than 
anniversaries of Brown v. Board of Education to see Americans celebrating the notion 
that courts can and should be champions of ideas whose times have yet to come.  
Americans’ “attachment,” as Gerald Rosenberg once described it,5 to the 
portrayal of judges triumphantly vindicating the rights of the repressed and 
the downtrodden fails to find wide-scale support in much of the literature 
studying courts.6  Indeed, many scholars criticize perceptions of dominant 
	
 1 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 253 (1962). 
 2 Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in All the Wrong Places, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 
795, 813 (2006).  
 3 Elliot Spagat, Justice Anthony Kennedy Compares Gay Marriage Uproar to Anger After Flag Burning Case, U.S. 
NEWS (July 15, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2015/07/15/justice-kennedy-
acknowledges-gay-marriage-controversy.  
 4 See, e.g., John Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Judicial Independence in a Democracy: Institutionalizing Judicial 
Restraint, in NORMS AND THE LAW 161–62 (John N. Drobak ed., 2006) (discussing the tension be-
tween judicial independence and accountability); Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1335 (2001) (distinguishing constitutional interpretation by courts from 
constitutional interpretation by Congress); Douglas Laycock, Constitutional Theory Matters, 50 TEX. 
L. REV. 767, 767–69 (1987) (examining the relevance and implications of different constitutional 
theories for the judiciary in contrast to the political branches). 
 5 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 
9 (2d ed. 2008). 
 6 See Robert A. Kagan, A Consequential Court: The U.S. Supreme Court in the Twentieth Century, in 
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 199 (Diana Kapiszewski, 
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judicial power as detached from the historical realities of backlash and re-
sistance to judicial authority.7  This raises the question: who is right about 
the role of courts in social change? 
Recent social reform attempts have revived this question.8  Beginning in 
the early 1990s, same-sex marriage advocates systematically used litigation 
as a tool for social change against stiff popular opposition.  The first of these 
early cases was the 1990 challenge to the District of Columbia’s marriage 
laws,9 followed by a challenge to Hawaii’s same-sex marriage ban in 1991.10  
Early polling data is sparse, but a 1996 national poll registered only 27% of 
Americans supported same-sex marriage.11  Deep public opposition notwith-
standing, Americans were seemingly in denial.  State-level responses to the 
prospect of same-sex marriage were fairly muted as only Alaska and Hawaii 
amended their state constitutions to thwart equal marriage before 2000.12 
When the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled in 2003 for 
equal marriage rights in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,13 it was the first 
such victory for same-sex couples.  At the time, Gallup recorded just over 40% 
support for same-sex marriage nationally.14  Angry electorates responded by 
	
Gordon Silverstein & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2013) (exploring the “roles played by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in the twentieth century, asking to what extent and in what ways the Court was a 
consequential political actor.”).  
 7 See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 95 (describing that courts existed in the desegregation era as 
an entity that exerted pressure on, and was pressured by, a greater political environment).   
 8 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 
130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 33 (2016) (examining the distribution of political power between the 
branches in the U.S. constitutional system); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Mila Versteeg, The 
Contours of Constitutional Approval, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 113, 115 (2016) (analyzing levels of support 
for the U.S. Constitution and its application over its constituents); Joy Milligan, Protecting Disfavored 
Minorities: Toward Institutional Realism, 63 UCLA L. REV. 894, 896 (2016) (arguing that the idealistic 
nature of social reform by the Warren Court in the twentieth century was heavily criticized because 
“courts were severely constrained in their ability to oversee successful social reforms and protect 
minorities.”); Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2017, 2020 (2016) (noting an empirical study on judicial behavior and role of ideological preference 
in judicial decision-making); Suzanna Sherry, Introduction: Is the Supreme Court Failing at Its Job, or Are 
We Failing at Ours?, 69 VAND. L. REV. 909, 909–10 (2016) (assessing various scholars’ views on the 
proper role of the Supreme Court in the United States constitutional system).  
 9 Dean v. District of Columbia, No. CIV.A. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364, at *1 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 
1992) (affirming the decision that “same-sex marriages are not authorized under the District of Colum-
bia Marriage and Divorce Act.”), aff’d, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, 
JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 16 & n.* (2002). 
 10 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 48 (Haw. 1993) (holding that there is no fundamental right for same-
sex couples to marry, but that strict scrutiny must be applied to statutes limiting marriage based on 
sex), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 11 Justin McCarthy, Americans’ Support for Gay Marriage Remains High, at 61%, GALLUP (May 19, 2016), 
www.gallup.com/poll/191645/americans-support-gay-marriage-remains-high.aspx. 
 12 See infra text accompanying notes 50–53. 
 13 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). 
 14 McCarthy, supra note 11. 
	
Mar. 2018] STAGES OF CONSTITUTIONAL GRIEF 875 
adopting anti-gay marriage bans in twenty-three states between 2004 and 
2006.15  Meanwhile, some Americans began the bargaining process, throw-
ing support behind non-marital same-sex relationship recognition like do-
mestic partnerships and civil unions.16 
A mere ten years later, supermajorities of Americans accepted and sup-
ported marriage equality.17  More stunning, state legislation attacking LGBT 
rights in Indiana and North Carolina were met with large-scale protestation 
and national boycotts.18  Were courts responsible for this dramatic about-
face in the American social fabric?  This Article will answer whether and how courts 
are responsible for the social change leading to Americans’ embrace of same-sex marriage. 
The Article will proceed in five parts.  To begin, it will construct a theory 
of courts and social change in Part I.  Part II will examine the historical de-
velopment of litigation asserting a right to same-sex relationship recognition.  
Turning to empirical data, Part III assesses how the public responded to 
court rulings expanding protections for same-sex couples.  Part IV and Part 
V then dissect responses from legislators and executive actors, respectively, 
to gay rights litigation.  The Article then closes with a synthesis of all the 
evidence laid out to conclude that courts were indeed largely responsible for 
the equal marriage revolution.   
I.  THE DIALECTICAL COURTS 
In 1986, California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird was up for 
retention election and under fire for her opposition to the death penalty.  Bird 
defended her unpopular judicial philosophy as an institutional virtue: 
“Courts are an aristocratic institution in a democracy.  That’s the dilemma 
for an institution that has the function of reviewing the will of the people.  
We’re bound to be ‘anti-majoritarian.’”19 
	
 15 David Masci, An Overview of the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 1, 2008), 
www.pewresearch.org/2008/04/01/an-overview-of-the-samesex-marriage-debate/. 
 16 See infra Part IV. 
 17 Scott Clement & Robert Barnes, Poll: Gay-Marriage Support at Record High, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/poll-gay-marriage-support-at-record-
high/2015/04/22/f6548332-e92a-11e4-aae1-d642717d8afa_story.html?utm_term=.71dbf78afe8c. 
 18 See Monica Davey, Campbell Robertson & Richard Pérez-Peña, After Rights Clash, Two States Revise 
Legislation, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 3, 2015, at A12; Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, North Carolina Fails to 
Repeal Measure That Caused Boycotts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2016, at A22.  
Within this Article, the variation in the use of the terms “LGB” and “LGBT” is intentional.  
Same-sex marriage legislation and litigation implicates the rights of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, so 
“LGB” is used to more precisely identify the class of persons whose rights are at issue.  The use of 
“LGBT,” which includes transgender persons, is used to capture the wider movement for sexuality-
based rights and the broader community within which sexual minorities have organized. 
 19 Anthony Lewis, Chief Justice Bird: Calm at the Center, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 1986), http://www.ny-
times.com/1986/10/23/opinion/abroad-at-home-chief-justice-bird-calm-at-the-center.html.  
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The Chief Justice’s vision of muscular judicial review as a bulwark against 
political winds aligns with the textbook explanation of courts’ purpose.  Ac-
ademics have been divided, proffering various theories and numerous em-
pirical studies about courts and social change—some arguing courts can 
shape public opinion,20 some finding courts follow dominant societal views,21 
some suggesting courts act counter to majoritarian impulses,22 and yet others 
finding courts are limited in their capacity to shape society at all.23   
Gerald Rosenberg’s seminal book, The Hollow Hope, is the leading piece of 
scholarship that is skeptical of sweeping judicial influence.24  Rosenberg calls 
the courts “constrained” and lays out three limitations that inhibit courts’ so-
cial change efficacy and the conditions necessary to overcome them. 
	
 20 See, e.g., PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND 
THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 74 (2008) (observing the “unique importance” Amer-
ica grants lawyers and judges in resolving ideological and political disputes); JAMES L. GIBSON & 
GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND 
THE JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 9 (2009) (observing that familiarity with the judicial 
system correlates with faith in its impartiality); WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS: LAW AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 138 (1967) (enumerating ways in which the law has 
changed even deep-rooted social attitudes); Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican 
Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 768 (1989) 
(analogizing the Court’s incomplete influence over public opinion to that of a schoolteacher); 
Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT Rights, 43 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 151, 181–82 (2009) (noting the many variables affecting the courts’ influence on public 
opinion); William K. Muir, Jr., The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on Moral Attitudes, 23 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 89, 91–96 (1970) (analyzing the impact of court decisions on differently situated individuals); 
Joseph Daniel Ura, Backlash and Legitimation: Macro Political Responses to Supreme Court Decisions, 58 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 110, 122–23 (2013) (finding that the Supreme Court is uniquely incentivized to push 
public opinion with its decisions).  
 21 See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE 
AMERICA 185 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court rarely challenges public opinion); Robert A. 
Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 293 
(1957) (arguing the courts are merely part of unified, national political alliances); Michael C. Dorf, 
The Majoritarian Difficulty and Theories of Constitutional Decision Making, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 283, 304 
(2010) (arguing that when the courts act counter to public opinion, the political system acts to bring 
them back in line); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajori-
tarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L. J. 153, 158 (2002) (characterizing scholarly adherence to 
countermajoritarian theory as an “academic fixation”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritar-
ian Difficulty: Affirmative Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court Politics, 23 L. & INEQ. 1, 92 (2005) (noting 
that political discourse and majority viewpoints inform court decisions in ways that are often “in-
congruous with the needs of disadvantaged classes.”); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights 
and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1996) (noting the Supreme Court’s retreat on 
First Amendment issues in the face of anti-Communist public opinion during the McCarthy era).  
 22 BICKEL, supra note 1, at 16. 
 23 Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81, 81 
(1994). 
 24 ROSENBERG, supra note 5.  
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Rosenberg’s first constraint is concerned with the limited, enumerated 
nature of constitutional rights.25  This constraint can be overcome with suffi-
cient legal precedent.  Second, courts lack “the necessary independence from 
the other branches of the government to produce significant social reform.”26  
If, however, there is substantial support for social reform from elected offi-
cials, this constraint can be overcome.  Third, courts are constrained in the 
implementation of decisions if there is significant public opposition, there are 
no incentives to induce compliance, and/or administrators crucial for imple-
mentation are unwilling to act.27 
Surely, there is currency in the constrained theory of courts.  It cannot 
be true that courts are unrestrained institutions that have the luxury of throw-
ing caution to the wind.  All the while, compelling evidence supports the 
proposition that courts can act as legitimizing institutions even when judicial 
intervention fuels discordant responses.  
Courts are dialectical.  Judicial institutions can legitimize and fuel social 
movements but must also rely on outside actors to enhance their social reform 
efficacy.  In essence, courts can guide the American polity through stages of 
constitutional grief and uneasy social turmoil.  Six theses underpin the theory. 
A.  Precedent  
Risk-averse judges are unlikely to rule for constitutional claims that result 
in sweeping change.  In the mid-1950s, for example, Supreme Court justices 
were conscious of the controversy ensnaring anti-miscegenation laws.  Still 
reeling over the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education, Justice Frankfurter 
steered the Court away from taking up interracial marriage, and Justice Clark 
similarly urged restraint, saying, “[o]ne bombshell at a time is enough.”28  
Even judges empathetic to a cause will approach it with caution because, 
as California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rodger Traynor put it, “a judge 
must plod rather than soar.”29  Litigants cannot, therefore, demand drastic 
changes in the law without sound precedent.  Successful social change must 
be incremental and “requires a lengthy strategy.”30  Consequently, it is ex-
pected to see that as civil rights doctrine is substantively liberalized and the 
number of liberal civil rights precedents increase, courts are more likely to 
rule in favor of the same or similar civil rights claims. 
	
 25 Id. at 13. 
 26 Id. at 15. 
 27 Id. at 21. 
 28 WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 193 (1964). 
 29 ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 12. 
 30 Id. at 31. 
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B.  Support-Structures 
Cases do not appear in courts “as if by magic.”31  Test cases must be 
manufactured and willing plaintiffs must come forward to press a claim.  Un-
dertaking litigation is demanding.  Pursuing a case in court taxes financial 
resources, necessitates personal time commitments, and requires securing ex-
pert assistance.  As a result, even the most passionate prospective plaintiffs 
hoping to use the courts for social reform may lack the assets and training 
needed to sustain litigation. 
More than the costs of protracted litigation, haphazardly filed lawsuits 
pursued in hostile jurisdictions or prayers for extreme remedies could inflict 
serious harm on a social movement.  As a consequence, the lack of central-
ized coordination is a serious liability for a social reform movement.  Long-
term litigation strategies aiming to foster national policy changes are complex 
and require a tremendous investment of resources and extensive coordina-
tion.  The impact of litigation should be greater due to strategic, well-orga-
nized support structures propping up litigation.32 
C.  Political Reinforcement  
Even if social reform litigation is successful, courts cannot enforce com-
pliance.  Legislators can defund the implementation of judicial decisions, 
write statutes to undercut rulings, and refer constitutional amendments to 
strip courts of subject matter jurisdiction or simply overturn decisions.  Thus, 
the more support a judicial decision garners from legislative and executive 
actors by supportive measures including, but not limited to, advancing legis-
lation and executive orders in line with the courts and blocking constitutional 
amendments to overturn court rulings, the more efficiently that judicially 
mandated policy is implemented. 
D.  Administrative Implementation 
Public policy’s success depends on the effectiveness of administrative 
agencies and bureaucrats charged with day-to-day government operations.  
Reform-oriented litigation is no different.  Successful plaintiffs require coop-
eration by public administrators.  Unless costs are imposed or incentives are 
offered to induce compliance, litigants and judges rely on public administra-
tors’ willingness to give rulings effect on the ground.  Therefore, the admin-
	
 31 This term is a derivative of work by Charles Epp.  See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 
18 (1998). 
 32 Id. at 19. 
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istrative implementation thesis forecasts that the more support a judicial de-
cision garners from public administrators, the more efficiently that judicially 
mandated policy is implemented. 
E.  Rights Consciousness Effect 
Moving away from state actors, the Article will examine the impact of courts 
on the citizenry.  If courts are effective agents for social change, judges should 
have the capacity to rouse citizens to take action and fuel activist mobilization.  
In this sense, court rulings can provide the impetus for individuals to see a right 
in a legal claim that they never considered before or cause an individual to re-
think his or her prior positions on the issue at hand.  For those who are the direct 
beneficiaries of a ruling, a rights consciousness effect may induce those persons 
to take action and engage in the political process to demand more rights.  
If courts can raise an issue’s prominence and inspire individuals to take 
action, then judicial institutions can be effective vehicles of social change.  
The rights consciousness thesis expects that litigation will increase issue sali-
ency and will subsequently give rise to a greater awareness of rights necessary 
to fuel social activism.  
F.  Legitimization  
While a rights consciousness effect should be seen soon after a decision is 
handed down, the public as a whole may require more time to debate and 
digest court rulings that have a profound impact on contested policy issues 
or social norms.  If the public holds courts in high regard as protectors of 
rights and liberties, judges should be able to tap into that institutional stand-
ing and confer legitimacy on the policy preferences reflected in their rulings.  
The legitimization thesis predicts that courts’ symbolic position as guardians 
of the Constitution bolsters courts’ institutional legitimacy; thus, public atti-
tudes on policy positions will have a positive relationship with the ideological 
direction of judicial actors. 
II.  MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDED NATURE OF RIGHTS 
The judicial process operates in [a] very incremental fashion . . . It is not a 
revolutionary way of changing things, but it does tend to, I think, support and 
indicate the inexorable changes that occur in society.  
—Judge Vaughn Walker33 
	
 33 Telephone Interview with Judge Vaughn Walker, N.D. Cal. (Aug. 11, 2016). 
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Courts are constrained from engaging in social reform by the constitu-
tional text a court is charged with expounding and precedent, the latter ap-
plying with greater rigor to inferior courts in the judicial hierarchy.  Judges 
are risk-averse actors who prefer acting incrementally and will resist sweep-
ing rulings for broad constitutional claims even if they are sympathetic to 
those claims.34  Consequently, litigants cannot rely on judges to do their bid-
ding without sufficient precedent to back the right asserted.  A threshold con-
dition that allows for social reform-minded impact litigation’s success is am-
ple constitutional precedent to support such action.  
The precedent thesis predicts that as civil rights doctrine is liberalized over 
time, the more rapidly and decisively courts will favor related civil rights 
claims.  Evidence indicating that pro-equal marriage rulings or jurisprudential 
trends expanding protections for sexual minorities emboldened courts to rule 
more quickly or more expansively on same-sex couples’ civil rights claims sup-
ports the hypothesis.  In this vein, as the number of pro-equal marriage rulings 
increase, judges will readily “pile on” and abandon incrementalism. 
If judges act cautiously, thus requiring social reform-minded litigants to 
seek incremental change, litigants must act strategically and sustain a wide-
spread campaign.  Any nationwide social reform campaign requires a tre-
mendous amount of financing, planning, and expertise.  But, interest groups 
and impact litigation-focused organizations can blunt these costs and devise 
long-term litigation blueprints to maximize the likelihood of success.  
Support from the broader legal community is also important in this re-
spect.  While formal organizations, such as nonprofit legal groups, aid social 
reform litigation’s success, support from the legal community at large is crit-
ical because prospective plaintiffs require members of the bar unaffiliated 
with civil rights groups to press claims.  The support structure thesis posits 
that organizational infrastructure is a necessary condition for litigation-fo-
cused social reform and tangential public activism to flourish.  
In 2015, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that 
the freedom to marry extended to same-sex couples.35  Obergefell came in the 
wake of an onslaught of litigation attacking state same-sex marriage bans that 
kicked off in 2013.  That post-2013 litigation emerged from a longer shift in 
the trajectory of equal protection jurisprudence favoring LGB rights.  In-
deed, legal challenges predated Obergefell for well over four decades.  Disman-
tling every state law prohibiting marriage between two persons of the same 
sex was a long time in the coming. 
The first same-sex marriage challenge was in 1971 on the heels of the 
Supreme Court’s 1967 ruling in Loving v. Virginia, which struck down state 
	
 34 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS 158 (2009). 
 35 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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laws banning interracial marriage.36  The case, Baker v. Nelson, arose after a 
Minneapolis court clerk denied a marriage license to Richard Baker and 
James McConnell.37  Minnesota law limited marriage rights to “persons of 
the opposite sex.”38  Baker and McConnell alleged Minnesota’s marriage law 
ran afoul of the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 39 
A state trial court and the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the claim.  
The Minnesota Supreme Court opined, “The institution of marriage as a 
union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of 
children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis.”40  The couple 
appealed to the Supreme Court, which summarily dismissed the couple’s pe-
tition for want of a federal question.41  
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in 1973 rejected a same-sex couple’s 
claim that the state’s limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples violated 
their due process right to marry and offended the prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment in Jones v. Hallahan.42  The couple additionally argued 
Kentucky law abridged their religious free exercise and association rights.43  
In a procrustean rebuke, the state court ruled, “[T]he relationship proposed 
by the appellants does not authorize the issuance of a marriage license be-
cause what they propose is not a marriage.”44  
A 1974 case, Singer v. Hara, challenged Washington State’s marriage law, 
claiming the prohibition of same-sex marriage offended the state and federal 
constitutions.45  The Washington Court of Appeals readily dispensed with 
the couple’s Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges.46  The 
court rejected the state constitutional claims and concluded that “the public 
interest in affording a favorable environment for the growth of children” out-
weighed the asserted right.47 
The 1970s-era lawsuits failed to overcome the bounded rights constraint 
because they necessitated non-incremental change.  For example, anti-sod-
omy laws were still on the books in an overwhelming majority of states—
	
 36 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 37 Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) 
 38 Id. at 186. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id.  
 41 Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 42 501 S.W.2d 588, 589–90 (Ky. 1973), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 43 Id. at 589. 
 44 Id. at 590. 
 45 522 P.2d 1187, 1188–89 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
 46 Id. at 1197 (“This historic institution manifestly is more deeply founded than the asserted contem-
porary concept of marriage and societal interests for which petitioners contend. The due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a charter for restructuring it by judicial legislation.”). 
 47 Id.  
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including states targeted for marriage litigation.48  While the Washington 
Legislature repealed the state’s anti-sodomy law in 1976,49 the laws in Ken-
tucky and Minnesota remained on the books until 1992 and 2001, respec-
tively, when state courts invalidated them on state constitutional guaran-
tees.50  The first court ruling striking down a law criminalizing same-sex 
sexual conduct did not come until 1980.51  
The plaintiffs failed to litigate strategically, putting the cart before the 
horse by tackling marriage rights for persons whose intimate relations were 
subject to criminal prosecution.  Even if the judges in these cases were sym-
pathetic to the plaintiffs, the litigants simply demanded too much.  After these 
losses, a number of litigation-centered organizations formed over the next 
decade, including Lambda Legal (1973), the National Center for Lesbian 
Rights (1977), the Gay and Lesbians Advocates and Defenders (1978), and 
the American Civil Liberties Union’s LGBT Project (1985).52  The absence 
of organizations dedicated to LGB rights and long-term litigation strategy 
handicapped the movement.  The bungled marriage litigation in the 1970s 
was too aggressive and too uncoordinated.  A robust support-structure for 
LGB rights litigation may have avoided these ill-advised actions. 
The Supreme Court addressed the criminalization of same-sex relations 
in 1986.  In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court turned away a challenge to a Geor-
gia statute that criminalized sodomy.53  Writing for the Court, Justice White 
set aside same-sex couples’ conduct from conduct protected in previous pri-
vacy cases that shielded interests in childrearing and education, intimate fam-
ily relationships, procreation, marriage, and abortion.54  White wrote, “No 
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand, and 
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated, either by the Court 
of Appeals or by respondent.”55  
Bowers was detrimental.  However, the Bowers Court noted that the case 
“raises no question about the right or propriety of state legislative decisions 
to repeal their laws that criminalize homosexual sodomy, or of state-court 
	
 48 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861-
2003 201–02 (2008) (describing failed attempts to undo decriminalization of sodomy in two states 
during the late 1970s). 
 49 1975 Wash. Sess. Laws 863, 866 (repealing, effective July 1, 1976, laws criminalizing sodomy).  
 50 Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 500 (Ky. 1992); Doe v. Ventura, No. MC 01-489, 
2001 WL 543734, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. May 15, 2001). 
 51 Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47, 49–50 (Pa. 1980) (striking down Pennsylvania’s crimi-
nalization of non-marital, consensual sodomy as an equal protection violation). 
 52 ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY 
STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 27, 34, 47 (2005). 
 53  478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 54  Id. at 190–91. 
 55 Id. at 191. 
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decisions invalidating those laws on state constitutional grounds.”56  Indeed, 
between 1992 and 2002, five state high courts did so.57 
As state courts struck down sodomy laws on state constitutional grounds, 
same-sex marriage advocates, led by Evan Wolfson, launched a challenge to 
Hawaii’s same-sex marriage ban in Baehr v. Lewin.58  In Baehr, the Supreme 
Court of Hawaii determined that Hawaii’s law limiting marriage between 
opposite-sex couples constituted sex-based discrimination and, thus, required 
the state trial court to apply strict scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution.59  
The Supreme Court of Hawaii victory was mooted in 1998.  Hawaiians 
amended the Hawaii Constitution to permit the legislature to restrict mar-
riage to heterosexual couples, thus removing the statute from the ambit of 
the state constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.60   
Later that year, a state court in Alaska followed the Hawaii courts’ lead 
in a same-sex marriage challenge and ruled that “[t]he state must . . . have a 
compelling interest that supports its decision to refuse to recognize the exer-
cise of this fundamental right by those who choose same-sex partners rather 
than opposite-sex partners.”61  Alaska voters amended the state constitution 
to ban same-sex marriage wholesale.62  
While litigation percolated in Hawaii courts, the United States Supreme 
Court recognized for the first time that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protec-
tions safeguarded against sexual orientation discrimination.  Romer v. Evans 
was the Supreme Court’s first authoritative statement that the entanglement 
of state action with anti-gay animus is constitutionally impermissible.63  The 
Court, applying rational basis review, invalidated a state constitutional 
amendment that repealed and prohibited all local policies that recognized ho-
mosexuals as a protected class.64  The amendment also prohibited any legis-
lative, executive, or judicial action aimed at expanding protections based on 
	
 56 Id. at 190.   
 57 Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 353–54 (Ark. 2002); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998); 
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 500; Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 126 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v. 
Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 266 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), abrogated by Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Mor-
gan, 263 S.W.3d 827 (Tenn. 2008). 
 58 852 P.2d 44, 48–49 (Haw. 1993), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 59 Id. at 67. 
 60 HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1998) (“The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to op-
posite-sex couples.”). 
 61 Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *1 (Alaska Super. 
Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). 
 62 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (1998) (“To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist 
only between one man and one woman.”), invalidated by Hamby v. Parnell, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1056 
(2014). 
 63  517 U.S. 620, 632, 635–36 (1996). 
 64 Id. at 624, 631–32, 635. 
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sexual orientation.65  The Court determined that “the amendment seems in-
explicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects” and concluded 
that animus did not constitute a rational basis for Colorado’s state action.66  
Without any animus-free justification for walling off LGB Coloradans from 
the regular political process, the Court struck down Colorado’s provision un-
der the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.67 
Beth Robinson, Susan Murray, and Mary Bonauto hoped for the victory in 
Vermont’s courts that narrowly evaded Evan Wolfson a few years before in Ha-
waii.  In December 1999, only three years after Congress enacted the Defense 
of Marriage Act68 in response to the Hawaii litigation, the Vermont Supreme 
Court prepared to rule on same-sex couples’ rights.  The constitutional question 
in Baker v. State was whether the state of Vermont could deny same-sex couples 
the rights, benefits and responsibilities provided to married heterosexual couples 
under the Vermont State Constitution’s Common Benefits Clause.69  
The Vermont Supreme Court unanimously held there was a constitu-
tional infirmity in denying same-sex couples marital rights, but it split on the 
remedy.70  The majority opinion held, “We hold that the State is constitu-
tionally required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and 
protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law.  That the State 
could do so through a marriage license is obvious.  But it is not required to 
do so . . . .”71  Far from definitively resolving the issue, the court gave what 
Beth Robinson would describe as “neither an outright loss nor a win.”72  
Precedential factors may account for the Vermont Supreme Court’s Sol-
omonic exercise.  Baker was the first court decision to recognize same-sex re-
lationships with finality.  However, Baker was not the first time the Vermont 
Supreme Court was a trailblazer in family law rights for same-sex couples.  
	
 65 Id. at 629. 
 66 Id. at 632. 
 67 Id. at 635. 
 68 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended 
at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)), invalidated by Obergefell v. Hodges,135 S. Ct. 
2584, 2607–08 (2015) (“[T]here is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-
sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.”), and United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act un-
constitutional as violative of the Due Process Clause).   
 69 VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7; Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). 
 70 Compare Baker, 744 A.2d at 886, 889 (holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to receive the same 
benefits and protections as opposite-sex married couples and directing the Vermont legislature to 
fashion a remedy consistent with its opinion), and id. at 889 (Dooley, J., concurring) (concurring 
with majority’s remedy), with id. at 898 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(dissenting, only, to the court’s failure to enjoin the state from denying marriage licenses “based 
solely on the sex of the applicants”).  
 71 Id. at 887. 
 72 Telephone Interview with Beth Robinson, Former Vt. Freedom to Marry Task Force Dir. & Vt. 
Supreme Court Justice (Sept. 14, 2012). 
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Vermont was the first state in the nation to recognize second-parent adoption 
for same-sex couples in 1993.73  Furthermore, Bowers remained good law.  
Even though Bowers was not a formal roadblock for full marriage recognition 
under the state constitution, it could not have been helpful.  Baker illustrates 
the “very caution of the judicial process”74 that leads judges to favor incre-
mentalism, consistent with the precedent thesis. 
In June 2003, the United States Supreme Court removed whatever ob-
stacle Bowers presented to courts considering same-sex marriage litigation.  In 
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck down anti-sodomy laws as violative of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, overturning Bowers.75  The 
Court found no constitutionally permissible basis to support animus-moti-
vated sodomy prohibitions.76  Writing for the Court, Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy concluded, “The State cannot demean their existence or control their 
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.  Their right to liberty 
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their 
conduct without intervention of the government.”77 
Shortly after Lawrence, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 
Goodridge v. Department of Health became the first court in the United States to 
rule that right to marry—or not to marry—must apply equally to same-sex 
couples as it does heterosexual couples under the Massachusetts 
Constitution.78  The court held: 
The question before us is whether, consistent with the Massachusetts 
Constitution, the Commonwealth may deny the protections, benefits, and 
obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex 
who wish to marry.  We conclude that it may not.  The Massachusetts 
Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals.  It forbids the 
creation of second-class citizens.79  
New York’s struggle over same-sex marriages erupted on February 27, 
2004 when New Paltz Mayor Jason West married twenty-five same-sex 
couples.80  Shortly after, the New York Attorney General’s Office issued an 
	
 73 In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B, 628 A.2d 1271, 1272, 1274 (Vt. 1993). 
 74 Roger J. Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1, 7 (1977). 
 75 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 76 The Court’s opinion in Lawrence infamously did not articulate what level of scrutiny applied to the 
Texas law. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1143 (2004) 
(“Either (1) the Court is by default applying rational-basis scrutiny and is therefore invalidating the 
law as failing to be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose, or (2) it is abandoning the tradi-
tional tiers of scrutiny in its substantive due process analysis and is replacing it with something new, 
perhaps a general liberty presumption.”). 
 77 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 78 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 79 Id. at 948. 
 80 Robert Sullivan, Mayor With a Mission, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 28, 2004), www.ny-
times.com/2004/03/28/magazine/mayor-with-a-mission.html?mcubz=0. 
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“informal opinion” stating same-sex couples should not be issued marriage 
licenses because the legislature did not intend for it.81  That prompted a series 
of lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of New York’s statute under the 
New York Constitution.  In 2006, the New York Court of Appeals settled the 
dispute in Hernandez v. Robles.82  The Court ruled that limiting marriage rights 
to heterosexual couples did not violate the New York State Constitution’s 
equal protection provision.83 
In 2004, just before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ ruling 
legalizing same-sex marriage took effect, Washington attorneys filed suit 
seeking a similar decision from the Washington Supreme Court.84  In 2006, 
the Washington Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim in Andersen v. 
King County.85  The Washington Supreme Court, while noting same-sex mar-
riage was a “subject of intense debate throughout the nation” and that “times 
[we]re changing” with regard to public perspective on same-sex marriage, 
found that sexual orientation was not a suspect classification and “a person 
ha[d no] fundamental right to a same-sex marriage.”86 
Like New York and Washington, litigants in Maryland met judicial 
defeat.  In September 2007, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that sexual 
orientation discrimination was not inherently suspect and the denial of 
marriage rights to same-sex couples did not implicate a fundamental right.87  
Applying traditional rational basis, the court rubber-stamped the reservation 
of marriage for heterosexual couples.88   
In 2005, same-sex couples achieved a short-lived victory in federal court.  
In response to a constitutional amendment to the Nebraska Constitution 
banning same-sex marriage, advocates for equal marriage rights initiated a 
lawsuit.  Taking an incremental approach, the plaintiffs in Citizens for Equal 
Protection, Inc. v. Bruning did not challenge the validity of Nebraska’s statutory 
definition of marriage, which limited licenses to opposite-sex couples.89  The 
plaintiffs’ challenge focused on political process theory.  The state constitu-
tional amendment, in their view, was unlawful because it imposed a burden 
	
 81 N.Y. Att’y Gen., Informal Opinion Letter No. 2004-1 on Same-sex Marriages Under the New York 
State Domestic Relations Law at 16 (Mar. 3, 2004). 
 82 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 83 Id. at 12. 
 84 Complaint to Redress the Denial of the Basic Civil Right to Marry, Andersen v. King County, No. 
04–2–04964–4–SEA, 2004 WL 1738447 (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2004). 
 85 Andersen v. King Cty., 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (plurality opinion), abrogated by Ober-
gefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 86 Id. at 990. 
 87 Conway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 616 (Md. 2007), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584 (2015). 
 88 Id. at 616, 634–35. 
 89 Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (D. Neb. 2005), rev’d, 455 F.3d 
859 (8th Cir. 2006), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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on same-sex marriage advocates that was not imposed on advocates for other 
marriage policies.90  The district court struck the amendment, leaving the 
statutory ban undisturbed.91  The Eighth Circuit reversed that ruling in 2006.  
The circuit precedent, though not a bar for district court judges sympathetic 
to same-sex plaintiffs, was a handicap.92  
The Ninth Circuit became the next appellate court to rule on this issue in 
the 2012 case Perry v. Brown.93  The Perry litigation grew out of a well-funded 
organization, the American Foundation for Equal Rights (“AFER”), that was 
created to support a federal court challenge to Proposition 8.94  Led by Chad 
Griffin, AFER secured high-profile attorneys David Boies and Ted Olson to 
take up the federal case.  In 2010, the District Court for the Northern District 
of California considered the challenge to California’s Proposition 8, an initia-
tive and referendum proposal that successfully banned same-sex marriage in 
the state constitution and overturned a 2008 ruling by the California Supreme 
Court extending marriage rights to same-sex couples on state constitutional 
grounds.  Federal District Court Judge Vaughn Walker ruled that Proposition 
8 violated same-sex couples’ fundamental right to marry and contravened the 
equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.95 
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and Attorney General Jerry Brown de-
clined to appeal the ruling.96  The main interest group that worked to ratify 
Proposition 8 stood in the state’s place on appeal.97  The Ninth Circuit issued 
a much narrower ruling that California’s Proposition 8 could not take away, 
by popular referendum, a right already enjoyed by a minority group.98  In 
sidestepping the lower court’s sweeping opinion, the appellate panel advanced 
a more gradual theory to seal the advent of same-sex marriage in California, 
but narrowed its precedential impact to discourage Supreme Court review.  
California and the plaintiffs vigorously opposed the petition for certiorari 
to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision.  In opposing the petition for certiorari, 
the City of San Francisco highlighted the need for additional litigation to sift 
	
 90 Id. at 1003. 
 91 Id. at 1009. 
 92 Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 871 (8th Cir. 2006), abrogated by Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 93 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 94 See DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 59 (2016) (“Proposition 8 gave rise to the first federal challenge to a state 
same-sex marriage law . . . [the challenge was backed by] a newly minted gay rights organization, 
American Foundation for Equal Rights . . . .”).  
 95 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that California’s 
same-sex marriage prohibition violated the Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment), 
aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 96 COLE, supra note 94, at 61.   
 97 Id. 
 98 Brown, 671 F.3d at 1096. 
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through the “significant constitutional questions” implicated by same-sex 
marriage laws to “percolate[ ] in the courts such that the ‘perspective of time’ 
helps to shed more light on the weighty issues they present.”99  The City of 
San Francisco stressed in its brief in opposition to certiorari that the Supreme 
Court should not choke off debate, seeing how “this case raises issues that are 
currently the subject of intense legislative and popular debate.”100  These po-
sitions reflect a gradualist approach to reform litigation. 
The Supreme Court nevertheless granted certiorari in Perry v. 
Hollingsworth and preserved the victory without reaching the merits.  The 
Court ruled that the citizen groups lacked standing to appeal the trial court 
decision.101  With the appellate ruling vacated and the trial court order intact, 
California resumed issuing same-sex marriage licenses in June 2013.102  The 
precedent thesis envisions incremental decision-making of this kind—Perry 
brought the nation’s most populous state into the equal marriage fold and 
avoided undoing a majority of state marriage laws in one fell swoop.  
The same day Perry was decided, the Court ruled in a related marriage 
case, Windsor v. United States.103  In Windsor, the Supreme Court struck down 
the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”),104 which was enacted by Congress 
to hedge against the potential effects of a judicial mandate requiring Hawaii 
to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples in 1996.105  DOMA amended 
the federal Dictionary Act to define “marriage” and “spouse” to exclude 
same-sex couples in over 1,000 statutes and regulations.106  When it was 
enacted, DOMA had no real practical effect.  No jurisdictions recognized 
same-sex marriage in 1996.107  Once Massachusetts issued same-sex 
	
 99 City and County of San Francisco’s Brief in Opposition at 23, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
2652, No. 12-144 (2013).  
 100 Id. at 24. 
 101 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (“We have never before upheld the standing 
of a private party to defend the constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen 
not to.  We decline to do so for the first time here.”). 
 102 Maria L. La Ganga, California Holds First Gay Wedding Since 2008, in San Francisco, L.A. TIMES (June 
28, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/28/local/la-me-ln-california-holds-1st-gay-mar-
riage-since-2008-in-san-francisco-20130628. 
 103 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).  
 104 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended at 
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regula-
tion, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the 
word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, 
and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”).  
 105 Richard Socarides, Why Bill Clinton Signed the Defense of Marriage Act, The New Yorker (Mar. 8, 2013), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-bill-clinton-signed-the-defense-of-marriage-act.  
 106 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.  
 107 Socarides, supra note 105 (“Some in the White House pointed out that DOMA, once enacted, would 
have no immediate practical effect on anyone—there were no state-sanctioned same-sex marriages 
then for the federal government to ignore.”).  
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marriage licenses in 2004, DOMA barred lawfully married same-sex couples 
from a wide array of federal benefits with respect to Social Security, housing, 
taxation, copyright, and veterans’ affairs.108  
The Court in Windsor held that DOMA violated the equal protection 
guarantees incorporated in the Fifth Amendment.  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Kennedy held upon “careful consideration” that DOMA had the pur-
pose and effect of imposing inequality on married same-sex couples, render-
ing DOMA constitutionally deficient.109  Justice Kennedy couched Windsor’s 
holding in a substantive due process, equal protection, and federalism hybrid 
but never articulated what scrutiny the Court applied.  
Despite the muddled rationale for striking down the federal anti-recogni-
tion law, the decision’s emphasis on same-sex couples’ dignity and their chil-
dren signaled a sea change that the Court was poised to defend same-sex 
couples’ families.  If the precedent thesis is right, Windsor should induce more 
lawsuits challenging marriage laws and elicit strong responses from courts to 
more aggressively rule in favor of same-sex couples.   
Given the Supreme Court’s implicit rejection of the reasoning relied upon 
by state courts rejecting same-sex marriage claims and the Court’s emphasis 
on married same-sex couples’ dignity to strike down the Defense of Marriage 
Act, it is not surprising a flood of new litigation cropped up in Windsor’s wake.  
In the last six months of 2013, twenty-one new state and federal court filings 
were initiated and another twenty-eight were filed in 2014, all of which 
squarely attacked the constitutionality of banning same-sex marriage.  By 
year’s end, two state courts of last resort struck blows to state marriage laws.  
An interesting trend emerged after Windsor.  [L]egal interest groups 
supported most of the litigation prior to June 2013.  Private attorneys backed 
four of the seventeen lawsuits filed before Windsor challenging same-sex 
marriage bans.  Legal interest groups shouldered more lawsuits post-Windsor 
than they did during the entire twenty-three-year span between the start of 
litigation in Hawaii and when Windsor was decided.  However, private 
attorneys’ share of the lawsuits was greater.  After June 2013, private 
attorneys filed twenty-four lawsuits while thirty-three lawsuits were headed 
by litigation-oriented organizations.  These numbers underscore the 
importance of support structures for sustaining the same-sex marriage 
litigation campaign in the long-term.110  
After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Windsor, married same-sex cou-
ples could avail themselves of federal benefits.  Civil unions, like New Jersey 
	
 108 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.  
 109 See id. at 2693 (“The avowed purpose and practical effect of [DOMA] are to impose a disadvantage, 
a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the 
unquestioned authority of the States.”).  
 110 Anthony Michael Kreis, The Capital of Trust: Judicial Power, Social Reform, and the Case of 
Same-Sex Marriage 46–47 (Aug. 8, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia) 
(on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law) (citations omitted).  
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offered to same-sex couples, were not recognized for federal purposes.111  
Taking advantage of these new facts, litigants in New Jersey challenged state 
law for not complying with Lewis v. Harris, which required the state treat 
same-sex couples “equally” to opposite-sex couples.112   
In Garden State Equality v. Dow, a state trial court ruled that New Jersey’s 
civil union law no longer comported with the New Jersey State Constitution’s 
equal protection guarantees because the state’s civil union law deprived com-
mitted same-sex couples the same benefits and privileges afforded to married 
same-sex couples by the federal government.113  New Jersey Governor Chris 
Christie’s Administration applied for a stay of the lower court’s ruling to the 
New Jersey Supreme Court and was denied.114  With the New Jersey Su-
preme Court signaling a no-win scenario for the Christie Administration, the 
trial court decision was not appealed and same-sex couples began obtaining 
marriage licenses in October 2013.115  In New Jersey, the Windsor decision 
had direct and immediate consequences.  
In New Mexico, the State Supreme Court struck down the state’s mar-
riage law on state constitutional grounds.  Writing for a unanimous court, 
Justice Edward Chavez noted New Mexico ran afoul of state constitutional 
guarantees by irrationally denying couples both state and federal benefits.116 
The day following the New Mexico decision, Judge Robert Shelby of the 
United States District Court of Utah struck down neighboring Utah’s 
Amendment 3, which banned same-sex marriage, in Kitchen v. Herbert.117  
Shelby was the first federal judge to invalidate a state’s marriage law for ex-
cluding same-sex couples post-Windsor.118  In Kitchen, Judge Shelby held that 
the plaintiffs raised a substantial question of federal law over which court had 
jurisdiction.119  Shelby ruled that Amendment 3 denied same-sex couples’ 
fundamental right to marry under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
	
 111  See, e.g., Peter J. Reilly, IRS Recognizes All Marriages But Not Civil Unions, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2013, 4:32 
PM) (reporting that, after the Windsor decision, the IRS would recognize same-sex marriages for 
federal tax purposes if the wedding was legal within the jurisdiction in which it was preformed, but 
would not do so for civil unions or registered domestic partnerships). 
 112 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 200 (N.J. 2006).   
 113 See Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 368–69 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 2013).  
 114 Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036, 1038–39 (N.J. 2013). 
 115 Kate Zernike & Marc Santora, As Gays Marry in New Jersey, Christie Yields, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2013, 
at A1. 
 116 Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 888 (N.M. 2013).  
 117 Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1216 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 
2014). 
 118 See Erik Eckholm, Federal Judge Rules That Same-Sex Marriage Is Legal in Utah, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 
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Clause and violated the Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause because 
Utah’s purported interests in promoting responsible procreation and child-
rearing did not rationally relate to Amendment 3.120  
The Kitchen decision marked the beginning of a sharp uptick in federal 
court rulings holding same-sex marriage bans constitutionally infirm.  Fol-
lowing Judge Shelby, district court judges in rapid succession voided anti-
gay marriage laws, with appeals made to the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 
10th, and 11th circuits.  The rate of court rulings indicates that judges are 
responsive to their colleagues’ actions and feel freer to rule for social reform 
litigation when acting in concert with other judges.  After Judge Shelby 
struck down Utah’s constitutional amendment banning equal marriage fed-
eral judges felt little need to exercise restraint and ruled against marriage 
bans with regularity, as the precedent thesis expects.121  
Courts were not unanimous in striking down state marriage laws after 
June 2013.  In all the post-Windsor litigation, only three courts ruled in favor 
of laws excluding same-sex couples from marriage.  Prior to Windsor, federal 
courts in Hawaii and Nevada upheld laws restricting marriage to opposite-
sex couples in 2012.122  In August 2014, a Tennessee court refused in Borman 
v. Pyles-Borman to grant a divorce to a same-sex couple married in Iowa.123  In 
turning the couple away, Judge Simmons upheld the state’s same-sex mar-
riage ban against a constitutional attack.  Simmons was the first judge to up-
hold a state marriage law, breaking a near fourteen-month winning streak 
for same-sex marriage proponents.  Two federal judges upheld bans in Lou-
isiana and Puerto Rico.124  
While litigation stacked up in state and federal trial courts, federal 
appellate courts began weighing in.  In June 2014, the Tenth Circuit affirmed 
lower court rulings finding for same-sex couples in Utah and Oklahoma.125  
The Fourth Circuit followed in July 2014, ruling against Virginia’s 
constitutional exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.126  In September 
	
 120 Id.  at 1215–16.  
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2014, the Seventh Circuit ruled against Indiana and Wisconsin’s laws banning 
same-sex marriage with remarkable speed—nine days after oral arguments.127  
The five losing states petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.128 
On October 6, 2014, the Supreme Court denied the five certiorari peti-
tions.129  Circuit precedent now foreclosed any plausible defense of marriage 
laws in Colorado, Kansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, West Virginia, 
and Wyoming.130  Overnight, the number of same-sex marriage states 
jumped from nineteen to thirty.131  The following day, the Ninth Circuit 
voided Nevada’s anti-marriage equality law and affirmed a ruling striking 
Idaho’s marriage amendment.132  In total, five additional states were placed 
into the equal marriage column, totaling thirty-five states and the District of 
Columbia.133  In short order, courts and legislatures brought near national 
uniformity to the patchwork of marriage laws that existed prior to June 2013.  
A month later, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit created a circuit 
split, upholding marriage laws limiting rights to opposite-sex couples in Ken-
tucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee.134  The majority opinion by Judge 
Jeffrey Sutton rejected the plaintiffs’ overtures that the federal courts were an 
appropriate venue for resolving the public debate on marriage equality.  Ul-
timately, the court determined that same-sex marriage was not a proper 
question for federal judicial resolution and should evolve through political 
	
sex marriage violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not further state interests in cre-
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processes.135  The Sixth Circuit decided the Supreme Court’s 1971 determi-
nation that a same-sex couple’s marriage claim in Baker v. Nelson lacked a 
justiciable federal question controlled their analysis.136   
With a circuit split, the Supreme Court would have to take the case or 
reverse the opinion summarily.  The Court granted certiorari in January 
2015 and designated James Obergefell as the lead petitioner.137  The appeal, 
now named Obergefell v. Hodges, was placed on the calendar for oral arguments 
in April 2015.  On June 26, 2015, the Court ruled 5-4 that the fundamental 
right to marry extended to same-sex couples.138  
Echoing the sentiments of the parties who opposed certiorari in Perry and 
the dissenting opinion in the Sixth Circuit, Justice Kennedy emphasized the 
near-uniformity with which courts exercised their power to dismantle a ma-
jority of state marriage laws to same-sex couples’ benefit.139  In clear terms, 
the majority opinion tied the Court’s comfort to rule decisively for same-sex 
couples with the numerous lower court rulings finding for same-sex couples, 
supporting the precedent hypothesis’ expectation that courts will more read-
ily rule for civil rights plaintiffs the more significant pro-civil rights decisions 
courts render.  The Court explained: 
Numerous cases about same-sex marriage have reached the United States 
Courts of Appeals in recent years.  In accordance with the judicial duty to 
base their decisions on principled reasons and neutral discussions, without 
scornful or disparaging commentary, courts have written a substantial body 
of law considering all sides of these issues.  That case law helps to explain 
and formulate the underlying principles this Court now must consider.  With 
the exception of the opinion here under review and one other . . . the Courts 
of Appeals have held that excluding same-sex couples from marriage violates 
the Constitution.  There also have been many thoughtful District Court de-
cisions addressing same-sex marriage—and most of them, too, have con-
cluded same-sex couples must be allowed to marry.  In addition the highest 
courts of many States have contributed to this ongoing dialogue in decisions 
interpreting their own State Constitutions.140 
The earliest same-sex marriage litigation failed to advance much, if any, 
measurable progress for same-sex couples or the movement for LGB rights 
more broadly.  As a basic matter, the litigation failed to achieve a victory in 
	
 135 Id. at 420–21. 
 136 Id. at 400. 
 137 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) (reviewing the Sixth Circuit’s reversal of 
sixteen consolidated cases that held unconstitutional state laws in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and 
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each case.  Even still, the litigation did not prompt any legislative movement 
to afford same-sex couples any relationship recognition—marriage or other-
wise.  States during the decade began to harden laws to ensure domestic re-
lations law excluded same-sex couples.  Maryland, Virginia, Florida, Califor-
nia, and Wyoming became the first states to expressly prohibit same-sex 
marriage between 1973 and 1977.  
The 1970s-era litigation failed because it emerged from nothing and then 
asked too much of judges.  There was no sustained attempt to build favorable 
precedent safeguarding the most basic legal rights of LGB persons before 
jumping to relationship recognition, nor was there any robust organizational 
infrastructure to prop up a protracted litigation campaign.  This evidence is 
consistent with the Constrained Court Theory and the hypotheses concern-
ing the value of precedent and the necessity of support-structures.141  
The decisions in Windsor and Obergefell benefited from the precedential 
rulings in Romer and Lawrence that overturned laws that discriminated against 
the LGB community.  And with respect to Lawrence, the Court federally con-
stitutionalized the right of LGB persons to be free of criminalization follow-
ing a series of rulings by state courts finding parallel protections in their re-
spective state constitutions.  Additionally, Obergefell came off the heels of over 
a decade’s worth of judicial decisions on the state and federal level eating 
away at state marriage laws, as well as legislative enactments of same-sex 
marriage rights.  However, the importance of the Windsor decision in same-
sex marriage advocates’ success in Obergefell is hard to overstate.  
In the most immediate sense, Windsor reshaped the landscape and al-
lowed the New Jersey state courts to easily circumvent the 2006 state su-
preme court precedent mandating equal benefits, but not equal marriage 
rights, to same-sex couples.  Windsor allowed New Jersey courts to reverse-
engineer the Lewis decision by reasoning the federal government’s non-recog-
nition of civil unions rendered New Jersey’s exclusion of same-sex couples 
from marriage constitutionally deficient under the New Jersey Constitution.  
Courts more eagerly side with social reform plaintiffs as other rulings 
backing that outcome accumulate.  The effectiveness of the signal Windsor 
sent to judges and lawyers to lay the groundwork to reign in discriminating 
marriage law states is evidenced by the sharp uptick in litigation filed in 
Windsor’s aftermath.  Not only did the number of new filings rise, but also 
private attorneys accounted for nearly double the proportion of those filing 
litigation post-Windsor than before June 2013.142  The increased share of 
litigation taken up by private attorneys suggests that the Supreme Court’s 
precedent communicated to some that a tipping point had been reached 
	
 141 See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text; see also supra Subparts I.A.–B. 
 142 See Kreis, supra note 110, at 48.  
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where litigation would yield substantial attorneys’ fees.  And, indeed, 
attorneys’ fees in excess of $13.5 million were assessed against states that 
defended anti-same-sex marriage laws.143  
The larger share of private attorney involvement may also have come 
about because the fears that haphazard litigation might lead to negative prec-
edent, thus requiring meticulous coordination on impact litigation, evapo-
rated with the Defense of Marriage Act’s demise.  Whatever the cause, the 
onslaught of new filings—and sometimes numerous filings in the same 
state—allowed courts to attack the legitimacy of state same-sex marriage pro-
hibitions with rapid fire.  That momentum, both in terms of the sheer num-
ber of courts striking down state marriage laws, the rate at which courts were 
dispensing with litigation, and the near uniformity of rulings against states, 
solidified Obergefell’s foundation. 
The presence of robust support structures to sustain an extended litiga-
tion campaign is crucial if courts are to be used as instrumentalities for social 
change.  As the Constrained Court Theory articulates, judges are more likely 
to rule in favor of litigants if they seek out incremental remedies or have suf-
ficient precedent to validate their claims.144  In the case of same-sex marriage, 
early cases failed to succeed because they did not look to make gradual 
change, nor were they part of any calculated widespread court-centered 
movement.  These 1970s-era lawsuits, if successful, would have invalidated 
every state’s marriage laws in one fell swoop and years before many states 
would decriminalize same-sex relations.  Later lawsuits smartly focused on 
state constitutions before raising federal constitutional questions—a more 
time-consuming and pricey tactic.  
The costs of pursuing a strategic incremental litigation plan necessitate fi-
nancial and logistical support to effectively execute it.  Later lawsuits benefited 
from well-funded efforts and exceptional attorneys, notably in the Proposition 
8 case.  Even more importantly for the same-sex marriage movement, the bar-
rage of lawsuits and court rulings striking down same-sex marriage bans in the 
post-Windsor era was the kind of unremitting social reform litigation drive that 
created an ideal environment for the United States Supreme Court to act in 
Obergefell, as Justice Kennedy highlighted.  Same-sex marriage litigation was 
more successful because plaintiffs took advantage of the shifting trajectory in 
LGB-rights jurisprudence and adopted a gradual approach.  Moreover, the 
movement and the litigation to support it were more effective because it had 
the necessary support structures to buttress prolonged fights in the courts. 
	
 143 See Zoe Tillman, Same-Sex Union Foes to Pay Up, NAT’L L. J., Jan. 25, 2016, at 1 (noting that since 
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III.  COURTS AND THE PUBLIC-AT-LARGE 
One substantial claim made by judicial interventionists is that courts have 
a legitimization effect on public opinion.145  Assuming courts are willing to 
breach the countervailing weight of public opposition in the first place, pro-
interventionists posit courts can bring the public into their fold and tamp 
down opposition.  What evidence exists to demonstrate that this effect holds 
true for same-sex marriage or gay rights more generally?  
In this Part, I examine the evidence against two competing conceptuali-
zations of court: the Constrained Court Theory and legitimization theory.  
The Constrained Court Theory does not leave room for the courts to lead 
the public on social reform issues, whereas legitimization theory says that 
courts have the capacity to bring the public in line with the court’s positions 
over time.  Legitimization theory reasons that because courts hold a particu-
lar gravitas in society, judges can confer legitimacy on an issue or movement 
that helps to advance social acceptance of an idea or movement.   
If the constrained court theory is right, then there should be no substan-
tial gains in public acceptance of same-sex marriage or same-sex relationship 
recognition after successful litigation campaigns.  If legitimization theory is 
accurate, observers should see significant gains in the public’s mood favoring 
equal relationship rights after judicial intervention.  Whatever gains LGB 
Americans made in garnering public support after victories in the courts, 
however, must be dissected.  If legitimization theory holds water, alternative 
explanations for the public’s warming toward same-sex relationships unre-
lated to judicial intervention should be discarded.  In addition, this Part will 
assess the thesis that judicial rulings gave rise to rights consciousness.  The 
rights-consciousness thesis predicts that courts can breathe life into an issue 
by bringing it to the fore of the public’s consciousness, allowing members of 
the public to understand the nature of what is at stake.   
Any attempt to parse the effect of litigation or court rulings on public 
opinion is a task fraught with methodological challenges.  First, it is difficult 
to isolate the effects of litigation and judicial intervention from other devel-
opments in society more broadly.  Second, the ordering of questions in a poll 
can influence polling outcomes.  Polls that measure public support for civil 
unions in addition to marriage for same-sex couples may produce results that 
vary from polling that questions respondents squarely on marriage recogni-
tion.  A third challenge is the limited polling data from the 1990s and early 
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2000s.146  Regarding state-level data, not all states are equal with respect to 
the body of data’s robustness.  For example, there are virtually no data cap-
turing Vermonters’ moods prior to the decision in Baker v. State in 1999.  
Other states, like California, have more reliably consistent polling data. 
This Part will begin examining Vermonters’ response to the state high 
court’s ruling that same-sex couples are constitutionally protected.  From 
there, this Part delves into state-level and national public responses.  
A.  States and the Backlash Thesis 
The Vermont Supreme Court was the first to rule with finality that same-
sex couples were entitled to equal rights under the state constitution.147  The 
Vermont Legislature’s enactment of civil unions followed.148  Extensive poll-
ing data was not taken measuring Vermonters’ support for civil unions or 
marriage for LGB people, limiting our understanding of Baker’s reception.  
One poll from late 2000 registered a majority of Vermonters (54%) in oppo-
sition to the new civil union law.149   
On the surface, the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision was not received 
warmly in the state.  Indeed, the ruling in Baker was heavily criticized and 
fomented an already bubbling anti-establishment movement.  As the move-
ment percolated, black-and-white signs cropped up throughout Vermont 
with a demand to “Take Back Vermont.”150  The New York Times reported on 
the host of issues that stoked the fires, in addition to same-sex couples’ win-
ning relationship recognition rights: 
Stop and inquire at houses displaying the signs in this poor farming and log-
ging region of central Vermont, and the translation becomes clear: We are fu-
rious at our legislators for passing a law this spring letting gay couples be joined 
in marriagelike civil unions.  We are mad about property tax reform, and all 
the permits we need to log or build on our land, and all the other laws our 
politicians pass against our will.  We want to vote them out in November.151 
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It bears noting that though a number of issues fed into the movement, the 
consensus seems to follow the assessment of one Take Back Vermont supporter 
who told the New York Times, “Civil unions are like the straw that broke the 
camel’s back.”152  The movement began as a response to two land use 
regulations, which severely restricted developers’ rights in the state and limited 
the clear-cutting of wooded areas.153  In 1997, the movement found an 
additional cause in fighting a law that created a statewide funding formula for 
education.154  That law, Act 60,155 was bitterly resisted.  In response, 
Vermonters filed eleven lawsuits, privatized a local school, and refused to send 
property taxes to state officials.156  The Take Back Vermont movement was 
described as a “simmering complaint over many issues,”157 that the civil unions 
law emboldened.  However, the movement continued to rove for new targets 
throughout the 2000 election campaign, as one media account reported: 
Civil unions opened the vent, but now the backlash has found other targets.  
“Take Back Vermont” has come to mean take it back from the state Supreme 
Court, which ordered equity for gay couples, and from the legislators who re-
fused to hold a referendum; from the environmentalists, big business and those 
40,000 New Yorkers and Bostonians who have second homes in Vermont.158 
Republican Richard Westman, who was first elected to the Vermont 
House in 1983, saw the leaders of the Take Back Vermont movement as 
riding a longer wave of anti-liberal establishment that crested in 2000: 
I think if you look at the election cycle, the two years before civil unions, 
the education funding bill had passed.  The Republicans had been on the 
downward slide for quite a long time.  After they passed Act 60 [concerning 
education funding], the Republicans came back and picked up seats.  The 
very next election cycle after civil unions, the Republicans picked up ten seats.  
There was some combination of those two issues, which helped produce a 
Republican majority in the legislature.  There was some feeling amongst some 
people on a host of issues that the place was getting out of control too fast.159 
Despite numerous grievances, the most aggressive opposition targeted the 
civil unions law.  Towns reported heightened tension, including anti-gay 
graffiti vandalism.  Hostility in one town caused the local newspaper to print 
an editorial signed by 168 locals lamenting that “a climate of fear [was] being 
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created by people whose alarmist tactics discourage rational debate.”160  The 
groups called for an end to “the divisiveness, hostility and mistrust we see 
overtaking our towns since the passage of the civil unions law.”161  These towns 
were not alone.  As then-Governor Howard Dean recalled, Vermont was 
ensnarled in “the least civil public debate in the state in over a century.”162  
Vermont was a tinderbox—so much so that officials feared that violence might 
be imminent and took precautionary measures.  Dean wore a bulletproof vest 
during the campaign season.163  The Speaker of the House had an armed state 
trooper standing guard behind a curtain during the civil union debate.164 
Dean said civil unions were one of a number of issues feeding into con-
servative discontents but that:  
Civil unions galvanized the right wing.  The [Take Back Vermont] 
movement was discombobulated until that point.  [Civil unions] scared a lot 
of people.  When some group is lower in the pecking order [and] is all of a 
sudden equal, that was a really an earthquake.  It was the straw that broke 
the camel’s back, but it was the biggest straw of them all.165 
Republican Tom Little echoed a similar theme offered in Dean’s assessment: 
I’d frame it this way.  It was clear to me then and now that it was all about 
civil unions, however the folks who were exercised by that included people 
who found common ground over property rights issues and gun control 
issues.  But if you looked at a Venn diagram there were also people opposed 
to legislation who were not part of those other circles.  I think it was a distinct 
motivation for some people.166 
The Take Back Vermont movement metastasized during the run-up to 
the 2000 elections.  Take Back Vermonters successfully primaried half of the 
ten Republican legislators who voted in favor of civil unions, including one 
thirty-year incumbent.167  Republicans took control of the Vermont House 
of Representatives for the first time in sixteen years.168  The battle for control 
of the House districts, a sign of the movement’s intensity, may overstate its 
overall potency.  The Vermont GOP exhibited signs of life throughout the 
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1990s.  Republicans controlled the Vermont Senate in 1995 and 1996 by an 
18-12 margin.169 
Democrat Howard Dean barely broke 50% of the vote in his gubernatorial 
reelection bid.170  However, Dean also faced opposition from Anthony Pollina, 
a Progressive Party candidate.  Pollina supported full marriage rights for same-
sex couples and garnered over 9% of the vote.  Ruth Dwyer, who hoped to ride 
a wave of anti-liberal elitism into power, had a lackluster showing at slightly 
below 38%.  Dwyer took a smaller share of the vote in 2000 than she did two 
years earlier.  In addition to reelecting Dean, Vermonters narrowly returned 
the lieutenant governor, a same-sex marriage supporter, for another term. 
The Take Back Vermont movement scared a number of key advocates 
for equal marriage and resonated within Vermont political circles for some 
years to come.  There is evidence that the initial reactions to Baker in Vermont 
polarized the public, but little basis to conclude there was a groundswell of 
backlash to the civil union law.  In fact, much of the anti-civil union pushback 
in Vermont was bootstrapped onto other festering complaints rural Vermont-
ers held against liberals.  The record offers little support for the proposition 
Baker independently spurred a widespread disquiet in the electorate.   
Turning west, parallels between Vermont and California are noticeable.  
At least one longstanding polling firm, Field, has measured Californians’ 
temperature on same-sex marriage as far back as 1977 and with regularity 
since the 1990s.  In addition to Field, the Public Policy Institute of California 
(“PPIC”) has consistently polled Californians’ support for equal marriage 
rights.  In 1977, “[A] poll of Californians showed a cold reception for gay 
rights, only 28 percent of Californians supported extending marriage rights 
to same-sex couples.”171  In the course of nearly a quarter century, the data 
exposes an uptick in support for equal marriage legalization, but no signifi-
cant softening in opposition.  
Polling data showing opposition to same-sex marriage in the high 50 to 
low 60 percentage range bore out in a 2000 California initiative to ban same-
sex marriage.  In 2000, California voters endorsed Proposition 22, also 
known as the Knight Initiative, to enshrine into state family law that “only 
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”  
Proposition 22 won majority support in all but six of the state’s fifty-eight 
counties, with all six counties clustered in the San Francisco Bay Area.  In 
all, Proposition 22 took 61 percent of the vote, with 38 percent of voters 
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opposed.  The defeat for equal marriage rights was resounding but mapped 
onto the previous near-25 years of polling data.  
Majority support in California for equal marriage was not registered until 
May 2008 when the California State Supreme Court legalized same-sex 
marriage.  Before the state Supreme Court struck down California’s statu-
tory same-sex marriage ban, public opinion was generally stable.  In the 
early 2000s, both the Field Poll and Public Policy Institute of California poll-
ing indicates support for equal marriage in the state hovered in the mid-to-
low 40 percent range.172 
California voters narrowly voted to overturn the California Supreme 
Court and ban same-sex marriage in November 2008.173  Importantly, vot-
ers’ willingness to oppose gay and lesbian rights was softer in 2008 than 2000. 
Fifty-two percent of voters opted to ban same-sex marriage, a near 10 per-
cent drop from 2000.174  PPIC polls indicate support for same-sex marriage 
cracked the 50% mark in March 2010 when the trial challenging Proposition 
8 was underway.  The Californian electorate was stable between February 
2006 and March 2010, during the heat of litigation.175  
Polling data in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Iowa is thin compared 
to California, particularly with respect to polling prior to each of those states’ 
courts ruling in favor of same-sex couples.  In Massachusetts, polls from April 
and November 2003, before the Goodridge decision, indicated opposition to 
same-sex marriage rested in the 40 percent range.  The polls registered op-
position at 44 and 43 percent, respectively.  Resistance to full marriage 
recognition spiked by 10 point in the wake of the Supreme Judicial Court’s 
ruling.  That February 2004 poll reported support for Goodridge’s outcome 
sunk to 35 percent from the earlier polls that recorded a near majority of 
Massachusetts residents supporting same-sex couples’ right to marry.  
The high court may have enabled this backlash when it gave the Massa-
chusetts General Court 180 days to enact legislation before Goodridge took 
effect.  The delay may have allowed for the stoking of opposition and build-
ing of tension as the dissolution of the stay drew nearer.  Nearly a year after 
Goodridge took effect and same-sex couples married in the Bay State, the pub-
lic warmed to the constitutionalization of same-sex marriage, with polling 
indicating slightly higher support for equal marriage in March 2005 than 
existed before the court ruled.176 
In Connecticut, three polls examined the level of support for gay marriage 
rights prior to the state supreme court ruling in Kerrigan in 2008.  Continuity 
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was a hallmark across the polls taken in 2003, 2004, and 2005.  Support for 
marriage lied in the low-to-mid forties and opposition in the low fifties.177  The 
April 2005 poll showed the greatest amount of opposition and a small decline 
in public acceptance of same-sex marriage.  Complicating analysis here, how-
ever, is the fact that no polling took place between April 2005 and December 
2008.  Thus, while there was a ten-point gap trending toward a pro-gay mar-
riage position after Kerrigan, there is no hard evidence to conclude the court 
caused it.  However, it is reasonable to infer from the numbers that, at a min-
imum, the court’s decision did not prompt a backlash.178 
Like California, Iowa presents a more complicated landscape for analysis.  
Three polls were taken in Iowa on same-sex marriage before Varnum, the 
first in September 2003.  In the first poll in the field, respondents overwhelm-
ingly objected to marriage for non-heterosexuals by a margin of 65 to 23.  
However, the next Iowa poll was not until 2008, placing that five-year span 
in a black box.  By 2008, there was a small rise in the public’s approval of 
same-sex marriage.  That small gain of supporters was matched with a nearly 
equally small sag in opposition, polling in 2008 showed 62 percent of Iowans 
rejected same-sex marriage. 
Whatever stability public opposition in Iowa held prior to 2009 was dis-
turbed radically around the time the Iowa Supreme Court struck down the 
state’s exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage.  Between polls taken 
four months prior to the Iowa Supreme Court’s ruling in April 2009 and 5 
months after the decision, opposition decreased by 19 points.  The precipi-
tous softening of opposition to same-sex marriage supports the legitimization 
hypothesis.  The September 2009 poll marked the first time that equal mar-
riage supporters and opponents were statistically tied.  No poll found major-
ity support of Varnum until 2014, but support steadily rose throughout the 
span between 2009 and 2014.179 
B.  National Temperature 
In the ten-year span between March 1996 and May 2006, Gallup’s 
polling on same-sex marriage indicated a 12% increase in support for same-
sex marriage.  Most of that early change occurred by February 1999 prior to 
Baker, Lawrence, and Goodridge, but after the Hawaii litigation, DOMA’s 
enactment, and Romer v. Evans.180  In March 2004, Gallup’s Frank Newport 
observed that between 1999 and 2004 “little changed from responses to 
surveys.”181  In their review of same-sex marriage opinion trends, Brewer and 
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Wilcox describe the period between 1988 and 2004 as one of “striking 
stability” where there was “no durable trend in public support” for same-sex 
marriage.182  In 2006, Persily, Eagan, and Wallsten echoed Newport, Brewer, 
and Wilcox, determining that “support for the legalization of same-sex 
marriage has risen only slightly since 1996.”183  Rosenberg’s treatment of 
polling data in 2008 fell in line with these earlier conclusions that “public 
opinion data don’t support the claim that litigation on behalf of same-sex 
marriage substantially increased support for it.”184 
Nationally, support for same-sex marriage was more muted between 
2004 and 2009 than in states moving toward same-sex marriage rights, but 
it was not stagnant.  Examining Gallup’s data on the question, opposition to 
same-sex marriage did not fall below 50% until May 2011, just weeks before 
New York’s Governor Andrew Cuomo signed the Marriage Equality Act.185  
Support for equal marriage never dipped below the 50% mark after May 
2012.186  Increased support over the long term for same-sex marriage meets 
the expectations of legitimization theory.  However, the lag in time between 
the first pro-LGB marriage rights rulings and rising levels of support makes 
the connection between the two slightly attenuated.   
The relative stability in public opinion between the 1990s and early 2000s 
did not last.  In the time between December 2003 after Goodridge was decided 
and May 2013 before the Supreme Court ruled in Windsor, public support for 
same-sex marriage rose from 31% to 53%.187  That trend—indicative of a 
legitimizing effect—continued after Windsor.  In May 2015, Gallup recorded 
public support for same-sex marriage at 60%.  The most significant period of 
change in the Gallup data was between March 2005 and May 2011.188  In 
2005, support for same-sex marriage bottomed at 28%.  Majority support for 
equal marriage was registered in the May 2011 Gallup poll.189  This time 
period was litigation intensive.  Adding onto wins in Vermont and 
Massachusetts,190 LGB advocates scored victories for relationship recognition 
in California, Connecticut, Iowa, and New Jersey prior to any state legislatively 
adopted equal marriage rights for gay couples.191  Unsuccessful litigation 
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concluded in the courts of last resort in Maryland, New York, Oregon, and 
Washington.192  In 2009, the first legislative enactments of equal marriage took 
place in Vermont and New Hampshire.193  Maine also passed same-sex 
marriage legislation that was rejected by voters prior to it taking effect.194 
The two polls Gallup initiated with the shortest time gap between them 
were conducted in this period.  Gallup’s poll in May 2005 saw a ten-point 
increase in public support for recognition of same-sex marriage from March 
2005.  Opposition dropped twelve points in the May survey.  The March 
poll registered the lowest amount of support for equal marriage since Febru-
ary 1999.195  In the interim that the two polls were in the field, Superior 
Court Judge Richard Kramer struck down California’s same-sex marriage 
ban on March 14, 2005.196  None of Gallup’s polls conducted in 2006 or after 
recorded support for same-sex marriage recognition below 39%.197  That 
single data point fails to find corroboration in polls in California where there 
was little movement in the same time period. 
While aggregate polling data lends some support to the legitimization hy-
pothesis, it is necessary to look at structural shifts undergirding the aggregate 
changes in public opinion to better parse out what effect court rulings may 
have had on public attitudes on marriage rights for gay couples. 
These data from Gallup recording whether Americans were satisfied or 
dissatisfied with the acceptance of gays and lesbians is telling.  Prior to 2004, 
satisfaction levels remained fairly stable between 35 and 40%.198  
Dissatisfaction with LGB acceptance began to shift in 2004.  The number of 
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Americans dissatisfied and wishing for less acceptance of sexual minorities 
peaked between 2004 and 2006, at the same time the largest rise in those 
dissatisfied and wanting more acceptance occurred.199  Indeed, the 
percentage of Americans voicing displeasure with the lack of progress on gay 
rights peaked in 2007, at 22%, which later dwindled to 10% by 2016.200  
The data indicate that events between 2004 and 2008 caused disruption in 
Americans’ mood on LGB issues.  Between 2004 and 2008, no states took 
legislative action to advance same-sex marriage, though four offered civil unions 
or substantially similar state recognition.201  Statewide nondiscrimination 
legislation covering private entities also progressed during this time in five states.  
If court rulings can arouse the passions of individuals to demand more 
acceptance and legal protections, then there should be a corresponding rise 
in the number of Americans calling for greater acceptance of gays and lesbians 
after major judicial victories.  The polling trend between 2004 and 2012 
mirrors what the rights consciousness thesis predicts.  Prior to 2004, there was 
little movement in the number of Americans clamoring for greater social 
approval of sexual minorities.  Each year, the percentage of respondents in 
this category fell within a three-point margin.202  After 2004, in the wake of 
Lawrence and Goodridge and in the midst of marriage controversies in states 
across the nation, there is a discernable upward trend in the percentage of 
Americans wanting greater acceptance of gays and lesbians.  
Equally interesting, this set of polling offers insight into the legitimization 
hypothesis’ validity.  If courts are legitimizing actors, then a decrease in 
Americans expressing a preference for less tolerance of gays and lesbians de-
spite a rise in legal protections for gays and lesbians, including rulings favor-
ing same-sex marriage, should be evident.  If courts are incapable of moving 
the public in their direction as the Constrained Court Theory indicates, then 
little movement or a rise in the number of Americans expressing dissatisfac-
tion with the growing social embrace of LGB rights will be detected.  Be-
tween 2003 and 2006, there was a small increase in the number of respond-
ents expressing a preference for less social acceptance of gays and lesbians.203  
After peaking in 2006 where it was two points shy of being the plurality po-
sition, the number of Americans holding a negative viewpoint of gay and 
lesbian tolerance dropped precipitously.  By 2015, 14% of Americans re-
jected the improved standing of gays and lesbians—halved from the 30% of 
Americans with that view in 2006.204 
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A few demographic factors warrant exploration.  First, the rise in the 
public’s aggregate warming toward LGB rights could be due to generational 
replacement.  Polling reveals distinct generational gaps in support for same-
sex marriage.  Younger Americans are more likely to support equal marriage.  
If younger Americans are more socially liberal, as their share of the electorate 
rises, one would expect to see the overall trend favor equal marriage rights.  
If favorable changes in the public’s overall support for equal marriage rights 
are generational, claims that judicial legitimization is responsible for the shift 
are undermined.  
Millennials born after 1981, for example, on average supported same-sex 
marriage double the rate of Americans born between 1928 and 1945.205  
Baby Boomers, born between 1946 and 1964, were more supportive of same-
sex marriage than the generation before, but less supportive than Americans 
born 1965 and later.206  Interestingly, however, support for same-sex couples 
rose among all these groups between 2001 and 2013.  Support among all of 
these generational groups bottomed out between 2003 and 2004, but in the 
following years, each age group’s increased level of support was steep.  Sup-
port for LGB couples among the Silent Generation (persons born between 
1928 and 1945) nearly doubled between 2003 and 2013, while support 
among Millennials jumped nineteen points.207 
Another consideration worth exploring is whether Americans were ex-
posed to more LGB people between 2004 and 2009.  One of the strongest 
arguments from scholars and pundits alike that judicial intervention in gay 
rights was unnecessary for the marriage movement’s success is that the num-
ber of openly LGB persons has risen over time, and the public’s exposure to 
LGB persons softened opposition to marriage rights.  Polling shows that 
Americans who had openly LGB friends and relatives were more likely to 
support same-sex marriage.208 
The causal link here, however, is unclear.  On one hand, greater exposure 
to sexual minorities may well enhance the likelihood of one’s support for 
sexual minority rights.  On the other hand, it could also be true that persons 
with more liberal attitudes on sexuality may signal a receptiveness that 
induces LGB people to be open with those already socially liberal persons.  
One poll looking at the percentage of Americans who personally knew an 
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LGB person in 2003, 2004, 2008, and 2009 did not show a significant shift 
in the number of Americans who had personal ties to openly LGB people.  
Comparing polling data between 1992 and 2010 shows a sharp uptick in 
the number of Americans who knew someone gay or lesbian—56% of 
Americans in 1992 did not know someone gay or lesbian.209  By 2010, an 
overwhelming number of Americans personally knew a person who 
identified as gay or lesbian and six in ten Americans had close family 
members or friends who were openly gay.210  
When asked why they supported same-sex marriage rights in 2012 and 
2013, polling responses suggest that personal relationships with LGB friends 
and family members impacted many Americans’ views.  In a 2013 Pew poll, 
14% of respondents said they had once opposed equal marriage but changed 
their mind.211  These respondents were then allowed to provide open-ended 
responses as to what caused them to change.  A 32% plurality mentioned 
openly LGB friends, family members, and acquaintances as having some 
influence on their decision-making process.212  However, a significant 
number of the proffered factors included changing world events and an 
increasing awareness of same-sex marriage.   
A 2012 Gallup poll also asked supporters of same-sex marriage the reason 
for their support.  The number of respondents that pointed to friends and 
family members failed to crack double digits at 9%.213  The top two justifica-
tions Gallup recorded for interviewees’ same-sex marriage support refer-
enced equal rights and personal happiness. 214  As a follow up question, re-
spondents who stated they changed their minds on same-sex marriage were 
asked for open-ended rationales for their shift in opinion.  Mirroring the 2013 
Pew results, generic responses of becoming more aware and tolerant were 
the top two reasons offered.  Contrary to the Pew findings, only 3% of those 
polled mentioned close LGB friends, relatives, and acquaintances as impact-
ing their change of heart.215  Thus, by the public’s own account, personal 
connections alone were not overwhelmingly responsible for attitude shifts in 
favor of equal marriage. 
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C.  Mood Shifts: Courts or the Secularization of America? 
The 2012 Gallup survey which asked respondents to offer explanations 
for their opposition to same-sex marriage were generally religious in nature.  
A 47% plurality of marriage equality opponents cited religion generally or 
the Bible as an explanation for their opposition.216  These numbers reflect 
the dominant narrative in state legislation and referenda concerning equal 
marriage opposition.  Could the rise in support for same-sex couples’ free-
dom to marry be part of a broader secularizing America? 
Polling data showing Americans’ attendance at religious services and 
those who say religion plays an important role in their life reveal relative sta-
bility in the public’s religious conduct.  Americans who indicate they at-
tended religious services within the last week has hovered around the 40% 
mark between 1992 and 2014.217  When asked how important religion was 
in their lives, a majority of Americans ranked religion as being “very im-
portant” in their lives over this period.218  There is a slight, but noticeable 
downward trend between 2004 and 2008, with those describing religion as 
“very important” sliding from 61% to 54%.219  
D.  Conclusion 
Measuring the cause-and-effect relationship between judicial decisions 
expanding same-sex marriage rights and relationship recognition rights more 
generally is a difficult task.  Nevertheless, the convergence of evidence offers 
credence to claims that the courts had a role in legitimizing same-sex mar-
riage with the public.  While state-level data collection was less robust than 
nationwide surveying, state court litigation appears to have disrupted stable 
levels of opposition and support in their wake, with the public mood trending 
toward the courts’ decisions.  
National polling also reveals that litigation-related disruption of public 
opinion between 2004 and 2008 gave rise to long-term acceptance of gay 
rights.  As marriages began in Massachusetts and state court litigation picked 
up steam, the number of Americans satisfied with gay rights nosedived.  In fact, 
the highest recorded percentage of Americans who were dissatisfied with the 
state of acceptance for gay and lesbians peaked in 2007.  In 2008, the smallest 
amount of separation between Americans satisfied and unsatisfied (both those 
who wanted more and less acceptance of sexual minorities) was recorded.  By 
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2016, Americans who were satisfied with acceptance of gays and lesbians or 
wanted greater acceptance outnumbered detractors 70% to 13%, a shift from 
the 51% to 30% margin in 2004.220  This evidence is consistent with the rights 
consciousness hypothesis’ expectations that rulings favoring same-sex marriage 
and rights for sexual minorities feeds a civil rights awareness that translates into 
more demands for expanded rights and acceptance. 
If the Constrained Court Theory is correct, there should be no noticeable 
shift in public opinion after judicial victories.  Conversely, if legitimization 
theory accurately captures the impact of litigation, we should discern signifi-
cant shifts in the public’s reception favoring civil rights for LGB persons in 
the wake of successful litigation.  Given the paucity of data prior to 2000, 
caution is warranted against overstating the weight of the evidence.   Mindful 
of that and the general limitations on drawing conclusions from polling data, 
the Constrained Court Theory does not square with polling on either the 
state or national level.  The polling between 1996 and 2004 shows little 
movement in the public’s mood favoring same-sex marriage, but there were 
significant shifts in the direction of equal marriage advocates between 2005 
and 2011 during which marriages continued in Massachusetts, more courts 
extended to same-sex couples the freedom to marry, and two states success-
fully enacted and implemented marriage equality legislation. 
IV.  THE STATUTORY EVOLUTION OF FAMILY LAW  
Beginning in the late 1990s, state legislators debated extending relation-
ship recognition rights to same-sex couples.  Some legislatures acted in re-
sponse to a court mandate to extend rights; some legislatures acted after free-
dom to marry litigation failed; and other legislatures acted without any threat 
of judicial intervention.  In this section, I chronologically examine legislative 
action in states that recognized same-sex marriage before 2013 to test the 
political reinforcement thesis and the rights consciousness hypothesis.  The 
evidentiary record of same-sex marriage in the legislative process is recon-
structed in this section through a variety of sources including floor debate 
transcripts, interviews with elected officials, recordings of legislative testi-
mony, and contemporary media accounts.  
We should expect to see, consistent with the principles outlined in the 
Constrained Court Theory, that the stronger the support from legislators, 
including blocking constitutional amendments to overturn a decision or en-
acting substantive legislation in support of a decision, the more effective a 
court’s ruling.  Testing the rights consciousness hypothesis, we should expect 
to see that judicial rulings in favor of LGB rights and same-sex relationship 
recognition motivated elected officials to take action.  Another important 
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pattern we should see—if the rights consciousness theory is valid—is that 
successful litigation made the issue of LGB civil rights more salient, prompt-
ing legislators to consider the merits of enacting pro-LGB legislation.  
In this section, I will examine the legislative activity that resulted in the 
status quo changing years before the Supreme Court struck down DOMA in 
Windsor v. United States.  The primary goal in this section is to understand 
legislators’ motivations and their varied responses to litigation and court de-
cisions in their own states and across the country.    
A.  Hawaii 
Hawaii’s same-sex marriage litigation was the first in the United States 
that appeared poised for success.  The Supreme Court of Hawaii’s instruc-
tion to the trial court that same-sex couples’ marriage exclusion claim trig-
gered strict scrutiny signaled that the advent of same-sex marriage recogni-
tion in Hawaii was a fait accompli.221  Upon remand, the trial court ruled 
against the state in December 1996.222  However, Judge Kevin Chang stayed 
his ruling despite believing the state’s likelihood to prevail on the merits in 
the Supreme Court of Hawaii “was ‘not particularly tremendous.’”223  
In 1997, the Hawaii State Legislature moved to curb the state courts’ 
jurisdiction over same-sex couples’ state constitutional rights as it pertained 
to relationship recognition by proposing an amendment to the state consti-
tution.  That amendment, successfully ratified by the voters in 1998, removed 
the question of same-sex marriage from judicial review, but it did not fore-
close the legislature from enacting equal marriage rights for same-sex couples 
or affording same-sex couples with other forms of relationship recognition.224 
The same year legislators submitted that constitutional amendment to vot-
ers, they created a state reciprocal beneficiary registry.225  Hawaii’s reciprocal 
beneficiary partnerships afforded couples otherwise prohibited from marrying 
to make medical decisions, bring wrongful death actions, receive worker’s 
compensation survival benefits, assume inheritance rights, own property by 
tenancy by the entirety, take emergency medical leave for their partner, earn 
state pension benefits, and obtain insurance covering a partner.226  The law 
did not provide for joint adoption rights, mandated private healthcare insur-
ance, joint tax filings, judicial dissolution of the partnership, spousal support 
if the couple separated, or spousal privilege in legal proceedings.  
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Unlike marriage or marriage-like relationship recognition by the state, 
Hawaii’s law created a relationship status that was easy to enter and almost 
as easy to exit.  As William Eskridge argued, Hawaii’s registry law 
“present[ed] [same-sex couples] with a bundle of rights and benefits [but] 
den[ied] them the duties and obligations associated with state-recognized 
marriage.  That is, the state promised to honor reciprocal beneficiaries’ rights 
to make decisions for one another and receive benefits but did not impose 
obligations on the couples.”227 
Hawaii did not successfully pass a bill in the legislature to expand rela-
tionship recognition for same-sex couples until 2010.228  The legislature sent 
Republican Governor Linda Lingle a bill creating civil unions—a relation-
ship recognition that served as a functional equivalent to marriage in all but 
name.229  Lingle vetoed the civil union bill on July 6, 2010, and Lambda 
Legal and the ACLU filed a lawsuit on July 29, 2010.230  The groups argued 
that the Hawaii Constitution required civil unions for same-sex couples even 
though the legislature retained the constitutional prerogative to limit mar-
riage to opposite-sex couples.231 
After pro-LGBT Neil Abercrombie was elected to serve as Hawaii’s 
governor, civil union legislation had the promise of becoming law.  In January 
2011, the Hawaii Senate voted 19-6232 and the House of Representatives 31-19 
to enact civil unions.233  Abercrombie signed the law, which became effective the 
following January.234  After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Windsor, Hawaii took 
the final step and enacted a marriage equality statute in November 2013.235 
Hawaii’s same-sex marriage litigation was a mixed success.  On one hand 
it raised the profile of same-sex marriage and was successful on the merits in 
the judicial process.  Conversely, the litigation fell short because unsupport-
ive legislators submitted a constitutional amendment for popular approval to 
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foreclose it.  The failure of same-sex marriage litigation in Hawaii is attribut-
able to opposition in the Hawaii State Legislature, as the political reinforce-
ment thesis predicts.  However, Hawaii’s enactment of a state-sanctioned re-
lationship status for same-sex couples illustrates a major step for same-sex 
couples’ rights, consistent with what we would expect to see if the rights con-
sciousness thesis is correct.  The events in Hawaii spurred action in other 
states, including Vermont.  The chain of events that unfurled there between 
1999 and 2000 culminated in the greatest single advancement of equal treat-
ment for same-sex couples.  
B.  Vermont 
Inspired by the prospect of civil marriage for gay couples in Hawaii, law-
yers Beth Robinson and Susan Murray helped found the Vermont Freedom 
to Marry Task Force in 1995.236  The Task Force’s mission was to train Ver-
monters to speak to their communities about same-sex marriage and partic-
ipate in local events such as county fairs.237  The Task Force’s work was grass-
roots in nature until three same-sex couples approached Robinson and 
Murray and asked to challenge Vermont’s marriage law.238  Robinson and 
Murray, joined by co-counsel Mary Bonauto of the Gay and Lesbian Advo-
cates and Defenders, filed suit in 1997.239  
In December 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled in Baker v. State 
that state legislators must provide all of the rights and responsibilities of mar-
riage to same-sex couples but could do so under another name.  The court 
punted the fight over equal marriage to the state legislature.240  In a short 
three-day window, the Task Force hastily drew up a legislative strategy.241   
Prior legislation concerning same-sex relationship recognition did not 
fare well.  Bills to enact domestic partnerships with limited visitation rights 
failed in 1992 and 1993 in the House Judiciary Committee.242  Another bill 
creating domestic partnerships equivalent to marriage failed in the 1993–
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1994 legislative session.243  No bill to recognize same-sex relationships was 
filed in the 1999–2000 session of the legislature before Baker.  
Task Force members understood from the get-go that equal marriage 
legislation was unlikely.  Lacking an appetite to expand marriage, legislators 
created a parallel institution called a “civil union”—a term coined in the 
Vermont Judiciary Committee.244  The outcome disappointed same-sex cou-
ples’ advocates, but it did not surprise them.245   
Setbacks notwithstanding, there were important developments for same-
sex marriage advocates.  Bill Lippert, an openly gay six-year veteran of the 
Vermont House of Representatives, was Vice Chairman of the House Judi-
ciary Committee in 2000.  After the civil union fight, Lippert resolved to 
press on for marriage equality and continue his service in the House.  “I de-
cided to stay in the legislature until we had full marriage equality,” Lippert 
said.246  For other legislative leaders, the Baker decision marked the first time 
they were provoked to seriously contemplate the merits of marriage equality.  
Shap Smith, who became the Vermont House Speaker in 2008, said, “I 
started to really think about [marriage equality] when Vermont was discuss-
ing the Baker decision.”247  A main sponsor of the 2009 marriage equality bill, 
Senator Claire Ayer, said that she first started thinking about marriage rights 
“when the decision in Vermont came down on the civil unions case.”248 
Similarly, House member David Zuckerman, a primary sponsor of both 
the 2000 and 2009 marriage equality bills, recalled: 
I was in the legislature when the Vermont Supreme Court made the Baker 
decision. . . . Prior to that, I don’t believe marriage equality was on my radar 
screen.  But that [the announcement of Baker] was the first time when I can 
put my finger on it and say I would work on marriage equality.249 
Representative David Deen was also an early marriage supporter.  Deen 
reflected, “I never really thought of marriage as being a civil right until the 
Supreme Court decision.  I just had never thought of it. . . . And then the [Ver-
mont] Supreme Court decision came down and I saw it very differently.”250  
Other Vermont leaders said Baker marked the beginning of their same-sex 
marriage advocacy.  Vermont House Speaker Michael Obuchowski said that 
“[i]t was the court decision in Baker” where he started thinking about same-sex 
couples’ rights.  “The fact that the Baker decision said that human beings’ rights 
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were being violated was a great motivator for me.  I tried to put myself in the 
plaintiffs’ situation and decided I wouldn’t want my rights violated.”251 
The House Judiciary Committee Chair, Republican Tom Little, also 
pointed to Baker as a watershed moment.  Little played a pivotal role in both 
2000 and 2009.  Little authored the civil union law and later chaired the Legis-
lature’s Commission examining marriage rights for same-sex couples in the lead 
up to the 2009 legislative session.  Little explained how Baker influenced him: 
I never sought elected office with gay marriage or gay rights as one of my 
reasons for running. . . . It was pretty much the litigation that brought it to 
my mind. . . . I read the Supreme Court decision and I agreed with it.  The 
only defense the Attorney General put up was procreation, which turned out 
to be a pretty lame reason to hang the whole thing on.252 
Like Little, Governor Howard Dean credited the Vermont Supreme 
Court for raising awareness about the inadequacies of family law.  Dean said 
that issues concerning same-sex couples were not “on his radar.”  Dean did 
not publicly support marriage equality until 2009, but he said that his gradual 
favoring of same-sex marriage dated back to 1999.  Dean recalled: 
Viscerally, I was uncomfortable with [same-sex marriage in 1999].  I grew 
up in a time [when] homophobia was okay.  I often say that if you were gay 
when I was in high school you’d get your ass kicked.  But, I was always very 
much for the underdog and for civil rights.  I knew out gay people and I 
wasn’t a flaming homophobe.  But, the idea of two men marrying?  I was 
like, “What?”  I was uncomfortable with it.  I think there were a lot of people 
like me who started out like me.  I never opposed it.  The court decision 
prompted me to think about it because the legislature was told they needed 
to do something about it.  After I sat down and people explained to me the 
1700 rights you didn’t get, it was pretty obvious to me that it wasn’t about 
sex—it was about equal rights.253 
Despite failing to attain what they set out to achieve in 1997, the Task 
Force’s leadership and same-sex couples secured a modest victory in Baker.  
Ultimately, the Vermont Supreme Court decision resulted in a “separate-
but-equal” relationship recognition status for same-sex couples.  The inven-
tion of civil unions in Vermont is complicated to assess in terms of success.  
On one hand, civil unions were subordinate institutions to marriage, but on 
the other, they offered same-sex couples direly needed tangible benefits and 
responsibilities of marriage.  Because the Vermont Supreme Court allotted 
the political branches some discretion to craft a remedy, the effectiveness of 
Baker was acutely reliant on the support of the governor and legislators, as 
the political reinforcement thesis predicts.  
The fact that Baker did not extend marriage eligibility to the LGB com-
munity in the short term made it less effective than if the Vermont Legislature 
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had approved a marriage bill.  Whatever its symbolic shortcomings, they 
should not detract from the unmistakable milestone of the Vermont civil un-
ions legislation, which accorded marriage in all but name to same-sex couples.  
Importantly, nothing suggests that Vermont legislators were eager to expand 
any official status to same-sex couples prior to Baker.  Michael Obuchowski, 
who held the Speaker post from 1995 to 2001, said that the momentum to act 
and protect gay couples “all generated from the court decision.”254  All three 
domestic partnership bills introduced in the 1990s failed to gain traction.  No 
bills were filed to address domestic relations and sexual minorities during the 
1999–2000 session before Baker.  Tom Little corroborated this point: 
I think but for the Baker decision you would’ve never had civil unions in Ver-
mont.  I think people may have introduced domestic partnership legislation 
or marriage legislation.  After the Massachusetts decision, and if Vermont 
still didn’t have litigation pending, there would have [been] a greater effort 
but I think it would’ve faced an uphill battle.255 
In this sense, the post-Baker landscape in Vermont is a paradox.  While Baker’s 
success was proportional to legislators’ political will to craft legislation and block 
constitutional amendments to overturn it, there are no facts in the record 
indicating the legislature was imminently poised to act on its own volition. 
The inadequacies of “separate-but-equal” institutions aside, the Baker de-
cision helped put in place a few key stepping stones for the Task Force from 
which they could build a legislative leadership team and buttress a pro-mar-
riage coalition.  When the Task Force pushed for equal marriage legislation 
in 2009, these incomplete victories post-Baker proved indispensable.  
C.  Massachusetts  
While Massachusetts’ Goodridge decision was pioneering,256 the political 
branches grappled with LGB rights long before it was handed down.  Sixteen 
years after its initial introduction, the legislature enacted legislation in 1989 pro-
hibiting sexual orientation discrimination in employment, housing, and public 
accommodations.257  That progress notwithstanding, Massachusetts continued 
to discriminate against LGB persons from becoming foster parents.258  That 
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policy was challenged in court and ended in early 1990.259  A subsequent effort 
to reinstate the policy through a budget provision was vetoed.260 
In 1993, Republican Governor William Weld said he was not in favor of 
same-sex marriage, though he later credited Goodridge for helping him come 
to support marriage equality.261  Weld’s Administration did, however, usher 
in considerable gains for same-sex couples.  In 1992, Weld extended some 
benefits to state employees’ same-sex partners.262  In 1996, despite fellow Re-
publicans’ fierce opposition to same-sex unions, Weld pledged to recognize 
out-of-state same-sex marriages.263  
In 1998, the General Court (Massachusetts’s legislature) advanced legis-
lation that would allow Boston to establish domestic partnerships with limited 
benefits open to same-sex and opposite-sex couples.264  Republican Governor 
Paul Cellucci opposed a domestic partnership law that included opposite-sex 
couples, believing it undermined marriage, and vetoed it.265 
In 1999, Democratic State Representative John Rogers filed a bill to 
block the Commonwealth from recognizing out-of-state same-sex mar-
riages.266  The 1999 bill never gained traction, but Rogers filed another in 
2001 to ban local domestic partnerships and Massachusetts from recognizing 
same-sex marriages and out-of-state civil unions.267  That same year, seven 
same-sex couples filed suit in state court challenging the constitutionality of 
the Commonwealth’s domestic relations laws to the extent the laws excluded 
same-sex couples from marriage rights.268   
In July 2001, Massachusetts Citizens for Marriage successfully petitioned 
to amend the state constitution, banning same-sex marriage.269  The Massa-
chusetts Constitution’s amendment procedure allows citizens to submit pro-
posals that meet a requisite number of petition signatures for the General 
Court’s consideration in joint session.270  If an offered amendment receives 
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25% of the General Court members’ approval—fifty votes in all—in to suc-
cessive sessions the proposal is submitted as a ballot question and is ratified 
by an affirmative majority vote.271 
Under the state constitution, the joint session is led by the president of 
the Massachusetts Senate.272  Senate President Tom Birmingham convened 
a session on June 19, 2002, and immediately adjourned it for a month.273  
Birmingham opposed Massachusetts’s Citizens for Marriage campaign and 
amending the constitution to restrict the marriage recognition to opposite-
sex couples.274  Upon legislators’ return on July 17, Birmingham again moved 
for an immediate adjournment.  The adjournment motion carried 137-53—
a sufficient number of votes to move the amendment on the merits.275  
Unsuccessful, proponents of the amendment turned back to the legislative 
process, offering a final pre-Goodridge anti-gay amendment push in April 
2003.  The effort failed to get any language out of committee.276 
The General Court before Goodridge was in a holding pattern as elected 
officials showed little desire to recognize same-sex partners.  This was due to 
socially conservative leadership in the House of Representatives, unlike in 
the Senate where civil unions were under discussion.277  LGB rights activists 
held out little hope of seeing favorable legislation enacted, as openly gay Mas-
sachusetts State Representative Liz Malia reflected: 
Our discussions were mostly around domestic partnership benefits.  And 
that had been the battle for the last few terms. . . .  
I think it’s probably pretty fair to say that, with some intensive discussions 
with leadership, where we thought we would be able to move would be 
toward domestic partners, but with DOMA language. . . .  
I think that we had really hit a stalemate before the Goodridge decision 
arrived.278 
One member of the Massachusetts House Judiciary Committee in 2004, 
Representative David Paul Linsky, echoed Malia’s grim outlook.  Linsky 
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estimated that some form of domestic partner legislation might have had 
support in the chamber, but that it was doomed because of opposition from 
House leadership.279  As for civil unions or marriage, Linsky said that but for 
Goodridge, Massachusetts would have had to wait.  Without the Supreme 
Judicial Court’s intervention, Linsky offered, “[A marriage bill] would never 
have gotten out of committee.  Whether or not a formal vote was taken, the 
bill would not come out.  At most, it would have been put into a ‘legislative 
study,’ which is a graveyard.”280 
When the Massachusetts high court handed down the Goodridge decision, 
the court stayed the ruling for 180 days.281  A month after the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court’s decision, the Massachusetts Senate submitted proposed legis-
lation for the court’s advisory review.282  The language referred to the court 
created Vermont-styled civil unions.283  The following February, the court 
opined that the Senate’s proposal, creating a subordinate civil union right for 
same-sex couples and preserving marriage for opposite-sex couples, was con-
stitutionality infirm, even if the distinction was in name only.284  The court 
reasoned that creating a separate name for state recognition of same-sex cou-
ples’ relationships relegated LGB persons to “second-class status.”285  
Anti-marriage equality advocates amassed support for abrogating 
Goodridge.  Of note, Archbishop Patrick O’Malley, leader of the Catholic 
Church in Boston, called for a constitutional convention to ban same-sex 
marriage.286  Then Governor Mitt Romney echoed O’Malley and backed a 
state constitutional amendment.287  Proponents of equal marriage rights mo-
bilized as well, forming a new pro-LGBT interest group: MassEquality.288  
The legislature met again in February to consider two legislatively 
proposed amendments to ban same-sex marriage, requiring 100 votes in the 
affirmative over two successive legislative sessions.289  Ultimately, legislators 
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defeated a proposed amendment, which was silent on civil unions but would 
have defined  marriage as the union of a man and a woman, 94-103.290  In 
March, the General Court gave its blessing by a margin of 105-92 to an 
amendment that would foreclose same-sex marriage but establish civil 
unions.291  In addition, the amendment included a provision disallowing the 
federal government from recognizing civil unions as a marriage for federal 
benefits.292  The amendment now required majority approval by legislators in 
2005, before it could be placed on the November 2006 ballot for ratification.293  
In the interim period, the Romney Administration prepared for imple-
mentation of Goodridge.  One area of controversy arose over the 1913 law that 
disallowed out-of-state persons to marry in Massachusetts if it was not legal 
for them to marry in their home state.294  In a forceful statement arguing for 
the strict application of the out-of-state validity requirement, Romney said, 
“Massachusetts should not become the Las Vegas of same-sex marriage. . . . 
We do not intend to export our marriage confusion to the entire nation.”295  
As controversy brewed over non-residents’ marriage applications, the 
Administration prepared to update the ministerial functions for licensing 
clerks.  Governor Romney’s legal counsel issued a memorandum instructing 
Justices of the Peace to resign if they were unwilling to perform same-sex 
marriages.296  The Administration rolled out new licensing forms, eliminat-
ing gendered language.297  Marriages began on May 17, 2004.298 
In September 2005, legislators were called to vote on the proposed consti-
tutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage and create civil unions.299  The 
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measure failed 157-39.300  Rank-and-file legislators backed away from the pro-
posal, as did one co-sponsor of the amendment, Republican State Senator 
Brian Lees, who explained his decision, “Gay marriage has begun, and life has 
not changed for the citizens of the commonwealth, with the exception of those 
who can now marry. . . . This amendment which was an appropriate measure 
or compromise a year ago, is no longer, I feel, a compromise today.”301  
Same-sex marriage opponents now returned to a voter-initiated amend-
ment process that would require only fifty votes rather than a majority of 
legislators to submit the anti-gay marriage amendment to the voters.302  The 
anti-Goodridge forces collected 170,000 signatures, triggering another consti-
tutional convention in 2006.303 
The joint session of the legislature adjourned twice without voting on the 
merits of the marriage prohibition by large margins.  In July, legislators voted 
100-91 to delay until November.304  In November, they voted to delay again 
by a vote of 109-87.305  Anti-gay marriage forces, frustrated by legislators’ 
lack of appetite to vote on the merits, filed litigation to force a vote on the 
proposed amendment.306  Eventually, they were successful and secured sixty-
two votes in favor of the ban in January 2007.307  A second constitutional 
convention would be necessary with the newly elected legislature.   
In the interim, supporters of amending the state constitution suffered a 
leadership vacuum.  A new Senate president took control of the chamber and 
joined House Speaker Salvatore DiMasi in opposition of disturbing 
Goodridge.308  Governor Deval Patrick, a same-sex marriage supporter, was 
elected in November 2006 to succeed Romney.309  Patrick joined the House 
and Senate leaders to work at peeling away pro-amendment votes.310  
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When the convention reconvened for mere seconds in June 2007, gay 
marriage opponents garnered only forty-five votes.311  The amendment’s 
backers lost seven supporters through resignations and turnover once the 
new legislature convened, but also failed to hold onto prior supporters.312  A 
total of nine legislators, including seven Democrats and two Republicans, 
switched their votes.313  One Democratic lawmaker, Senator Michael Mor-
risey, who switched his vote, explained his very private decision was about 
protecting minority rights.  Senator Morrisey explained, “In the end it came 
down to the fact that we have to do what we think is the right thing and what 
we feel comfortable with.  Protecting the rights of the minority is one of the 
things we have to do.”314  Other lawmakers that flipped offered their con-
cerns about taking away rights and greater exposure to LGB persons.  “I 
couldn’t take away the happiness those people have been able to enjoy,” 
Representative Paul Kujawski explained.315  Senator Gale Candaras, who 
voted for the amendment when she was a state representative, published an 
exhaustive explanation for her flip, writing: 
[Same-sex couples] deserve and are entitled to the same legal protections 
enjoyed by all others citizens of our state.  This is the law of the Common-
wealth, articulated by our Supreme Judicial Court in Goodrich v. The De-
partment of Public Health, decided in November, 2003.  Despite dire pre-
dictions, there has been no adverse societal impact from this decision and 
most people now express little concern about same gender marriage.316 
The Massachusetts General Court struck one more blow to anti-Goodridge 
groups by dismantling the last remaining impediment in Massachusetts law, 
which had barred out-of-state gay couples from marrying.317  The Massa-
chusetts Senate repealed the 1913 statute mandating residency requirements 
for marriage license applicants by a unanimous voice vote.318  The Massa-
chusetts House followed, voting to repeal by a large margin of 118-35.319  
Democratic Governor Patrick signed the repeal legislation in July 2008.320 
Though Massachusetts was the first jurisdiction to offer same-sex couples 
access to marriage in 2004, political leaders debated same-sex relationship 
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recognition throughout the 1990s.  The Goodridge decision was successful be-
cause it opened marriage rights to same-sex couples at a time when severely 
limited recognition attempts would have dead-ended.  Despite the intransi-
gence of legislative leadership and weak odds of pro-recognition legislation 
passing without judicial intervention, Goodridge opponents could not rally a 
sufficient number of state legislators to submit a constitutional amendment 
for referendum.  That outcome was not a foregone conclusion in January 
2007 when opponents of Goodridge mustered twelve votes more than neces-
sary to place an anti-gay marriage amendment on the ballot.  The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court marriage ruling had staying power because 
legislative opposition was weak and softened over time.  Goodridge was more 
effective when the legislature repealed residency requirements for marriage 
eligibility.  These developments reflect what we should see if the political re-
inforcement thesis is correct.  
The political reinforcement thesis and the Constrained Court model do 
not explain the Romney Administration’s good faith implementation of 
Goodridge, notwithstanding Governor Romney’s opposition to same-sex mar-
riage.  The shifts in legislators’ votes on the proposed anti-same-sex marriage 
amendment may validate the political reinforcement thesis to the extent that 
political leadership ushered in unabashed support for marriage equality.  
There is some evidence of legitimization and rights consciousness in the state-
ments provided by the legislators that flipped.  
The ripple effect of Massachusetts’ tussle with Goodridge and the merits of 
equal marriage rights touched numerous other states.  Perhaps no state felt 
the impact of Goodridge more immediately than California.  Though Califor-
nia wrestled with the issue long before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court ruled in 2004, the combination of civil disobedience, legislation, and 
litigation brought the issue to a head in Massachusetts’ wake. 
D.  California 
California’s first bout over same-sex marriage came in 1977.  Six years 
earlier, the Legislature revamped the family law code by striking gendered 
language from the state’s domestic relations statutes.321  While the gender-
neutral language was widely accepted as pertaining only to opposite-sex cou-
ples, legislation was introduced and enacted to define marriage as “a personal 
relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman.”322  
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Throughout the 1990s, a series of efforts were undertaken to establish 
enumerated rights for same-sex couples in the California Legislature.  The 
first 1990s-era same-sex marriage bill died in 1991.323  In 1994, Assembly-
man Richard Katz introduced AB 2810, which would have created a domes-
tic partner registry.324  Registrants would have had conservatorship and med-
ical decision-making rights, but Katz’s bill was vetoed.325  The bill was 
reintroduced the following session and failed to secure a floor vote.326 
As events unfolded in Hawaii in the mid-to-late 1990s, the question of 
same-sex marriage became more heated.  While California law permitted 
only opposite-sex couples to marry under state law, California law governing 
recognition of out-of-state marriages was potentially favorable for same-sex 
couples.  Section 308 of the California Code stated that “[a] marriage con-
tracted outside this state that would be valid by the laws of the jurisdiction in 
which the marriage was contracted is valid in this state.”327  
Without a public policy recognition exception or an express prohibition of 
out-of-state same-sex marriages, the prospect of Hawaiian weddings exposing 
a large loophole in state law was too much for State Senator William “Pete” 
Knight.328  Knight offered two failed bills to close the “loophole.”329  Knight 
and his allies turned to the state’s initiative and referendum procedure.  
Knight’s initiative, Proposition 22, which provided that only opposite-sex mar-
riages were valid in California, passed in 2000 with over 60% of the vote.330   
The first successful pro-recognition measure became law in 1999 (about 
two months prior to the Baker decision in Vermont331) and provided domestic 
partners with hospital visitation rights, and health insurance coverage for 
state employees.332  The scope of eligible domestic partners included same-
sex couples and opposite-sex couples over sixty-two, who may not marry out 
of fear of losing social security benefits.333  The bill, AB 26, made no reference 
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in either the legislative findings or the legislative counsel’s analysis to the Cal-
ifornia Constitution, the United States Constitution, or any court decision.334 
In 2001, the domestic partnership scheme was expanded.335  Domestic 
partners now had standing to bring tort claims, including wrongful death 
claims.336  In addition, the 2001 expansion granted a number of rights con-
cerning medical care, sick leave, and insurance.337  The last expansion of the 
California domestic partnership statute came in 2003.  That year, legislation 
was adopted that afforded domestic partners the presumption of rights and 
responsibilities equal to marriage.338  The 2003 legislation further recognized 
substantially similar relationships formed out-of-state.339  Unlike the organic 
legislation establishing domestic partnerships in 1999, the wholesale expan-
sion included legislative declarations that the bill would  “help California 
move closer to fulfilling the promises of inalienable rights, liberty, and equal-
ity contained in Sections 1 and 7 of Article 1 of the California Constitution 
by providing [rights for] all caring and committed couples” and “reduce dis-
crimination on the bases of sex and sexual orientation . . . consistent with the 
requirements of the California Constitution.”340 
The 2003 expansion took effect in 2005, the same year the California 
Legislature first moved to legalize same-sex marriage.341  However, the state’s 
initiative and referendum process complicated legislators’ push.  California 
law does not allow for legislators to undo a statute enacted by initiative and 
referendum without submitting the legislative proposal for a popular vote.342 
Assemblyman Mark Leno submitted a bill to legalize same-sex marriage 
in 2004.343  While Leno’s legislation came in the wake of Goodridge and the 
decision by San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom to issue same-sex couples 
marriage licenses, the architects of the bill had devised the plan prior to New-
som’s action.  Leno, who—along with John Laird—became one of the first 
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two openly gay men elected to the California Assembly in 2002,344 expressed 
that he was somewhat agnostic on the term “marriage” before events un-
furled in Massachusetts.  Indeed, Leno had an epiphany—a newfound rights 
consciousness—after processing the Goodridge opinion that led him to take the 
charge on equal marriage rights in California: 
So, for many years as an activist and elected official, I always wanted the 
same rights benefits, privileges, and responsibilities of marriage, but I wasn’t 
always sure we should be fighting over a word.  But, after reading the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court decision in 2003, my heart and mind were 
changed irrevocably.  So in it, the Massachusetts High Court, not unlike the 
Vermont and Hawaii courts before it, they said that there was no justification 
for denying same-sex couples rights.  But, the court went on to say that the 
only remedy to this identified discrimination is marriage and marriage alone.  
No other parallel construct would do.  They said that there was no difference 
between the way same-sex couples love and that their love isn’t inferior.  And 
that’s stuck with me and changed me.  And at that point in November 2003, 
I was ready to fight a war over a word.  Just a month before that, Governor 
Davis signed the domestic partner expansion.  So, we set our sights on intro-
ducing it before Valentine’s Day in 2004.345  
The timing of Newsom’s disobedience and Leno’s plan for legislation 
fused the parallel endeavors.  As the Los Angeles Times reported, the marriage 
equality bill was seen has having significant ties to Newsom’s act of civil dis-
obedience to issue marriage licenses contrary to state law: 
Gay rights groups view the California legislation as part of a strategy that 
emerged when San Francisco began granting marriage licenses three 
months ago.  Now, court cases are pending in New Jersey, Washington, Or-
egon, New York and California, and a federal constitutional amendment is 
up for debate in Washington, D.C. 
. . . . 
“It’s a public conversation in all those arenas,” said Jennifer Pizer, senior 
staff attorney with the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in Los 
Angeles.  “In California, we have the particularly poignant example of cou-
ples who married in San Francisco.  We have the Legislature doing its job 
and public opinion moving steadily toward equality.”346 
	
 344 See Margie Mason, Bay Area Democrats May Become First Openly Gay Men in State Legislature, BERKLEY 
DAILY PLANET (March 7, 2003), http://www.berkeleydailyplanet.com/issue/2002-03-07/arti-
cle/10588?headline=Bay-Area-Democrats-may-become-first-openly-gay-men-in-state-legislature-
-By-Margie-Mason-The-Associated-Press (reporting on gay candidates running in California in 
2002); John Myers, Even Rivals Say Mark Leno Is One of Sacramento’s Most Accomplished Lawmakers.  Now 
His Time is Up., L.A. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2016, 12:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-
sac-mark-leno-legislature-legacy-20160829-snap-htmlstory.html (referring to Leno as “one of the 
first two openly gay men elected to the Legislature”); John Laird, California, 1985, OUTHISTORY: 
OUT AND ELECTED IN THE USA: 1974–2004, http://outhistory.org/exhibits/show/out-and-
elected/early-1980s/john-laird (last visited October 31, 2017). 
 345 Telephone Interview with Mark Leno, Cal. State Sen. (July 21, 2016). 
 346 Robert Salladay, Gay Marriage Bill Expected to Die in Assembly, L.A. TIMES (May 18, 2004), http://ar-
ticles.latimes.com/2004/may/18/local/me-marriage18 (outlining Democratic strategy on Gay 
Marriage legislation after efforts appeared to have been abandoned by the lawmakers). 
926 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:4 
Leno saw a windfall from Newsom’s act of defiance, which shored up 
support among the openly gay members of the legislature.  Considering the 
political ramifications and timing of marriage legislation, two of the five 
members of the California Legislature’s LGBT caucus balked at Leno’s de-
cision to accelerate marriage equality.  After thousands of same-sex couples 
flocked to San Francisco to marry, the cautious holdouts’ concerns yielded 
to the excitement of the moment.  Leno recalled: 
I had awareness of what Gavin was thinking of doing as of Monday that 
week that we were going to introduce the bill.  There was some discord 
among our LGBT caucus in Sacramento.  Two of my colleagues wanted me 
to proceed.  Two were not sure the votes were there.  Because the marriage 
licenses were being issued, thousands and thousands of people had come to 
California.  Those colleagues, after they saw it on television and were part 
of the thrill of it all, they had realized that they internalized the discrimina-
tion themselves.  Marriage seemed like a dream, but then to see it in reality 
they took hold of themselves and were on board.  What happened that week-
end in San Francisco demystified it.347  
That conversation continued throughout the remainder of the year, as 
the California Senate Judiciary Committee’s official bill analysis from 2005 
noted: 
In 2004, several events once again brought to the forefront the issues of 
same-sex marriages, civil unions, and domestic partnerships.  On February 
24, 2004, President Bush endorsed the idea of an amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution to ban same-sex marriages in the country.  This endorsement 
followed a flurry of events surrounding same-sex marriages, including the 
issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples in San Francisco the week 
before; the Massachusetts high court decision stating that only marriage—
not civil unions—would provide same-sex couples equal protection under 
that state’s constitution; the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court inval-
idating a prohibition against same-sex marriages . . . .348 
Leno’s bill did not move out of committee.  Between 2004 and 2005, 
Leno gained the support of the Assembly Speaker who wanted to pause 
Leno’s push until a non-election year.349  When Leno introduced legislation 
for the 2005 session, the legislative findings emphasized the historic role Cal-
ifornia played in eradicating race-based marriage discrimination and tied the 
legislation to judicial decisions elsewhere: 
The highest courts in three states have held that denying the legal rights 
and obligations of marriage to same-sex couples is constitutionally suspect or 
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impermissible under their respective state constitutions.  These states are 
Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts. 
California’s discriminatory exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage 
violates the California Constitution’s guarantee of due process, privacy, 
equal protection of the law, and free expression by arbitrarily denying equal 
marriage rights to lesbian, gay, and bisexual Californians.350 
In the interim period, same-sex marriage advocates benefited from a state 
trial court ruling by Judge Richard Kramer striking down Proposition 22 as 
unconstitutional sex discrimination and an impermissible infringement of 
LGB Californians’ fundamental right to marry under the state constitu-
tion.351  Kramer’s ruling was a boon for advocates, but opponents hoped to 
capitalize on the setback.  As the Washington Post reported, Kramer would not 
have the final say on the matter because in addition to inevitable appeals, 
efforts were “already underway to amend the state’s constitution to ban 
same-sex marriage.”352 
Opponents continued to fight equal marriage in the legislature, relying 
heavily on the argument that the welfare of children was threatened by mar-
ried same-sex couples who could not raise children as successfully as oppo-
site-sex parents.  The California Senate Judiciary noted the “main argument 
offered in opposition” throughout hearings was the same “primary rationale 
that Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts have offered in unsuccessful de-
fense of their laws prohibiting same-sex marriage. . . .”353  
In addition to child welfare justifications, the anti-gay marriage forces 
opposed the same-sex marriage bill because it subverted the will of the people 
as expressed in Proposition 22 and gave “added weight to Judge Kramer’s 
rationale for striking down” Proposition 22.354  
Judge Kramer’s decision was part of the Legislature’s analysis.  However, 
legislators looked at the trend favoring LGB rights in California and beyond 
in the years leading up to 2005.  The Assembly floor report vetted the trajec-
tory of case law favoring relationship recognition for same-sex couples and 
sexual orientation nondiscrimination more broadly: 
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Three state supreme courts have addressed the question of whether a 
state law that defines marriage so as to exclude same sex partners violates 
their respective state constitutions. . . .  
. . . In Romer v. Evans (1996) the Court overturned . . . [a provision in] the 
Colorado Constitution to exclude lesbians and gay men from obtaining legal 
protection.  More recently, in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the U.S. Supreme 
Court struck down a state homosexual sodomy law . . . . So far, no state high 
court has found adequate justification under state law for treating homosex-
ual couples differently than heterosexual couples in defining marriage, even 
under a constitutionally lenient “rational basis” test.  This appears to be 
where California’s courts ultimately may arrive, as the trial court opinion in 
the coordinated marriage cases demonstrates.355   
In September 2005, the California Senate approved Leno’s marriage bill 
21-15.356  The California State Assembly followed on a 41-35 vote.357  The 
California Legislature was the first legislative body to bless same-sex mar-
riage, but Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed the legislation citing 
Proposition 22.358  While the bill’s backers argued that Proposition 22 was 
intended to protect the state’s sovereignty and block out-of-state marriages, 
Schwarzenegger saw the measure as a wholesale preemption of same-sex 
marriage legislation.359 
In rejecting supporters’ narrow abstraction of Proposition 22, the Gover-
nor’s position was that the only constitutional path to eliminating marriage 
discrimination was by another referendum or judicial fiat.  “This bill simply 
adds confusion to a constitutional issue.  If the ban of same-sex marriage is 
unconstitutional, this bill is not necessary.  If the ban is constitutional, this 
bill is ineffective,” Schwarzenegger wrote in his veto statement to the Legis-
lature.360  The Legislature forced the issue again in 2007, by passing another 
same-sex marriage bill.361  By this time, same-sex marriage litigation had 
reached the California Supreme Court.  Schwarzenegger rebuffed the Leg-
islature and again vetoed the measure writing, “I maintain my position that 
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the appropriate resolution to this issue is to allow the Court to rule on Prop-
osition 22.”362  Seven months later, the California Supreme Court invali-
dated Proposition 22 as violative of the state constitution.363  Voters ratified 
a citizen-initiated constitutional amendment in November 2008 that over-
turned the state Supreme Court ruling.364 
The California Legislature was more than willing to embrace equal mar-
riage legislation before the state Supreme Court’s 2008 ruling, but failed be-
cause of insufficient support to override the Governor.  Governor Schwarzeneg-
ger admonished legislators to defer to the courts or offer voters the option to 
consider equal marriage legislation through the referendum process.  California 
voters ultimately blocked marriage equality at the ballot box in response to the 
state Supreme Court’s In re Marriage Cases decision.  Even before marriage made 
headway in the legislature or courts, lawmakers succeeded in creating state-rec-
ognized relationship status for same-sex couples.  Tracing the legislative history 
of these bills reveals that elected officials increasingly relied on constitutional 
law principles and rights-based language to frame efforts to support expanded 
relationship recognition for gay couples.  This trajectory lends substantial 
weight to the rights consciousness hypothesis’ validity—an assessment that is 
corroborated by evidence laid out in the following section.   
E.  Vermont 2007–2009 
In July 2007, Vermont House Speaker Gaye Symington and the President 
Pro Tempore of the Vermont Senate, Peter Shumlin, jointly created a com-
mission charged with examining the status of same-sex couples and their fam-
ilies.365  That body, the Vermont Commission on Family Recognition and 
Protection (“Commission”), took testimony at eight hearings throughout the 
state and held a special ninth hearing on legal issues at the Vermont Law 
School.366  The Commission found that supporters of full marriage rights for 
same-sex couples believed that the civil union statute failed to comply with 
the Vermont Constitution’s equality mandate as articulated in Baker.  The 
Commission’s official report also noted a common theme across the meetings: 
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Witnesses often drew analogies between the civil union law and the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1896 decision, Plessy v. Ferguson, in which the Court upheld 
the constitutionality of a state law imposing racial segregation in public ac-
commodations (specifically, railroad passenger cars), provided the accom-
modations were equal.  Frequently during this testimony, the Commission 
heard comments about second class citizenship, stigmatization, and “sepa-
rate cannot be equal.”367  
In addition to recording the public’s opinions on the legal nature of civil 
unions, Vermonters in support of equal marriage offered examples of ways 
they found civil unions unworkable.  Participants explained during these 
meetings that civil unions required extra paperwork or additional explana-
tions to others who did not understand them.  Concerns were also expressed 
that civil unions were less portable across state lines than marriage.368  
Though at the time only Massachusetts permitted same-sex couples to marry, 
Rhode Island and New York recognized out-of-state same-sex marriages as 
marriages.369  The Commission concluded that, taken as a whole, the “testi-
mony reflects the evolution of attitudes in Vermont since the enactment [of 
civil unions] toward greater and more open acceptance of gays and lesbians 
in Vermont society, community, and public life.”370 
Opponents registered their views with the Commission, too.  However, 
some anti-gay rights leaders urged social conservatives to not participate in 
Commission hearings because of perceived bias among those empaneled.  
Marriage opponent Craig Benson called the body a “kangaroo commission” 
because it was “the left having a dialogue with the far left.”371  Stephen Cable, 
the president of the opposition group Vermont Renewal, urged “Vermonters 
to boycott the hearings and pay no attention to the report” because it lacked 
bipartisan direction.372 
Those who rejected same-sex marriage claimed that the civil union statute 
satisfied Baker, same-sex marriage failed to affect the purpose of the institution—
raising children, and allowing same-sex nuptials contradicted biblical truths.  
During the legal issues session of the Commission’s meeting at Vermont 
Law School, Professor Greg Johnson and Professor Michael Mello, experts 
on civil unions, and Professor Peter Teachout, an expert on the Vermont 
Constitution provided testimony.373  Mello recommended the Commission 
	
 367 Id. at 7 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483 (1954)). 
 368 Id. at 7–8. 
 369 Id. at 5, 19. 
 370 Id. at 5, 7–8, 14, 19. 
 371 Daniel Barlow, Vt. Panel Considers Same-Sex Nuptials, RUTLAND HERALD (Aug. 24, 2007), 
http://www.rutlandherald.com/articles/vt-panel-considers-same-sex-nuptials/. 
 372 Id. 
 373 OFFICE OF LEGIS. COUNCIL, supra note 366, at 17. 
	
Mar. 2018] STAGES OF CONSTITUTIONAL GRIEF 931 
follow the lead of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court when it rejected 
legislators’ attempt to create civil unions for same-sex couples in lieu of mar-
riage.  Mello stated:  
A more profitable enterprise would be to study the effects of civil unions as a 
substitute for marriage.  This is precisely what the Massachusetts court did 
in Goodridge II.  The court recognized that the good intentions of civil unions 
legislators were beside the point.  The Commission should do so as well.374  
Mello concluded that if the Vermont General Assembly failed to provide 
equal marriage to same-sex couples, it would provoke a second round of liti-
gation challenging the constitutionality of civil unions.  He predicted the Ver-
mont Supreme Court would ultimately find the civil union regime impermis-
sible under the Vermont Constitution, just as the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court rejected civil unions under the Massachusetts Constitution.375  
Professor Johnson echoed Mello’s call for the Commission to look to Massa-
chusetts’s example, explaining that that state’s high court borrowed from the 
civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s to scold the Massachusetts Leg-
islature’s attempt to create marriage by another name for same-sex couples:   
The dissimilitude between the terms “civil marriage” and “civil union” is not 
innocuous; it is considered a choice of language that reflects a demonstrable 
assigning of same-sex, largely homosexual, couples to a second-class sta-
tus . . . The [civil union] bill would have the effect of maintaining and fos-
tering a stigma of exclusion that the Constitution prohibits . . . The history 
of our nation has demonstrated that separate is seldom, if ever, equal.376 
For his part, Professor Teachout examined the litigation in Massachusetts 
and litigation percolating in the Connecticut courts, parsing the different tools 
of interpretation and constitutional texts that might lead courts to reach various 
outcomes on the question of equal marriage versus civil unions.377  Teachout 
testified that while Baker mandated equality between same-sex couples and 
opposite-sex couples, the Vermont General Assembly had room under the 
decision to examine what constituted “equality” and take appropriate action.378 
The Commission made a series of findings in its final report, most notably 
that extending marriage to same-sex couples would offer LGB Vermonters 
access to intangible benefits of significant consequence.  In giving same-sex 
couples access to the terminology of martial relationships that hold “social, 
cultural and historical significance,” the state would make a “strong statement of 
full inclusion.”379  Further, the Commission found that affording same-sex 
couples equal marriage rights would likely “enhance the portability of the 
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underlying legal consequences of the status.”380  However, the Commission 
declined to recommend to the Vermont General Assembly whether to take 
action on legislation that would make marriage equality a reality.381  The 
Commission nevertheless encouraged lawmakers to consider four issues before 
taking action including whether the legislature could change the tax filing system 
to ease the burden on civil union couples, what impact access to marriage would 
have on same-sex couples who had already entered into civil unions, whether 
same-sex couple child rearing had any scientifically verifiable impact on 
children, and what impacts the Massachusetts law had on LGB couples: 
What has been the experience of the Massachusetts lesbian and gay couples 
who have married under Massachusetts law?  Are these couples successfully 
obtaining all of the rights, privileges, and benefits of marriage—under Mas-
sachusetts law, federal law, and the laws of other states?  Are their marriages 
more readily understood and more portable than a Vermont civil union?382  
House Speaker Gaye Symington appointed Johannah Donovan to the 
Commission seat representing the House because Donovan was both a 
supporter of equal marriage and a devout Catholic.  Though she pointed out 
that “Baker started the conversation,” marriage equality advocates benefited 
from the “right [legislative] leadership in the right places at that time.”383  
One of leadership’s priorities was to continue that conversation by forming 
the Commission.  The Commission’s work was a success in Donovan’s eyes 
because it offered a forum to exchange personal stories and bring added 
normalcy to marriage rights for same-sex couples.  But, she explained that 
Baker paved the way: 
Without Baker and without civil unions, we probably wouldn’t have gotten 
there.  I remember people in my church coming up to me and saying, “We’re 
okay with civil unions but you don’t [ ] need to go to marriage.”  And I said 
to them a few years back you were uncomfortable with civil unions and that 
the same would be true for marriage.  It was all just part of an evolutionary 
process for people.384  
Former House Judiciary Chairman Tom Little, who chaired the Com-
mission, agreed that there was relatively little opposition expressed through-
out the hearings.  His pulse on Vermonters’ attitudes, like Donovan’s, indi-
cated to him that equal rights for same-sex couples accrued legitimacy and 
opponents’ desire to fight another battle waned.  Little said, “After civil un-
ions were in effect for five or six years they said it isn’t that bad or the sky 
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doesn’t fall or these are my neighbors, and so some of them just [ ] didn’t 
want to fight another battle over it.”385 
Many Vermont legislators cautiously watched developments in Massa-
chusetts and elsewhere in the wake of the Baker decision and subsequent civil 
union legislation.  Between 2000 and 2009, courts in Connecticut, Iowa, and 
California joined Massachusetts and extended the freedom to marry to same-
sex couples.386  The once “progressive” civil union law in Vermont now 
lagged behind and some elected officials began to rethink Vermont law in 
light of the new marriage rulings.  At the same time, the pushback against 
marriage equality energized the Vermont Freedom to Marry Task Force.  
The success of Proposition 8 in November 2008, banning same-sex marriage 
in California, “was a real wake up call to us here in Vermont and it really 
helped motivate our people in the field,” Beth Robinson said.387  
State legislators paid attention to national developments, too.  Republi-
can Heidi Schuermann’s consideration of equal marriage rights began with 
Baker, but her focus on the issue was heightened by momentum in other 
states.  Schuermann said, “Knowing we had civil unions, which at the time 
I thought they essentially gave all the rights and protections to gay and les-
bian couples that marriage did, [ ] I didn’t give it much thought.  So, after 
Massachusetts and Iowa, it came to the forefront more and more.”388  
House Speaker Shap Smith likewise observed that the judicial decisions 
legalizing same-sex marriage might have shifted the dynamic in Montpelier.  
“People here have seen what [marriage equality] looks like and realized it 
doesn’t harm anybody,” Smith said.389  Beth Robinson echoed a similar per-
spective, telling Fox News in 2009 that “the fact that we’re not dealing with 
an unknown, that we can look at our neighboring states and see that families 
are stronger and nobody has lost anything, that makes it a lot harder for folks 
to argue against it here.”390 
After courts ruled in favor of marriage equality in California, 
Connecticut, and Massachusetts, in the fall of 2008, then-Speaker-designate 
Smith knew he had a sufficient number of votes to enact marriage equality 
in both chambers of the legislature.  For him, “[T]he question was whether 
	
 385 Telephone Interview with Tom Little, supra note 166. 
 386 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 398 (Cal. 2008) (applying the California Constitution); Ker-
rigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 411 (Conn. 2008) (applying the Connecticut Con-
stitution); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009) (applying the Iowa Constitution). 
 387 Democracy Now, In Historic Vote, Vermont Legislature Legalizes Gay Marriage (Video 2 of 2), YOUTUBE 
(Apr. 8, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AvZIh25lOR8. 
 388 Telephone Interview with Heidi Schuermann, Vt. State Rep. (June 28, 2012). 
 389 Philip Shishkin, Vermont House Backs Gay Marriage, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2009, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123871484665384529.  
 390 Fox News, Governor Sununu Discusses Same-Sex Marriage in New Hampshire, YOUTUBE (Apr. 6, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z31W-7XTsrw. 
	
934 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:4 
the bill would be vetoed or not and we thought about it.  It was not clear that 
the votes were for an override.”391  
Marriage equality advocates’ challenges were twofold.  First, advocates 
had to persuasively demonstrate that civil unions were insufficient substitutes 
for marriage.  On this point, Beth Robinson noted: 
We were in a different position because the rhetorical conversation we were 
having.  We were not moving from a place of nothing to a place of marriage.  
The challenge we had was persuading people that even in a world of civil 
unions that it was worth revisiting the conversation even though it was pain-
ful for the state the first time around.392   
The second hurdle advocates needed to overcome was assuring legislators 
that marriage equality would not enflame social strife, like some perceived the 
civil union law did in 2000.  Representative Mark Larson, who along with 
David Zuckerman introduced the 2009 marriage equality legislation, focused 
on a political messaging strategy to ease legislators’ nerves.  Larson said that 
the Take Back Vermont episode in 2000 created lasting scars that required 
tending to: “We were concerned that because civil unions had been such a 
dramatic process, people were worried that marriage equality would cause us 
to revisit all the trials and tribulations of passing civil unions.  The challenge 
was trying to show people that it wouldn’t be as bad as civil unions.”393 
Few observers doubted the prospects for marriage equality’s success in 
the Vermont Senate.  Claire Ayer, a Democrat and the Senate Majority 
Whip, had a good feeling about the odds in the Senate where members “gen-
erally voted on party lines.”394  Ayer said, “We had it all along because we 
had a 23-7 majority.  It was a slam dunk in the Senate.”395  The Senate under 
the leadership of Senate President Peter Shumlin, Majority Leader David 
Campbell, and Ayer quickly pushed a same-sex marriage bill through their 
chamber.  It won unanimous approval from the Senate Judiciary Committee 
and sailed through a 26-4 floor vote.396 
Governor Jim Douglas weighed in after the Senate’s passage and com-
mitted to veto the legislation during the House’s deliberations.  Governor 
Douglas’s announcement stoked fears that his premature intervention might 
destabilize the House’s work.  Senate President Peter Shumlin implored the 
governor to reconsider by highlighting developments across the states: 
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That was a huge fight 9 years ago and what the governor seems to have 
missed is that Connecticut and Massachusetts allow marriage now the New 
Hampshire House I never thought I’d see this passed it yesterday . . . I 
thought that the way the debate happened in the Senate was a reflection of 
how things have changed we saw folks who never would have voted for civil 
unions 9 years ago stand up and vote for this marriage equality bill.397 
Concerns about the House were unfounded.  The House Judiciary Com-
mittee sent the legislation to the floor by an 8-2 vote.398  On the House floor, 
legislators in opposition offered robust defenses of tradition, while those in 
favor talked about constitutional rights, equality, and civil rights.  Representa-
tive Kesha Ram compared civil unions to segregated drinking fountains.399  
Gary Gilbert, a legislator from rural Fairfax, told the House that he was duty 
bound to vote in favor of the legislation no matter his personal views: 
Simply because I, as an individual believe that marriage is a sacrament 
and chose to be married within a church, does not mean that everyone must 
have the same beliefs. . . . The choice to marry is a public declaration of a 
personal choice . . . . I cannot deny the rights to others that I claim for my-
self.  As a legislator, I must uphold the Vermont and U.S. Constitutions and 
my Oath of Office.  I support this bill.400 
The bill passed the House 94-52 and was promptly vetoed.401  The next day, 
the House attempted to override, which would require an additional six 
votes.  The veto override succeeded on a 100-49 vote.402  It was only the 
seventh time a Vermont governor’s veto was overridden.403  One of the ad-
ditional votes came from Republican Richard Westman, who voted against 
the civil unions bill in 2000.  When asked how he came to support equal 
marriage rights, Westman said he was “dragged along with the rest of soci-
ety.”  He recalled: 
I think the marriage legislation was anti-climactic because the die had 
been cast in many respects in Baker, and Vermonters had made a decision 
that we were going to recognize the rights of same-sex couples to marry.  I 
think the Baker decision and civil unions and the incremental decisions we 
faced with health care and insurance and where same-sex couples fit had 
brought us to a place.  I think that the jolting decision had been the one 
about civil unions and so what happened in other places [like Massachusetts 
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and Iowa] mattered a little less.  Even with the people who were opposed 
there was an acceptance of the decision.404 
In Vermont, advocates ushered in legislation for equal marriage after 
fourteen years of grassroots labor paired with litigation.  When Bill Lippert 
and Beth Robinson were asked what factors made 2009 different from 2000, 
Lippert emphasized the importance of more openly LGB legislators who 
were able to tell their colleagues their stories.405  Lippert also noted the lifting 
was less heavy in 2009 because the baseline of support ballooned.  During 
the post-Baker debate, only twenty-two members of the House supported full 
marriage recognition.  In 2009, Lippert had fifty-nine co-sponsors.406  
Despite benefiting from greater rank-and-file member enthusiasm, holding 
the House coalition together and overriding Governor Douglas’s veto—the 
first overridden veto in nineteen years—were uphill challenges since advocates 
needed to expand their margin of victory.  Robinson, for her part, pointed to 
the same-sex marriage decision in Iowa as an important factor that kept the 
coalition glued together.  The Varnum decision “really drove home the inevita-
bility of full equality for same-sex couples,” she said.407  Robinson opined fur-
ther that the “urge to closure” on the issue was an important boon for the 
override when legislators realized LGB Vermonters would not simply give up 
fighting for equal relationship recognition if the veto was sustained. 408 
F.  Maryland 
Two weeks before the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Richard Baker 
and James McConnell’s appeal challenging Minnesota’s marriage laws,409 
the Maryland Legislature Special Committee on Family Law and Domestic 
Relations (“Special Committee”) convened to consider a comprehensive list 
of concerns related to marriage eligibility.410  The Special Committee’s orig-
inal agenda was limited to sundry issues, among them the clerks’ ability to 
demand proof of age, the administration of blood tests, and the status of com-
mon law marriages.411  The only witness to testify before the Special Com-
mittee, the Maryland Association Clerks of Court President Vaughn Baker, 
raised the question of same-sex marriage.412    
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The Special Committee met again in October 1972.  This time the 
agenda officially included same-sex marriage in addition to regulations con-
cerning a woman’s right to keep her maiden name after marriage.  According 
to media reports at the time, no witnesses testified—either for or against—
the same-sex marriage agenda item.413  When the Maryland General Assem-
bly convened in 1973, the body enacted Senate Bill 122, which limited valid 
marriages as those contracted between a man and a woman.414  Maryland 
was the first state to expressly ban same-sex marriage. 
 The issue was dormant in Maryland’s legislature until 2003, when a 
newly elected member of the House took the issue up with the hope of fol-
lowing Vermont’s lead.  Richard Madaleno was elected from Montgomery 
County to the House of Delegates.  He was the first openly gay person elected 
to the Maryland General Assembly.415  Madaleno, later elected to the Mar-
yland Senate in 2006, recalled his first effort to move same-sex relationship 
recognition forward: 
Vermont had just moved forward with civil unions and there was a lot of talk 
about civil unions.  When I was first elected in 2002, one of the first bills I 
requested to draft was to take the Vermont civil unions approach and draft 
it.  People were deathly afraid of it.  We toyed around with the issue of Equal-
ity Maryland, which was then Free State Justice.  I was on the Board of the 
group.  The big goal of that group was to pass an anti-discrimination law, 
which we did in 2001 and then we had to deal with a referendum.  The 
organization went through reorganization and we fumbled around a little 
bit until civil unions were the big thing on the table.  And all of the sudden 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court suddenly allowed civil union[s] and the 
conversation moved from civil union[s] to marriage.416   
Unlike Massachusetts, however, Maryland’s journey toward the freedom 
to marry met judicial defeat.  Senator Madaleno recalled that legislative in-
transigence—made bleaker by Republican Governor Robert Ehrlich’s op-
position to equal marriage—made litigation appealing:  
From 2002 to 2006, we had a Republican governor and several of our 
judges; we knew four of our seven judges on the Court of the Appeals would 
be retiring.  So we decided to move on a court case because that seemed like 
the more likely route for getting something done than the legislature at that 
time, especially with a Republican governor.  We figured with his approval 
ruling so high we couldn’t move forward.  At that time, we saw efforts in 
New York and Washington and the hope was maybe we could get some 
momentum with other states using the same logic.417  
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In September 2007, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that because 
sexual orientation discrimination did not constitute a suspect class and be-
cause the denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples did not implicate a 
fundamental right, the State of Maryland met its low burden under rational 
basis to limit marriage to heterosexual couples.418  In response to the court’s 
decision, the head of the statewide LGBT rights organization, Dan Furman-
sky, Executive Director of Equality Maryland, announced two legislators 
would introduce marriage legislation in 2008 and said: 
This court case has been more than just about using all branches of gov-
ernment to remedy discrimination. . . . It’s been about educating legislators 
and neighbors about the harms faced by same-sex couples and their children 
because of the inability to marry.  We fully intend to fight for fair and equal 
protection under the law for our families.419 
However, Maryland is a referendum state.420  And so with a legislative 
strategy came a serious risk that any legislative success could be overturned 
by popular referendum.  Legislators devised a plan to cautiously lead the state 
toward equal marriage through a stealth education campaign and incremen-
tal policy changes.  Now in the Maryland Senate, Madaleno and other 
LGBT activists mapped out a new plan of attack: 
And once [the Maryland Court of Appeals] decision came down in 2007, 
that’s when the focus came back to marriage and we decided to use a strategy 
[conceived] by lobbyists we called the “Bill and Bob strategy.”  Bill was the 
big bill we would pursue to get marriage.  The Bob component was about 
starting to break down marriage into its various components.  Because family 
law goes to one committee and we have few committees, we wanted to break 
it down.  We wanted to break down marriage into various components so 
that every committee would have to hear testimony on the legislation.  By 
2010, my colleagues would say I’m so done with every year dealing with 
more and more gay bills.421 
In 2008, the General Assembly enacted legislation that created domestic 
partnerships, granting limited enumerated rights to non-married couples, both 
heterosexual and homosexual, provided they met a series of qualifications.422  
But as advocates predicted, marriage legislation was slow in the coming.  In-
deed, despite the liberal nature of the state, Maryland’s stumbling block on 
marriage legislation came from portions of the state heavily populated by Af-
rican-American communities, which staunchly opposed same-sex marriage.423 
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The first major push for the main marriage bill came in 2011.  That leg-
islation successfully passed the Senate, but it was a number of votes short in 
the House.  The House leadership decided to debate the legislation despite 
the lack of votes and then hold it over until the following year.424  The 
Speaker of the House and other members heading the efforts determined 
that they were more likely to sway indecisive members leaning against the 
legislation in 2012 if they were not forced to go on the record as opposing 
the legislation.425  In the interim year, advocates benefited from a more active 
role by Governor O’Malley and a successful pro-marriage movement in New 
York.  “The Governor got fully engaged in the issue.  Once it got passed in 
New York on a bipartisan basis that helped too,” Speaker Michael Busch 
emphasized.426  The legislation was successful in 2012, passing the House of 
Delegates in a dramatic 72-69 vote, and then withstanding a popular refer-
endum in the November election.427  
In Maryland, a number of factors influenced the legislative process.  A sig-
nificant number of legislators viewed marriage equality legislation as an exten-
sion of civil rights, consistent with the rights consciousness thesis.  However, 
New York legalizing same-sex marriage boosted advocates’ push in 2012.  Not 
only did key players in Maryland point to New York’s landmark law as a rea-
son for the state’s progress, but also legislators used the New York Marriage 
Equality Act’s religious exemptions as a pattern for Maryland’s law.428  Litiga-
tion appears to have had the least impact on legislative developments in Mar-
yland than in other states, perhaps due to the timing of legislation and the 
state’s physical distance from jurisdictions with successful marriage litigation.  
G.  Marriage Without Courts?  
Thus far, this section has offered evidence that courts wielded significant 
influence that benefited the marriage equality movement in state legislatures 
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before United States v. Windsor.429  The record does not indicate that the courts 
alone were responsible for moving the cause forward.  Rather, this section 
offers detailed analysis suggesting the courts were critical in moving legisla-
tures and, as a consequence, the nation towards equal marriage.  But, what 
if the courts failed to intervene?  Would equal marriage rights for same-sex 
couples have come about absent litigation?   
If pro-LGB state laws proliferated before same-sex marriage litigation, 
then it might be said that same-sex marriage would have advanced absent 
judicial intervention.  Consider civil rights laws that protect against sexual 
orientation discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommoda-
tions.  These laws are the best metric of policy trends because they do not 
implicate government-backed discrimination or constitutional claims.  Thus, 
they are entirely discretionary policies.  
Before 2003 when Lawrence and Goodridge were decided, only fourteen 
states enacted sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws.430  New Mexico be-
came the fifteenth state with such a law in 2003.431  A majority of Americans 
did not live in jurisdictions that adopted civil rights legislation prohibiting 
private LGB anti-discrimination until the Oregon Equality Act took effect in 
2008.432  Many of these laws lingered for years before they were successfully 
adopted.  New York, for example, enacted the Sexual Orientation Nondis-
crimination Act (“SONDA”) in 2002,433 though it was initially proposed in 
1971 and died without seeing any action.434  SONDA first secured approval 
in the New York Assembly in 1993 only to meet a near decade of cold recep-
tion by the New York Senate.435  Similarly, legislation in Maryland failed for 
eight successful legislative sessions before passing in 2001.436 
Before 1997, no state provided any statewide status to same-sex relation-
ships.  Few states saw any progression on relationship recognition before 
1997 either.  Before 1997, attempts to provide enumerated rights to non-
	
 429 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  For a discussion of Windsor, see supra notes 103–112 and accompanying 
text. 
 430 See JEROME HUNT, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, A STATE-BY-STATE EXAMINATION 
OF NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND POLICIES 3–4 (2012), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/ 
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 432 Oregon Equality Act, 2007 Or. Laws. Ch. 100 
 433 HUNT, supra note 430, at 65. 
 434 N.Y. Gay Rights Bill Passes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2002), www.nytimes.com/2002/12/17/nyre-
gion/ny-gay-rights-bill-passes.html?mcubz=0. 
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marital couples failed in Washington, D.C., California, and Hawaii.437  Con-
gress blocked the District of Columbia’s 1992 domestic partnership law that 
extended hospital visitation rights and insurance options for municipal em-
ployees until 2002.438  The California Legislature passed limited protections 
for unmarried couples including hospital visitation rights, property rights, 
and decision-making rights in the event of a partner’s incapacitation.439  Gov-
ernor Pete Wilson vetoed that bill.440  No state before Baker offered same-sex 
couples relationship recognition akin to marriage.  No state prior to Goodridge 
extended the freedom to marry to same-sex couples.  Thus, while a slow 
march progressed on civil rights protections in housing, employment, and 
public accommodations, these legislative victories were hard wrought.   
Though no state gave formal sanction to same-sex relationships prior to 
1996, a handful of jurisdictions did take important steps to provide tangible 
benefits to non-marital relationships, primarily for the domestic partners of mu-
nicipal employees.  The first high-profile attempt to extend limited benefits to 
same-sex domestic partners was in 1982.441  That legislation was passed by the 
San Francisco City Council and vetoed by Mayor Diane Feinstein.442  In 1985, 
Berkeley, California extended equal benefits to the non-marital partners of city 
employees.443  Three years later, Los Angeles offered sick and bereavement 
leave to unwed city workers in relationships, including same-sex couples.444  
In July 1989, the New York Court of Appeals ruled 4-2 that the legal 
definition of a family included a same-sex couple under New York City’s 
rent-control regulations.445  The court held that after considering a non-mar-
ital couple’s exclusivity and longevity, emotional and financial commitment 
to one another, the manner in which they held themselves in public, and 
their routines of daily life, if it appeared that a couple functioned as a family 
it should be considered as such.446  Ruling for Miguel Braschi, who was in a 
same-sex relationship, the majority reasoned that the law’s treatment of a 
	
 437 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 14–15 (discussing the failure to secure passage of a robust domestic 
partnership law in Washington, D.C.); id. at 23 (discussing similar failure in Hawaii); Jerry Gillam,  
Panel Rejects Establishing Right to Breast-Feed in Pubic, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 1995), http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/1995-03-31/news/mn-49148_1_public-safety-committee (noting that the Judici-
ary Committee of the California Assembly rejected a measure which would have given same-sex 
couples the ability to register as domestic partners). 
 438 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 14–15. 
 439 Id. at 14. 
 440 Id. 
 441 Id. at 13. 
 442 Id. 
 443 Id. 
 444 Scott Harris, Council OKs Leave for Unwed Partners, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 1988), articles.latimes.com/ 
1988-10-06/local/me-4291_1_sick-leave. 
 445 Braschi v. Stahl Ass’ns Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53–54, 61 (N.Y. 1989). 
 446 Id. at 53–54. 
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family “should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history, but 
instead should find its foundation in the reality of family life.”447 
The attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union who argued on be-
half of Braschi, William Rubenstein, said that the ruling “mark[ed] the most 
important single step forward in American law toward legal recognition of 
lesbian and gay relationships.”448  Indeed, the ruling had at least one im-
portant consequence.  The New York State Division of Housing and Com-
munity Renewal promulgated a new rule to expand the Braschi rule 
statewide, marking the first time a statewide entity recognized a same-sex 
couple—along with other non-marital couples—as a family.449  State legisla-
tors announced their intentions to codify the rule in a state statute and cele-
brated the Braschi decision.450 
The following week, New York City Mayor Ed Koch announced he would 
issue an executive order to expand benefits to the non-marital partners of city 
employees.  Koch, however, emphasized that his executive order had “nothing 
to do with gay rights.”451  Koch said that the “largest number of people eligible 
will be heterosexuals living together as couples but not married, elderly people 
living with companions, people who have a domestic relationship but not nec-
essarily sexual relations.”452  The move was nevertheless significant and, ac-
cording to advocates at the time, well ahead of private companies.  
In May 1989, San Francisco enacted an ordinance providing sick and 
bereavement leave to city employees’ domestic partners.453  That ordinance 
	
 447 Id. at 53. 
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was petitioned for referendum.  Proponents of the domestic partner ordi-
nance pledged to “quote the New York decision in their campaign literature 
during the fall referendum battle.”454  The campaign was unsuccessful.  De-
spite voters rejecting the law in 1989, San Franciscans ratified a revised ver-
sion of the policy in a 1990 referendum.455   
Given the evidence in its totality, whatever favorable localized trends rec-
orded for domestic partnerships prior to 1996 cannot be said to have been 
an emerging policy trend absent judicial influence. 
H.  The Legislative Response Before Windsor 
Under the Constrained Court model of judicial efficacy, as articulated by 
Rosenberg, “[I]f judicial decisions supporting same-sex marriage can survive 
political backlash then . . . the judiciary’s lack of the power of implementa-
tion, does not come into play.”456  This metric of efficacy works to the extent 
that it measures the sustainability of judicial rulings in light of legislators’ po-
litical will to overturn them.  That analysis, however, overlooks the extent to 
which legislators are either influenced by courts from other jurisdictions or 
civil rights case law that is tangentially related to the issue at hand.  
The courts of last resort in Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Ver-
mont rendered decisions that were successful, in part, because there was suf-
ficient strength in legislative leadership to resist calls to amend their respec-
tive state constitutions.  Consistent with what the political reinforcement 
thesis predicts, the amount of political support for the underlying court deci-
sions was proportional to the courts’ efficacy.  The Massachusetts and Iowa 
decisions were the least dependent on support from the political branches 
because these courts left legislators no option but to accept equal marriage, 
defy the court, or embrace a constitutional amendment banning same-sex 
marriage.  Conversely, the New Jersey and Vermont courts allowed the po-
litical branches to exercise some degree of discretion in crafting a remedy.   
The significant role leadership played in these jurisdictions is hard to 
overstate.  This is particularly true in Iowa and Massachusetts, where lead-
ership repeatedly stymied attempts to attack pro-marriage equality rulings by 
blocking any votes on proposed constitutional amendments outright.  By 
	
 454 Dick Polman, Partners in Love But Not in Law, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 30, 1989. 
 455 Compare Kevin Roderick & Victor Zonana, 3 Bay Area Gays Win Elections; Domestic Partners Law Ap-
proved, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 8, 1990), articles.latimes.com/1990-11-08/news/mn-5391_1_domestic-
partner (noting the passage of a domestic partners law in San Francisco), with Victor F. Zonana, 
Gay Agenda Takes Beating—Even in San Francisco, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 9, 1989), http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/1989-11-09/news/mn-1424_1_gays-san-francisco (reporting that San Francis-
can voters “narrowly rejected a law that would have permitted unmarried “domestic partners” to 
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 456 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 
350 (2d ed. 2008). 
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erecting a roadblock for marriage equality opponents, leadership allowed de-
cisions to marinate with rank-and-file members and their constituents, weak-
ening the opposition to court rulings.  In Massachusetts pro-amendment or-
ganizers lost the wind in their sails within three years of Goodridge taking effect, 
and in Iowa formidable legislative resistance nearly dissipated within five 
years of Varnum.  In these states, the courts’ rulings had greater durability 
because knee-jerk constitutional amendments were unavailable.  
While the legislative support reinforces the idea that courts’ efficacy in 
social movements improves with greater legislative support, what fails to be 
addressed is the extent to which the courts helped tamp down opposition 
through a legitimization effect, aided by legislative stall tactics.  In other states 
like New Jersey, the leadership helped galvanize support for same-sex mar-
riage, where it had failed before.  However, neighboring jurisdictions’ ad-
vancement of equal marriage for LGB people also contributed to the shifting 
dynamics, particularly in New Jersey. 
In Hawaii, Vermont and New Jersey, litigation advanced the ball by ex-
panding relationship recognition for same-sex couples, albeit with mixed suc-
cess.  The initial bout of litigation in Hawaii prompted legislators to create a 
new state-recognized relationship status that provided limited rights and ben-
efits, though without substantial long-term obligations, to same-sex couples.  
At the same time that Hawaiian legislators sanctioned LGB relationships, they 
also submitted a proposed state constitutional amendment to thwart the state 
supreme court from extending the freedom to marry.  However, that amend-
ment was less damaging to the movement than others because it neither pro-
hibited marriage nor statuses substantially similar to marriage.  By contrast, 
litigation in Alaska resulted in a total loss, where the litigation prompted a 
wholesale prohibition on same-sex marriage in the Alaska Constitution. 
Importantly, Vermont gave life to the concept of enacting a substantially 
similar institution for same-sex relationship recognition after Baker.  Vermont 
and New Hampshire also set an example for other states that civil unions could 
be used as a springboard for marriage legislation down the road.  Prior to 2013, 
Washington legislators gradually expanded domestic partnership recognition 
to build support for equal marriage rights.  Hawaii, Illinois, and Rhode Island 
also adopted civil union statutes prior to adopting marriage in 2013.  Civil 
unions or similar state-recognized relationships in Connecticut, California, 
Colorado, Nevada, New Jersey, and Oregon provided important tangible ben-
efits to same-sex couples until courts intervened to mandate equal marriage.   
Prior to 2013, relationship recognition for same-sex couples in Hawaii, Ver-
mont, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Iowa was directly attribut-
able to judicial intervention.  While thousands of couples in California were able 
to avail themselves of marriage rights in the window between the California 
Supreme Court’s decision and Proposition 8, California would not recognize 
same-sex marriage for nearly five years after voters constitutionally proscribed 
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it.  Thus, the windfall of the California Supreme Court’s decision extending 
marriage rights to same-sex couples yielded a benefit to some couples.  
Courts shaped legislative developments in neighboring states.  In Ver-
mont, a number of key participants in the successful enactment of equal mar-
riage traced their decision-making process back to the Baker decision.  Nu-
merous legislators in Vermont and New Hampshire looked to developments 
in Massachusetts in the aftermath of Goodridge in rationalizing their decision 
to support same-sex marriage.  In Maine, the state’s governor, who had pre-
viously expressed opposition to equal marriage, heeded the equal protection 
analysis of neighboring courts and his staff to support his decision to become 
the first governor to sign same-sex marriage into law.  
Even failed litigation had some net gains in the legislative process.  Leg-
islation to adopt same-sex marriage was sometimes introduced only after a 
state constitutional challenge to the state’s domestic relations statute was re-
jected.  In Washington, litigation influenced key actors in Washington’s road 
to same-sex marriage, including the governor who defended the constitution-
ality of the state’s marriage law.  As the record indicates, legislators were 
motivated by a host of other factors in addition to courts, including personal 
connections with LGB persons, religious values, and experiences in other 
civil rights causes.  For some legislators the inclusion of religious exemptions 
for religious institutions and organizations enabled them to support pro-LGB 
marriage laws.  In a number of jurisdictions the presence of openly-LGB 
elected officials—particularly those in positions of leadership—shaped the 
climate in favor of equal marriage. 
Legislators often looked to other jurisdictions and heavily relied on legal 
rationales to justify their positions to advance same-sex marriage legislation.  
In Maryland, numerous legislators pointed to New York’s decision to legalize 
same-sex marriage in 2011 as a catalyst for action in Annapolis.  Legislators 
in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont kept a watchful eye on events in 
one another’s political circles while also keeping tabs on the fallout of equal 
marriage in Massachusetts.  In the first jurisdictions to move on same-sex 
marriage, litigation increased the issue’s saliency for many of the leaders on 
the marriage question.  
One common denominator across all of these states is that the success of 
equal marriage legislation or sustaining equal marriage rulings was deeply 
tied to leadership.  Litigation had a profound influence on legislative leaders 
in New England and was extensively cited in California.  In some jurisdic-
tions, like New York, general principles of equal protection were used to jus-
tify votes in favor of same-sex marriage.  For the most part, these legislators 
did not speak specifically to any one state or case as motivating their vote.  
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that constitutional arguments in favor of 
same-sex marriage would have carried the weight had courts routinely cast 
aside litigation, leaving same-sex couples without a single victory.  Much 
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more common were legislators using civil rights cases from the 1950s and 
1960s (typically Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia) to legitimize 
their votes to legalize same-sex marriage.  This rhetoric is evidence of rights 
consciousness.  Legislators do not draw these connections to suggest same-
sex marriage is simply good policy.  Rather, proponents of equal marriage 
emphasized the bridge between Brown, Loving, and same-sex marriage to 
frame the issue as a matter of fundamental rights. 
As with any legislative body, ascribing a single motive or a handful of 
motives to legislative action is a challenging task.  Elected officials often used 
courts and constitutional principles to reinforce their decisions.  As the 
interviews referenced above suggest, the two most important roles courts had 
were raising awareness about equal marriage rights and legitimizing supporters’ 
invocations of a constitutionally mandated extension of the freedom to marry. 
V.  FORMS AND LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
After Goodridge was handed down in 2003,457 a flurry of activity followed 
in municipalities and executive branch offices across the nation.  Local offi-
cials pressed the issue of same-sex marriage rights and statewide elected offi-
cials reacted to shifting political dynamics.  This Part assesses the motivations 
for these localized sparks of activism and the longer-term impact they had 
between 2003 and 2012.  In addition, this Part will examine the other exec-
utive and administrative action pursued by statewide officials to advance 
same-sex marriage in addition to the impact those policies had for the same-
sex marriage movement.  In this Part, we will use these developments to test 
the political reinforcement, administrative implementation, and rights con-
sciousness hypotheses. 
The Constrained Court Theory does not anticipate courts mobilizing in-
dividuals to assert rights or empower grassroots actors.  Conversely, the rights 
consciousness thesis offers the competing vision that courts can make partic-
ular issues more salient.  By bringing awareness to a rights-related claim and 
galvanizing others to make similar claims, courts can inject momentum into 
social reform movements.  If this expectation materializes in the same-sex 
marriage movement, the evidence should indicate that executive actors and 
public administrators are induced or encouraged by litigation to advocate on 
behalf of same-sex couples’ rights.  If the Constrained Court Theory is right, 
then we should not see much movement within the immediate stretch of time 
that social reform litigation is taken up and/or resolved.  
	
 457 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  For a discussion of Goodridge, see 
supra notes 78–79. 
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Looking at states where litigation successfully dismantled discriminatory 
marriage laws, we can test the political reinforcement and administrative im-
plementation hypotheses.  Here, we should expect to see, consistent with the 
Constrained Court Theory, that the stronger the support from executive of-
ficers and public administrators, the more effective a court’s ruling.  Further, 
if the facts reveal evidence that elected officials’ views on marriage shifted 
along with the courts, that pattern may be explained by legitimization theory.  
Finally, we should find that public administrators charged with the imple-
mentation of same-sex marriage adhered to judicial mandates because the 
court rulings required minor administrative adjustments and noncomplying 
persons would encumber significant financial penalties. 
This Part will focus on the states where litigation successfully ended mar-
riage discrimination against same-sex couples or where the status quo was 
disrupted.  We will begin with the state that saw the greatest amount of post-
Goodridge activity—California. 
A.  California 
In 2004, San Francisco’s newly elected mayor, Gavin Newsom, attended 
the State of the Union as a guest of Representative Nancy Pelosi.  President 
George W. Bush’s January 20 address fell within the 180-day window the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court created between its decision in 
Goodridge and the decision’s effect.  Perhaps the decision to legalize civil same-
sex nuptials was already weighing on Newsom’s mind.  At least one media 
profile of Mayor Newsom suggested that after the Massachusetts decision in 
November 2003 “gay Californians urged their state’s politicians to take sim-
ilar steps” as the Massachusetts justices.458 
Regardless of the extent to which Newsom was considering the merits of 
Goodridge, it was hardly an escapable topic at the 2004 State of the Union.  
Bush’s speech sharply condemned the litigation attacking same-sex couples’ 
exclusion from marriage and the Massachusetts decision to extend the free-
dom to marry: 
A strong America must also value the institution of marriage. . . .  
. . . . 
Activist judges, however, have begun redefining marriage by court order, 
without regard for the will of the people and their elected representatives.  
On an issue of such great consequence, the people’s voice must be heard.  If 
judges insist on forcing their arbitrary will upon the people, the only alter-
native left to the people would be the constitutional process.  Our nation 
must defend the sanctity of marriage.459 
	
 458 Jonathan Darman, SF Mayor Gavin Newsom Risks Career on Gay Marriage, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 16, 2009, 
7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/sf-mayor-gavin-newsom-risks-career-gay-marriage-78439.  
 459 Text of President Bush’s 2004 State of the Union Address, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2004), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/bushtext_012004.html.  
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That the Bush Administration considered using the State of the Union as 
a platform to denounce equal marriage rights for same-sex couples was no 
surprise given that 2004 was an election year.  While Bush stopped short of 
endorsing a federal marriage amendment to the Constitution by the time of 
the State of the Union, Republican Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist of Ten-
nessee had called for one.460  Senate Democratic Minority Leader Tom 
Daschle of South Dakota rejected a federal marriage amendment, support-
ing the existing provisions of the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act.461  None of 
Bush’s slate of potential Democratic opponents endorsed equal marriage, in-
cluding Senator John Kerry,462 who hailed from Massachusetts, and Howard 
Dean, who signed the Vermont civil union bill into law.463 
Newsom took umbrage over President Bush’s attack on equal marriage 
and the Goodridge decision.  “I was at the State of the Union,” he said, “and I 
felt a real resolve on this issue,” Mayor Newsom would later tell the press.464  
What Newsom could—or would—do remained an open question.  Accord-
ing to a February 2004 interview with The New York Times, Newsom, who was 
a businessman prior to his foray into politics, did some basic legal research: 
When Mr. Newsom returned to San Francisco, he said, he read the court 
decisions that authorized gay marriage in Massachusetts, as well as the 
United States Supreme Court ruling last year on sodomy.  As he mulled 
those precedents and Mr. Bush’s comments, he said, he became convinced 
that he had a moral obligation to open the doors to same-sex marriages.465 
Within two weeks of his Washington, D.C. trip, he asked top staffers to 
consider if and how the city’s clerks could issue same-sex marriage licenses.  
Newsom’s staff began researching the question and collected a database of 
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legal documents, media reports, and other relevant materials while Newsom 
reached out to LGBT rights leaders.   
On Monday, February 9, Newsom’s senior aids met with representatives 
from the ACLU, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and Equality Cal-
ifornia about the legal and political dynamics of the mayor’s decision to 
marry same-sex couples.  The group assembled talking points, centering on 
a position that denying same-sex couples marriage licenses was unconstitu-
tional, and developed a strategy for implementation.466 
The following day, Newsom’s administration issued a letter to the San 
Francisco County Clerk, requesting she take appropriate action to issue mar-
riage licenses without regard to applicants’ sex or sexual orientation.  New-
som’s letter emphasized the existing protections safeguarded by the Califor-
nia courts and the California Constitution against sex and sexual orientation 
discrimination, as well as making non-specific references to court decisions 
in Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts.  Newsom wrote:  
I swore to uphold the Constitution of the State of California. . . . The Cali-
fornia courts have interpreted the equal protection clause of the California 
Constitution to apply to lesbians and gay men . . . . The Supreme Courts in 
other states have held that equal protection provisions in their state consti-
tutions prohibit discrimination against gay men and lesbians with respect to 
the rights and obligations flowing from marriage.  It is my belief that these 
decisions are persuasive and that the California Constitution similarly pro-
hibits such discrimination. 
Pursuant to my sworn duty to uphold the California Constitution, includ-
ing specifically its equal protection clause, I request that you determine what 
changes should be made to the forms and documents used to apply for and 
issue marriage licenses in order to provide marriage licenses on a non-dis-
criminatory basis, without regard to gender or sexual orientation.467 
While Newsom’s letter garnered media attention, the mayor did not offer 
a timeline for when he wanted to implement a plan of action to issue same-
sex couples marriage licenses.  Newsom only let two days lapse between his 
letter to the county clerk when San Francisco officials blessed the first same-
sex weddings.468   
The reaction among the local gay and lesbian community was euphoric.  
Their unbridled enthusiasm was on display for national consumption.  Within 
the first nine days of San Francisco opening the doors to same-sex couples, 
more than 3200 couples received marriage licenses.469  According to Molly 
	
 466 See Gordon, supra note 464. 
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LAW/02/23/same.sex.marriage/index.html?iref=mpstoryview (noting marriages began on Feb-
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 469 Mayor Defends Same-Sex Marriages, CNN: LAW CENTER (Feb. 22, 2004, 10:51 PM), http://www.cnn. 
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McKay, the founder of Marriage Equality California, Newsom did for these 
couples what the LGB community had yet to achieve for themselves: 
Newsom put same-sex couples on the radar screen of the nongay world 
in a way those couples had never been before.  He allowed an opportunity 
to see real-life couples being impacted in a way that no paid-for advertising 
campaign or national gay and lesbian spokesperson could ever do.  It was so 
real, and to have all these couples wrapping around the block, standing gout 
in the elements. . . . 
It changed the nature of the debate.470 
Newsom credited his decision to move forward on nondiscriminatory 
marriage licenses to George W. Bush’s rejection of Goodridge.  “‘We’re react-
ing to the president’s decision to use this as a wedge issue to divide people.  I 
think what he’s doing is wrong.  It’s hurtful,’ Newsom said.”471 
President Bush returned the favor, floating to the media that as he 
marinated on whether to support a federal constitutional amendment 
banning same-sex marriage, he had a watchful eye on Newsom’s civil 
disobedience.  Less than a week after San Francisco began marrying same-
sex couples, President Bush said:  
I have watched carefully what’s happened in San Francisco, where licenses 
were being issued even though the law states otherwise.  I have consistently 
stated that if—I’ll support law[s] to protect marriage between a man and a 
woman.  And obviously these events are influencing my decision.472 
Within a week, Bush endorsed enshrining opposite-sex marriage in the 
federal constitution.473 
Openly gay Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank was unnerved by 
Newsom’s defiance of state law, believing it would set back the marriage move-
ment and energize conservatives in the lead up to the November 2004 elec-
tions.  Indeed, eleven states backed state constitutional amendments banning 
same-sex marriage, which Frank blamed on San Francisco’s “spectacle wed-
dings.”474  Frank believed if San Francisco had waited for court approval of 
same-sex marriages before issuing marriage licenses—as Massachusetts had—
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that “there would have been some collateral damage” to Democrats’ electoral 
prospects and equal marriage efforts, but it would have been “a lot less.”475 
 While Barney Frank’s preferred approach favoring litigation may have 
been inevitable, it was now on a fast track.  Organized interest groups had 
contemplated filing a lawsuit challenging California’s marriage laws before 
Newsom took action, and litigation was now certain to follow.  Indeed, the 
“proceed with caution” approach to litigation all but evaporated between the 
events in Massachusetts and San Francisco.476  One noteworthy civil rights 
activist, Kate Kendell of the National Center for Lesbian Rights, said in 2004 
that “California was in the queue” but that the group “probably would have 
waited another year or year and a half” had Mayor Newsom not intervened 
in the interim.477  Kendell told the Washington Post that “fate dealt a different 
hand.”478  When interviewed on the impact of the Massachusetts litigation 
on events in the Bay Area, Kendell said: 
Had it not been for Massachusetts, even considering the President’s State 
of the Union in isolation, I don’t think the Mayor would have done what he 
did.  Moreover, Bush might not have said what he did [in the State of the 
Union] without Massachusetts.  After all, what else did his mentioning “ac-
tivist judges” refer to? 
I think that Mayor Newsom felt this was the way the issue was trending 
and that Massachusetts should not be out ahead of California.  I think he felt 
that what he was doing was consistent with progressive ideology around 
equal protection of laws and full inclusion and fairness.  The Massachusetts 
ruling provided a foundation for him to build on.  It’s my suspicion that he 
would not have done what he did if there were a complete vacuum.479 
San Francisco Board of Supervisors President Aaron Peskin backed up 
Kendell’s observation on the impact of Goodridge.  “The Massachusetts state 
supreme court . . . decisions clearly gave Mayor Newsom license to commit 
an act of municipal civil disobedience in San Francisco[,]” he said.480 
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When asked to rank the most important developments in the same-sex 
marriage movement between 2003 and 2004, Sherri Sokeland Kaiser, a dep-
uty city attorney for the City and County of San Francisco, said: 
[N]othing could be more important than having a state that legally provides 
marriage to same-sex couples on the basis of the very constitutional concerns 
that are being raised in many other states.  [Goodridge] and the humanizing 
influence it’s going to have as more and more couples in Massachusetts get 
married, and the sky doesn’t fall, and marriage doesn’t lose its meaning for 
anyone . . . . The more it just becomes an accepted and normal and really 
unremarkable event in Massachusetts, the more that’s going to be an in-
creasingly powerful example for other states, such as California, to follow.481 
Similarly, San Francisco Board of Supervisors President Aaron Peskin 
pointed to the primacy of judicial legitimatization in the advancement of the 
same-sex marriage movement between 2003 and 2004.  Peskin ranked 
Goodridge as the most important factor because it “ultimately started the dom-
ino effect of acceptability.  San Francisco was important symbolically.  But 
Massachusetts catalyzed judicial activism.”482 
With Newsom and the Massachusetts justices interrupting the preexisting 
strategic plan for impact litigation in California, other legal support organi-
zations prepared to step in and file litigation.  Lambda Legal, for example, 
publicly offered to defend same-sex couples wanting to ensure the validity of 
their San Francisco marriages.483  The City also prepared to attack the state’s 
domestic relations regime and filed suit alleging the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from marriage rights violated state constitutional rights, only ten days 
after city officials met with LGBT rights leaders.484 
Anti-gay marriage organizations also prepared for litigation in wake of 
Newsom’s provocation.  The Proposition 22 Legal Defense and Education 
Fund and the Campaign for California Families requested judicial relief—
an injunction binding the City from issuing more licenses to same-sex cou-
ples.485  Responding slowly, a state trial court refused to stop the marriages, 
finding the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.486  Noticeably 
absent from the litigation up to this point was Attorney General Bill Lockyer, 
who vowed to defend the state’s law but publicly aired his disagreement with 
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its treatment of same-sex couples.  Lockyer said that he “personally [did not] 
support policies that g[a]ve lesser legal rights and responsibilities to commit-
ted same-sex couples.”487 
The day following Lockyer’s statement, Governor Schwarzenegger de-
manded Lockyer take action against city officials.  That same day, 
Schwarzenegger told a gathering of Republicans: 
We rely upon our courts to enforce our rule of law, but we’re seeing in San 
Francisco that the courts are dropping the ball.  
. . . .  
While we wait for the courts to act, it’s time for the City of San Francisco 
to start respecting state law. It is time for the city to stop traveling down this 
dangerous path of ignoring the rule of law.488   
The California Attorney General subsequently filed with the California Su-
preme Court to enjoin San Francisco from issuing marriage licenses to same-
sex couples.489 
On March 11, 2004, the California Supreme Court halted marriages not 
expressly permitted by state law pending further resolution.490  Mayor New-
som and the City complied.  In August, the California high court unani-
mously ruled San Francisco officials acted outside of their authority by refus-
ing to enforce the family law code under the premise it was unconstitutional, 
since no court of competent jurisdiction struck down the licensing require-
ments.491  The court ruled, 5-2, that because civil marriage contracts were 
clearly defined as between a man and a woman under state law and city of-
ficials acted beyond their authority, the nearly 4,000 same-sex licenses issued 
in the month that the city went unchecked were void.492   
The outcome in this case, which is fundamentally one about municipal 
powers and statutory interpretation, is unremarkable because there was little 
doubt that municipal authorities lacked the power to alter domestic relations 
law.  The real surprise is the degree to which the courts gave San Francisco 
officials slack to continue defying state law while litigation percolated.  In some 
	
 487 Harriet Chiang & John Wildermuth, Governor Demands End to Gay Marriage / Lockyer Told to Act Against 
S. F.’s Same-Sex Licenses, SF GATE (Feb. 21, 2004, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/arti-
cle/Governor-demands-end-to-gay-marriage-Lockyer-2793095.php (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 488 Rusty Dornin & David Mattingly, Same-Sex Marriages Break for Weekend, CNN (Feb. 21, 2004, 6:43 
PM) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/21/same.sex/. 
 489 Evelyn Nieves & Michelle Garcia, Calif. Court Won’t Halt Gay Marriages, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2004), 
http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A13697-2004Feb27.html. 
 490 Lockyer v. City of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 467 (Cal. 2004). 
 491  Id. at 464 (holding that “local officials in San Francisco exceeded their authority by taking official 
action in violation of applicable statutory provisions,” since “in the absence of a judicial determi-
nation that such statutory provisions are unconstitutional, local executive officials” lacked authority 
to issue same-sex marriage licenses). 
 492 Id. at 499, 503. 
	
954 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:4 
sense, the unusual leeway comports with the notion of judges preferring incre-
mental change as the precedent thesis states.  Though the 4,000 licenses issued 
to same-sex couples in this window were not valid, the courts’ complicity reads 
more like an attempt to nudge the public toward accepting equal marriage 
before constitutional challenges to state family law were decided on the merits.  
Newsom’s bold move was accompanied by the introduction of legislation 
during the second week of the San Francisco marriages in the California Leg-
islature.  State Assemblyman Mark Leno of San Francisco introduced a bill 
to legalize same-sex marriage in California.493  Leno also participated in the 
city marriage defiance movement and was deputized to perform marriages 
on behalf the city.  He solemnized over 100 marriages.494  Leno described his 
legislative work as part and parcel to Newsom’s defiance.  “It’s a one-two 
punch,” Leno said.495  Leno nevertheless pledged to defer to the House 
Speaker’s judgment on whether his bill would receive a hearing.  The House 
Speaker’s spokesman conveyed the Speaker’s wishes to “wait to see how 
lower courts ruled on the constitutionality of gay marriage before deciding 
whether to allow Leno’s bill a hearing.”496 
Leno, however, was not reacting to Newsom as much as he was acting in 
tandem—both men shared the same motivation stemming from the Bush 
Administration’s hostility toward the Goodridge decision in Massachusetts.  In 
fact, Leno made clear weeks before the San Francisco marriage rush that he 
was aghast over the State of the Union address and what he perceived as the 
politicization of equal marriage rights: 
It was disgraceful for the president of the United States to pander to his 
radical right-wing supporters out of his own concerns for re-election . . . . 
This puts me and my community in the position of taking one of two actions: 
Either continually playing defense or taking proactive steps.  Rather than 
playing defense and explaining why we don’t need a constitutional amend-
ment, this (legislation) moves forward in a positive fashion.497 
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For his part, Governor Schwarzenegger’s position on same-sex marriage 
appeared to soften during the time that marriages continued in San Fran-
cisco contrary to state law.  A week before the California Supreme Court 
stopped Newsom and his allies from issuing more licenses to same-sex cou-
ples, Schwarzenegger was a guest on Jay Leno’s national evening program.  
When asked if he inherently opposed equal marriage rights for same-sex cou-
ples, the Governor responded, “No, I don’t have a problem.  Let the court 
decide.  Let the people decide.”498  He also expressed disagreement for calls 
to federally ban same-sex marriage by constitutional amendment.  While the 
Governor’s new tepid demeanor towards changing the state’s domestic rela-
tions law fell well short of an endorsement, Newsom believed it was signifi-
cant to the extent that it helped “soften the opposition.”499 
The most crucial executive action in California came in 2009.  After the 
California Supreme Court ruled that the state constitution required equal 
marriage rights for same-sex couples, state voters initiated a constitutional 
amendment to overturn the decision.  That initiative, Proposition 8, was suc-
cessful on Election Day in November 2008.  Governor Schwarzenegger op-
posed Proposition 8 prior to its ratification, calling it a “waste of time” and 
preferring to give deference to the state courts’ judgment.500  The governor 
stopped short of endorsing equal marriage.  Meanwhile, the state’s attorney 
general, Jerry Brown, personally opposed Proposition 8, but pledged to de-
fend it in the lead up to November 2008.501 
The proposition’s success prompted days of protests by pro-LGBT Cali-
fornians.  Less than a week after voters backed the amendment to take away 
marriage rights from same-sex couples, Schwarzenegger expressed a change 
of heart on the merits on equal marriage.  “It’s unfortunate, obviously, but 
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it’s not the end . . . I think that we will again maybe undo that, if the court is 
willing to do that, and then move forward from there and again lead in that 
area,” the governor said.502  
The American Foundation for Equal Rights funded a federal court chal-
lenge alleging Proposition 8 violated the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth 
Amendment.503  That group, represented by David Boies and Ted Olson, 
backed the federal case.  This is a noteworthy development that satisfies a 
condition of the support-structure hypothesis—the legal community elite 
staunchly supported same-sex couples’ litigation.  More than influential pri-
vate practitioners attacking Proposition 8, the state’s top executives refused 
to defend the law.504  Consequently, the same-sex marriage ban’s defense was 
in the hands of intervening parties that supported the campaign backing 
Proposition 8.  Schwarzenegger told the federal district court that the suit 
brought by two same-sex couples against the marriage amendment “presents 
important constitutional questions that require and warrant judicial determi-
nation.”505  Taking a more aggressive track than the governor’s relative neu-
trality, Attorney General Brown argued that Proposition 8 violated the fun-
damental rights of LGB couples.506 
These critical decisions in 2009 and 2010, to not defend Proposition 8 
and not appeal the decision striking it down, carried great significance.  At 
trial, Proposition 8’s proponents abjectly failed to produce any substantive 
defense of the law.  Proponents offered only two witnesses to support the 
constitutional amendment—both witnesses were by all accounts ineffective 
and ill prepared.507  
The thin amount of evidence presented in support of Proposition 8, despite 
Judge Vaughn Walker’s prodding for a more vigorous defense, was damning.  
Judge Walker’s 138-page ruling thoroughly dismantled the justifications 
proffered by the defense.  Legal experts roundly expected the decision to survive 
the test of time.  One high-profile Proposition 8 supporter concluded Walker’s 
work product was too persuasive to be overturned, while same-sex marriage 
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advocates celebrated the decision as a major turning point because of its 
dedication to detail.508  In the end, the state’s nondefense proved dispositive for 
the litigation’s outcome.  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2013 that the 
interveners lacked Article III standing to appeal Judge Walker’s ruling.509 
B.  The Emerging of National Civil Disobedience 
The ramifications of Newsom’s civil disobedience rippled across the na-
tion, consistent with the expectations of the rights consciousness thesis that 
predicts judicial rulings can help fuel an awareness of emerging legal claims 
and bring them into mainstream discourse.  A number of mayors applauded 
Newsom.  Chicago’s Mayor Richard Daley said he had “no problem” with 
Cook County issuing same-sex marriage licenses.510  Cook County Clerk Da-
vid Orr refused to issue licenses to gay couples, though he personally sup-
ported marriage rights for gay couples.  “We feel the law must change either 
by the Illinois General Assembly or by the [state] Supreme Court, as was 
done in Massachusetts,” a spokesman for Orr said.511  Orr’s withholding of 
licenses to gay couples drew protests to the Cook County Clerk’s Office.512  
Supporters of marriage equality held a sit-in on the first day that Massachu-
setts began marrying same-sex couples in May 2004.513 
In Manhattan, hundreds of LGB activists took to the streets and de-
manded the mayor take a position on marriage.514  New York City Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg waded into the controversy offering strong support for 
civil unions, but left the door open to equal marriage.  Bloomberg equivo-
cated, “I think the term ‘marriage’ is what is polarizing people, and as I say, 
I’ve gone back-and-forth.”515 
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The rights consciousness chain reaction went beyond local leaders speak-
ing out on equal marriage rights.  Following the acts of municipal defiance 
in California, same-sex couples in other states took to the courts.  In Wash-
ington, a King County Administrator encouraged couples that wanted to 
marry to file suit against him challenging Washington’s marriage law.516  On 
March 8, 2004, six couples applied for marriage licenses in King County and 
were denied at the direction of King County Administrator Ron Sims.  
Lambda Legal filed suit challenging the Washington law under state consti-
tutional grounds the same day.517  
Later on March 8, Seattle Mayor Greg Nickels issued an executive order 
recognizing municipal employees who lawfully married a same-sex partner 
outside Washington.518  Nickels also took the opportunity to propose an 
amendment to Seattle’s nondiscrimination law.519  The Mayor recom-
mended the definition of “marital status” specifically be amended to include 
same-sex married couples.520  Nickels and his supporters hoped the city could 
then require equal benefits for gay and straight employees’ spouses for pri-
vate employers, but it was never adopted.521 
According to Lambda Legal’s lead attorney on the case, Jamie Pedersen, 
who would play a significant role in advancing LGBT rights in the Washing-
ton Legislature, litigation was contemplated for some time in Washington. 
But, the Goodridge decision in Massachusetts and local efforts to issue marriage 
licenses pushed them to act earlier than originally planned.  “The explosion 
of support for gay marriage across the country absolutely made us move 
faster. . . . The train was leaving the station and we could either be on it, or 
be chasing it,” Pedersen said.522 
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A second lawsuit came on April 1 from the ACLU on behalf of eleven 
same-sex couples.523  ACLU representatives were more energized in 2004 to 
tackle same-sex marriage bans than before.  “The time is much better now 
than it was a year or two ago,” ACLU Executive Director Kathleen Taylor 
said on the organization’s decision to file suit.524  While the rights consciousness 
effect is evidenced in Washington, it would have been muted but for the infra-
structure that was in place to buttress LGBT litigation and advocacy.  The 
ACLU and Lambda Legal were vital building blocks—these organizations op-
erationalized the burgeoning post-Goodridge/post-San Francisco rights con-
sciousness.  As the support structure thesis predicts, these groups utilizing their 
resources and expertise were able to take swift action and tap into the new 
sense of urgency expressed by same-sex couples to have their rights vindicated.  
The same day same-sex couples applied for marriage licenses in Wash-
ington, New Jersey officials in Asbury Park started to issue marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples.525  The deputy municipal clerk, Dawn Tomek, told re-
porters that she studied the state’s marriage law after a resident made an 
inquiry after marriages began in San Francisco.  Finding that New Jersey law 
neither expressly permitted nor banned same-sex marriage, Tomek decided 
to act.  “I went by the Constitutions of the United States and of New Jersey, 
both of which guarantee equal rights,” she said.526  The City backed Tomek, 
issuing a statement that issuing same-sex couples marriage licenses was “a 
matter of ‘fundamental civil rights.’”527  
After two businesses days, ten couples completed license applications and 
waited for the seventy-two-hour waiting period to expire.528  Unlike in San 
	
REPORTER, (Mar. 8, 2004, 10:00 PM) (internal quotations omitted), http://www.seattlepi.com/lo-
cal/article/Seattle-gays-go-to-court-after-wedding-licenses-1138971.php. 
 523 ACLU Files Lawsuit Seeking Marriage Equality for Same-Sex Couples in Washington State, ACLU (Apr. 1, 
2004), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-files-lawsuit-seeking-marriage-equality-same-sex-couples 
-washington-state. 
 524 Maureen O’Hagan, King County Won’t License Gay Marriages, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 4, 2004, 12:00 
AM) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://old.seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2001870939 
_law04m.html.  
 525 See Johnson, supra note 517. 
 526 Robert Hanley & Laura Mansnerus, Asbury Park Deputy Mayor Officiates at a Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 09, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/09/nyregion/asbury-park-deputy-mayor-offi-
ciates-at-a-gay-marriage.html?_r=0 (reporting Asbury Park Deputy Clerk Dawn Tomek’s decision 
to start issuing marriage licenses to gay couples in New Jersey) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 527 Joseph A. Gambardello, Kaitlin Gurney & Kristen A. Graham, Shore Town is First in N.J. to Let Gays 
Marry, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 9, 2004, at A7 (explaining the foundations of Asbury Park’s issuance 
of marriage licenses to gay couples, despite that “state law does not yet officially authorize same-
sex marriages.”). 
 528 See Kaitlin Gurney & Kristen A. Graham, A Dash to Get Married: Asbury Park Is Defying the State on 
Same-sex Weddings, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 10, 2004, at A01 (documenting controversy between 
Asbury Park officials who married gay couples and officials who insisted that doing so would con-
stitute a misdemeanor under New Jersey state law). 
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Francisco, however, local LGBT rights activists were not included in the de-
cision-making process. Nevertheless, Lambda Legal and New Jersey Lesbian 
and Gay Coalition expressed support, issuing a joint statement that said, “Our 
organizations . . . support and congratulate all the jurisdictions across the 
country that have taken this courageous action, including Asbury Park.”529 
In neighboring Pennsylvania, New Hope City Council members passed a 
resolution asking Bucks County officials to issue same-sex marriage licenses. 
Because the city had no authority to issue licenses, there was little the council 
could do, but members told the media that they had started discussing the issue 
in the weeks after Gavin Newsom’s order to the San Francisco County Clerk.530 
1.  Oregon 
Civil disobedience by municipal action soon came to Portland, Oregon. 
Oregon law was peculiar in that it defined marriage as “a civil contract entered 
into in person by males at least 17 years of age and females at least 17 years of 
age.”531  The use of “by” as opposed to “between” suggested an opening might 
exist for same-sex couples to avail themselves of marriage rights under existing 
law.  However, the Oregon domestic relations statute also made repeated 
references to marriage by using the term “husband and wife.”532  
Opponents of marriage equality hoped to foreclose efforts by same-sex 
couples to take advantage of Oregon courts or the state legislature in the 
wake of Goodridge to legalize gay nuptials.  A campaign to amend the Oregon 
Constitution failed in 1999, but Goodridge reignited the debate.533   
On the heels of Gavin Newsom’s stand on marriage and after hearing 
equal marriage opponents were initiating a petition to amend the state con-
stitution to ban gay marriage rights, the head of the state’s largest LGBT 
rights organization, Basic Rights Oregon, approached Multnomah County 
	
 529 Rudy Larini & Mary Jo Patterson, Asbury Park Weds 2 Men, a First in N.J., STAR-LEDGER, Mar. 9, 
2004, at 1 (alteration in original).  
 530 See Rosa Salter, Pervaiz Shallwani & Joanna Poncavage, New Hope Backs Gay Marriage, MORNING 
CALL (Mar. 11, 2004), http://articles.mcall.com/2004-03-11/news/3519459_1_same-sex-mar-
riage-gay-marriage-issue-marriage-licenses (stating that New Hope City Council members started 
discussing issuing same-sex marriage licenses in the weeks after San Francisco did).  
 531 OR. REV. STAT. § 106.010 (2018), invalidated by Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (2014); 
see also Oregon County Issues Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, CNN (Mar. 3, 2004), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2004/US/West/03/03/same.sex.marriage/index.html. 
 532 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 106.041(1) (2013) (“All persons wishing to enter into a mar-
riage contract shall obtain a marriage license from the county clerk upon application, 
directed to any person or religious organization or congregation authorized by ORS 
106.120 to solemnize marriages, and authorizing the person, organization or congrega-
tion to join together as husband and wife the persons named in the license.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 533 PINELLO, supra note 470, at 105. 
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officials and encouraged action.534  Seeing an opportunity to take advantage 
of the statutory ambiguity, on March 3, 2004, same-sex marriage licenses 
were issued in Multnomah County—one day after opponents filed to begin 
circulating petitions in support of a constitutional ballot initiative.535  
Multnomah County Attorney Agnes Sowle justified the County’s position: 
The Oregon Constitution prohibits the county from discriminating 
against same-sex couples when they are applying for marriage licenses be-
cause that kind of discrimination based on gender and based on sexual ori-
entation is not allowed in Oregon.536 
Six days later, County Circuit Judge Dale Koch rejected an application 
to enjoin the county from continuing to issue same-sex couples marriage li-
censes.537  Judge Koch’s ruling allowed nearly 3,000 gay and lesbian couples 
to secure marriage licenses from the county in hand.538  
In the interim, elected officials quickly sought advisory opinions on the 
legal status of same-sex marriage in Oregon.  The Democratic leader in the 
Oregon Senate, Kate Brown, requested an opinion from legislative coun-
sel.539  The opinion focused on a 1998 Oregon appellate court decision, Tan-
ner v. Oregon Health Sciences University, which held that the state could not deny 
insurance benefits to state employees in same-sex relationships.540  In Tanner, 
the court ruled sexual orientation was a suspect class: 
Sexual orientation, like gender, race, alienage, and religious affiliation is 
widely regarded as defining a distinct, socially recognized group of citizens, 
and certainly it is beyond dispute that homosexuals in our society have been 
	
 534 See Taylor Clark et al., Inside Portland’s Velvet Revolution: How Gay Marriage Went from Idea to Reality, 
WILLAMETTE WEEK (Mar. 9, 2004), http://www.wweek.com/portland/article-3009-inside-port-
lands-velvet-revolution.html. 
 535 See Renée LaChance, Nothing Left to Lose: A Look at Oregon’s Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, PQ MONTHLY 
(Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.pqmonthly.com/nothing-left-lose-look-oregons-fight-sex-mar-
riage/18687 (chronicling the timeline of marriage rights in Oregon between 1993 and 2014, in-
cluding Multnomah County’s issuance of marriage licenses beginning on March 3, 2004); Elections 
Div., Or. Sec’y of State, Initiative Number 150: Constitutional Definition of Marriage, INITIATIVE, 
REFERENDUM AND REFERRAL SEARCH, http://egov.sos.state.or.us/elec/web_irr_search.rec-
ord_detail?p_reference=20040150..LSCYYYMARRIAGE (documenting petition for amendment 
to Oregon constitution titled: “Only Marriage Between One Man And One Woman Is Valid Or 
Legally Recognized As Marriage,” which was filed on March 2, 2004). 
 536 Oregon County Issues Same-sex Marriage Licenses, CNN (Mar. 3, 2004, 2:12 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2004/US/West/03/03/same.sex.marriage/.  
 537 JASON PIERCESON, COURTS, LIBERALISM, AND RIGHTS: GAY LAW AND POLITICS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 157 (2005). 
 538 William McCall, Oregon Supreme Court Voids Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2005), 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55056-2005Apr14.html. 
 539 Letter from Greg Chaimov, Or. Legislative Counsel, to Kate Brown, Or. Senator, (Mar. 8, 2004) 
(on file with ACLU Oregon), http://www.aclu-or.org/sites/default/files/Lit_Li_Other_LegCoun-
sel3_02_04.pdf. 
 540 Tanner v. Or. Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). 
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and continue to be the subject of adverse social and political stereotyping 
and prejudice.541  
The legislative counsel letter emphasized that the Oregon courts’ 
jurisprudence was more favorable to claims of sexual orientation 
discrimination than many states.  “Even the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, which has ordered that state to make marriage available to 
same-sex couples, does not treat homosexuals the same as racial minorities 
and religious adherents,” the letter highlighted.542  The letter also detailed 
two Oregon state court cases where the courts ruled LGB persons and same-
sex couples were fit parents.543  Assessing the legal landscape in Oregon and 
nationally, the legislative counsel opinion concluded the Oregon 
Constitution compelled equal marriage rights for LGB Oregonians.544 
Democratic Governor Ted Kulongoski asked the state’s attorney general 
for an opinion on the Multnomah County marriages.545  Attorney General 
Hardy Meyers offered a more muted opinion than the state’s legislative coun-
sel, on March 12.  Meyers ultimately concluded that the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from marriage rights had improbable odds in surviving judicial scru-
tiny: “[T]he Oregon Supreme Court would likely conclude that withholding 
from same-sex couples the legal rights, benefits, and obligations that—under 
current law—are automatically granted to marriage couples of the opposite 
sex likely violates Article I, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution . . . .”546 
With the attorney general opinion concluding the Portland clerks were 
acting contrary to state law, Governor Kulongoski urged clerks to abide by 
the male-female requirements of state family law. 547  The governor, along 
with the attorney general, pledged to expeditiously bring the constitutional 
question to state’s highest court.548  “There is only one body in this state that 
can give us a definitive ruling on whether this is constitutional or not, and 
	
 541 Id. at 447. 
 542 Letter from Gregory A. Chaimov, Or. Legislative Counsel, to Kate Brown, supra note 539, at 2 
(citing Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 331 (2003)). 
 543 Id. at 4 (citing Collins and Collins, 183 Or. App. 354, 359 (2002) (holding that a “court cannot 
consider parents’ homosexual relationship when deciding custody arrangement”); then citing Ash-
ling v. Ashling, 42 Or. App. 47, 50 (1979) (finding that “for purposes of deciding custody and visit-
ation, homosexuals and heterosexuals [should be] held to same standard of behavior.”)). 
 544 See id. at 1 (stating that “the answer is yes” with regards to whether “state law requires a county 
clerk to license the marriage of a same-sex couple). 
 545 Letter from Hardy Meyers, Attorney Gen., State of Or., to Ted Kulongoski, Governor, State of 
Or. 11 (Mar. 12, 2012), https://aclu-or.org/sites/default/files/Lit_Li_Other_AttnyGeneral3_ 
12_04.pdf. 
 546 Id. 
 547 See Oregon Attorney General: Gay Marriage Illegal, CNN (Mar. 12, 2004), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2004/LAW/03/12/oregon.gay.marriage/ (noting that the governor of Oregon stressed that same-
sex marriage licenses should not be issued in the state until the state Supreme Court ruled on the 
issue).  
 548 Id. 
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that entity is the Oregon Supreme Court,” Kulongoski said.549  In the in-
terim, Kulongoski offered support for civil unions, stating, “I believe that 
every citizen in this state is entitled to the same rights, privileges, responsibil-
ities as every other citizen.”550  
On March 24, the ACLU and Basic Rights Oregon filed suit challenging 
the permissibility of the state’s marriage law under the Oregon Constitu-
tion.551  On April 20, 2004, Judge Frank Bearden ordered the county officials 
to halt same-sex marriage licenses. 552  Bearden also mandated the state treat 
the 3022 same-sex marriage licenses already issued by the county as valid.553  
As appeals percolated, opponents of equal marriage campaigned on the bal-
lot proposal to ban same-sex marriage in state constitution.554  Voters ap-
proved that measure in November 2004.555  
Though the amendment’s backers put their campaign in motion before 
the Portland licenses were issued, they believed they capitalized on the clerks’ 
disregard for state law.  Kelly Clark, counsel for the Oregon’s Defense of 
Marriage Coalition, suggested that average Oregonians had “always worried 
that there might be some secret gay agenda.”556  Pointing to the events in 
Portland, Clark said, “And, lo and behold, there was a secret gay agenda.”557 
On April 14, 2005, the Oregon State Supreme Court decided in Li v. State 
that the newly adopted constitutional amendment mooted the question of 
equal marriage rights.558  The court further ruled that Multnomah County 
lacked authority to remedy a perceived state constitutional violation and all 
same-sex marriage licenses were therefore void.559 
	
 549 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 550 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 551 Matthew Preusch, Oregonians Look to One Suit to Settle Gay Marriage Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2004, 
at A16 (noting that Oregon’s same-sex marriage issue was to be decided in a single lawsuit filed in 
Portland, Oregon).  
 552  Li v. State, No. 0403-03057, 2004 WL 4963162 (Or. Cir. Ct. Apr. 20, 2014) (order directing Ore-
gon to record the marriage of same-sex couples and enjoining Multnomah County from issuing 
further licenses to same-sex couples without declaring a prevailing party).  
 553 Id.; see also Lynn Marshall & Elizabeth Mehren, Oregon Judge Puts Hold on More Gay Marriages, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2004), http://www.latimes.com/la-me-timelinegaymarriage2004apr21-story.html. 
 554 KLARMAN, supra note 168, at 107–8 (detailing the efforts of same-sex opponents and proponents to 
lobby for and against a constitutional amendment referendum). 
 555 See William McCall, Oregon Supreme Court Voids Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 
2005, at A03 (noting that the Oregon Supreme Court in part relied on the fact that Oregon voters 
voted in favor of a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage to reach its decision). 
 556 Sarah Kershaw, Oregon Supreme Court Invalidates Same-Sex Marriages, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/15/us/oregon-supreme-court-invalidates-samesex-mar-
riages.html.  
 557 Id. 
 558 Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 98 (Or. 2005) (en banc) (holding that the newly adopted constitutional 
amendment further limited the state constitutional scope of marriage in Oregon). 
 559 See id. at 101–02 (stating that the county overstepped its authority in issuing marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples). 
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The Oregon Supreme Court also rejected litigants’ calls to determine 
whether civil unions were required under the state constitution because the 
issue was not raised in lower courts.560  However, less than twenty-four hours 
before Li was decided, Governor Kulongoski forwarded legislation to enact 
civil unions and ban discrimination in housing and employment on the basis 
of sexual orientation.561  The Kulongoski Administration was unfazed by the 
Oregon Supreme Court’s decision.  The Administration’s spokesman reiter-
ated, “The state’s position from the outset was that the fundamental issue 
was whether or not same-sex couples were entitled to the rights and privileges 
of marriage, not just the institution of marriage itself.”562 
The omnibus civil unions-nondiscrimination bill, SB 1000,563 prompted 
the first vote ever on same-sex unions in the Oregon Legislature.564  It passed 
the Oregon Senate with 19 votes.565  Opponents generally cast it as an 
attempt to subvert the marriage amendment and “overturn the will of the 
voters.”566  Opponents also often referred to civil unions as “‘gay marriage’ 
by another name.”567  
Despite the public’s expressed opposition to equal marriage in the prior 
election by a margin of 57 to 43%, polling offered a more nuanced picture.568  
One poll found 49% of Oregon voters supported civil unions at the time 
SB1000 was under debate.569  That poll also registered 30% of Oregon voters 
opposed to civil unions, with 21% undecided.570  Still, the public was divided 
and so, too, was the legislative response.  The Republican Oregon House 
Speaker refused to hear a civil unions bill, though some GOP House leaders 
offered to advance Hawaii-styled reciprocal beneficiaries legislation.571 
	
 560 See id. at 102 (holding that “[t]hese appeals do not require us to explore the full range of actions 
from which a governmental official might choose in vindicating that official’s personal constitu-
tional vision.”). 
 561 Todd Simmons, Civil Compromise, ADVOCATE, May 24, 2005, at 17 (noting that less than 24 hours 
before Li’s ruling, Oregon Governor Kulongoski “introduced a bill to create civil unions.”).  
 562 Kershaw, supra note 556. 
 563 S.B. 1000, 73d Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2005). 
 564 Charles E. Beggs, Committee Sends Civil-Union Bill to Full Oregon Senate, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER (June 23, 2005, 10:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Committee-
sends-civil-union-bill-to-full-Oregon-1176772.php.  
 565 Id. 
 566 Oregon Senate OKs Civil Unions Bill, FOX NEWS (July 9, 2005), http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
2005/07/09/oregon-senate-oks-civil-unions-bill.html.  
 567 Niki Sullivan, Oregon Senate Panel Passes Bill to OK Civil Unions, SEATTLE TIMES (June 8, 2005, 4:29 
PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/oregon-senate-panel-passes-bill-to-ok-civil-un-
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 568 Brad Cain, Civil Union Bill Passes Oregon Senate, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (July 10, 2005), 
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2005/jul/10/civil-union-bill-passes-oregon-senate/ (quoting 
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 571 Historic Civil-Union Vote Set in Senate, STATESMAN JOURNAL, June 8, 2005, at 15. 
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Governor Kulongoski, undeterred, wanted to take action and keep the issue 
of LGBT rights alive.  Kulongoski issued an executive order to form a 
commission charged with studying the state of equal rights in Oregon.572  The 
Governor explained the motivation behind his reinvigorated civil rights agenda: 
After Oregon passed this constitutional amendment [banning] same-sex 
marriage, which I campaigned against [in 2004], I think everyone thought 
the political process would go dead on this issue.  I put it back in the next 
legislative session two months after the election because I didn’t want it to 
go dead.  I like the task force because I don’t want a political vacuum to be 
generated.  I want the public to care about the debate.573 
The governor and his task force held hearings across the state and worked 
to craft legislation,574 which was passed in 2007.575  Instead of using the term 
“civil union” as advocates had in 2005, the 2007 legislation created “domes-
tic partnerships.” 576  The domestic partnership legislation, which was cou-
pled with anti-discrimination legislation, passed with bipartisan support.577  
As a near immediate outgrowth of the Oregon marriage defiance, same-sex 
couples galvanized efforts to secure marriage-like status and anti-discrimination 
protections—first introduced in 1973—in housing, public accommodations, jury 
service, foster parenting, state institutions, public schools, and employment.578 
2.  New Mexico  
The emergence of a rights consciousness effect was short lived in one New 
Mexico county.  On February 20, 2004, Sandoval County, New Mexico, Clerk 
Victoria Dunlap started issuing same-sex marriage licenses.579  Dunlap, a Re-
publican, was prompted to act after a phone call from a member of the public: 
	
 572 Or. Exec. Order No. 06-03, (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.oregon.gov/gov/Documents/execu-
tive_orders/eo0603.pdf. 
 573 Sean Kennedy, Q&A Gov. Ted Kulongoski, ADVOCATE, Mar. 28, 2006, at 6.  
 574 See, e.g., Sarah Lemon, Task Force Discusses Equality, MAIL TRIB. (Sept. 22, 2006), www.mailtrib-
une.com/article/20060922/news/309229988 (reporting on one of the Task Force’s regional meetings). 
 575 Domestic Partners Bill Approved, L.A. TIMES (May 3, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/-
2007/may/03/nation/na-gayrights3.  
 576 Id. (explaining that “domestic partnership” would allow same-sex couples to enter into contractual 
relationships giving them the same state law benefits of married couples). 
 577 Id. (noting that the Oregon bill passed with unanimous support from the Senate’s majority Demo-
crats and two Republicans who joined). 
 578 DONALD P. HAIDER-MARKEL, OUT AND RUNNING: GAY AND LESBIAN CANDIDATES, 
ELECTIONS, AND POLICY REPRESENTATION 104 (2010). 
 579 Christopher Lisotta, Bringing Marriage to New Mexico, ADVOCATE, July 6, 2004, at 20; see also Susan 
Montoya Bryan, Same-Sex Couples Marry in Sandoval County, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Feb. 20, 2004), 
http://www.abqjournal.com/news/state/apwed02-20-04.htm. 
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I had a person call and ask if we did perform same-sex marriages. And I 
said as of yet we had not but I would look into it. I had one of my staff mem-
bers ask an attorney, and [County Attorney David Mathews] said that we had 
to issue the licenses. We could not prohibit anyone based upon sex.580 
Mathews told Dunlap that New Mexico’s marriage law did not mention 
sex-based requirements for parties to a marriage, though a 1961 statute es-
tablishing the statewide marriage license form did make reference to male 
and female applicants.581  In 1973, New Mexico outlawed sex-based discrim-
ination, Mathews said.582  Dunlap stated that she would continue to issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex applicants until she received an opinion from 
the State Attorney General directing her not to.583  
“This has nothing to do with politics or morals. . . . If there are no legal 
grounds that say this should be prohibited, I can’t withhold it. . . . This office 
won’t say no until shown it’s not permissible,” Dunlap said.584  Clerks in 
neighboring Santa Fe and Bernalillo counties disagreed and declined to fol-
low Dunlap, believing the law was clear.585  “‘My position is I took an oath 
to uphold the law, not change the law,’ said Rebecca Bustamante, Santa Fe 
County Clerk.  ‘I wouldn’t do it because I just don’t think I can.’”586 
Unlike in other states, New Mexico Attorney General Patricia Madrid 
took swift action to put a stop to Dunlap’s reading of state law.  On the same 
day Dunlap started issuing licenses, Madrid issued an advisory letter that the 
licenses were “invalid under state law.”  The Sandoval County Clerk’s Office 
heeded the Attorney General’s advice after the 66 licenses were issued.587 
In 2004, the New Mexico Attorney General’s Office offered clerks little 
room to engage in disobedience.  By 2011, the Office’s tone was markedly 
different.  Now headed by Attorney General Gary King, the Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office responded to an inquiry from State Representative Al Park con-
cerning the status of marriages contracted by same-sex couples outside of 
New Mexico.  The formal opinion concluded: 
While we cannot predict how a New Mexico court would rule on this 
issue, after review of the law in this area, it is our opinion that a same-sex 
marriage that is valid under the laws of the country or state where it was 
consummated would likewise be found valid in New Mexico.588 
	
 580 Lisotta, supra note 579. 
 581 See Montoya Bryan, supra note 579. 
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 584 Id.  (second alternation in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 588 Office of N.M. Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter No. 11-01, at 1 (Jan. 4, 2011).  
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3.  New York 
On Tuesday, February 24, 2004, President Bush announced his support 
for a federal constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage.  Bush 
cited the events unfolding in San Francisco as partial motivation for his de-
cision to take action on what he called “the most fundamental institution of 
civilization,” but it trigged additional pushback in New York.589  On Friday, 
February 27, 2004, New Paltz Mayor Jason West drew national attention 
when he began marrying same-sex couples.590 
When West became mayor in June 2003, same-sex relationship recogni-
tion was one of the many items on his agenda.  He took no action on gay 
rights during the remainder of the year.  While the national debated unfolded 
after same-sex unions started in Massachusetts, West told the National Con-
ference on Organized Resistance in January 2004 that he wanted to marry 
same-sex couples as a newly minted mayor.591  West was emboldened by 
Mayor Gavin Newsom’s refusal to discriminate against same-sex couples, the 
mandates of state law notwithstanding.  “San Francisco is absolutely an in-
spiration and made it clear we also wanted to stand up to President Bush,” 
he said.592  But, West’s thinking on equal treatment for same-sex couples be-
gan in the months after the Baker decision in Vermont—long before the post-
State of the Union tussle.  “The first time I recall [contemplating equal mar-
riage for same-sex couples] was in 2000, I ran as a protest [state legislative] 
candidate for the Green Party just after Vermont had legalized civil unions.  
That was the first time it came on my radar as civil unions,” West said.593  
On Monday, February 23, 2004, West asked the New Paltz clerk if she 
would issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.  The clerk declined.  After 
President Bush threw his support behind the proposed federal amendment, 
West announced he would follow Mayor Gavin Newsom’s lead and start sol-
emnizing wedding ceremonies.  Though West had started to take the neces-
sary steps to illegally marry same-sex couples prior to George W. Bush’s con-
stitutional reform announcement, West said that Bush “gave me even more 
conviction in marrying same-sex couples.”594 
	
 589 President Bush’s Remarks on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
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metro/news/politics/columns/statepolitic/n_10018/. 
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As West began marrying same-sex couples in rural New Paltz, a political 
firestorm came about in New York.  Eventually, West was enjoined by a state 
court from continuing to marry same-sex couples, but other New York 
elected officials, like Ithaca Mayor Carolyn Peterson, looked for ways to con-
tribute and bring the issue of LGB rights to the fore.595  
Peterson recognized that the marriages in New Paltz were merely sym-
bolic because the Department of Health would refuse to file them, but hoped 
to seize the opportunity to pursue litigation.596  Peterson announced in March 
that the city would coordinate a campaign to send same-sex couples’ unsigned 
marriage applications to the state Health Department.597  Once the Health 
Department rejected the application, Ithaca officials would provide legal as-
sistance and work to file a lawsuit challenging the state’s marriage laws.598  
On March 3, 2004, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer weighed 
in, providing an informal opinion on the status of relationship recognition 
for same-sex couples in New York.  In response to an inquiry from the Town 
of Olive concerning the ministerial obligations of clerks, the Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office replied that New York clerks must not issue marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples because the legislative intent behind the state’s domestic 
relations law was to never to permit sex-blind marriages.  Though the con-
trolling statute did not authorize clerks to issue marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples, the opinion pointed out that “serious constitutional concerns” were 
raised by the statute’s discriminatory effect.599 
The City of Cohoes requested the Attorney General’s Office opine on 
the validity of same-sex marriages entered into from out-of-state or parallel 
state recognized relationship statuses, like civil unions.  The opinion con-
cluded that New York common law “presumptively require[d] that” same-
sex couples’ out-of-state civil unions were recognized under state law.600 
New York was the first state to signal it would treat out-of-state same-sex 
marriages as valid, although the Attorney General’s opinion did not carry 
the force of law.  Later in 2004, concrete steps were made to adhere to the 
principle of comity laid out by Spitzer’s office.  In October 2004, the New 
	
 595 See Thomas Crampton, Court Says New Paltz Mayor Can’t Hold Gay Weddings, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 
2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/08/nyregion/court-says-new-paltz-mayor-can-t-hold 
-gay-weddings.html; Thomas Crampton & Michelle York, Hoping Courts Will Address Same-Sex Mar-
riage, Ithaca Begins Accepting Licenses, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2004/03/02/nyregion/hoping-courts-will-address-same-sex-marriage-ithaca-begins-accepting-li-
censes.html. 
 596 Id. 
 597 Id. 
 598 Id. 
 599 N.Y. Att’y Gen., Informal Op.  No. 2004-1 on Same-sex Marriages Under the New York State 
Domestic Relations Law at 4, 16 (Mar. 3, 2004). 
 600 Id. at 1, 16. 
	
Mar. 2018] STAGES OF CONSTITUTIONAL GRIEF 969 
York State Comptroller announced the state’s retirement system would rec-
ognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed outside New York.601  New 
York City Mayor Bloomberg followed suit in November 2004. Bloomberg 
issued a statement on the expansion of benefits: 
A few weeks ago, I asked the Corporation Counsel to advise me on 
whether the City’s five pension systems could be expanded to recognize 
same-sex marriages, legally entered into in other jurisdictions as well as Ver-
mont civil unions.  Today the Corporation Counsel has advised me that such 
recognition is legal and just.  I am forwarding the opinion to my representa-
tives on the boards of the City’s five pension systems and directing them to 
introduce resolutions to ensure that parties to these relations are treated in 
the same manner as parties to opposite-sex marriages.602 
By 2006, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the numerous consti-
tutional claims pressed in state courts to dismantle the state’s sex-conscious 
marriage law.603  While the New York Legislature hemmed and hawed over 
legislation to legalize same-sex marriage, New York Governor David Pater-
son took a significant step by issuing an executive memorandum recognizing 
New Yorkers’ same-sex marriages performed outside of the state.604  
While recognition of marriages across state lines is historically noncon-
troversial, the lengths states went to block gay, lesbians, and bisexuals from 
marrying out-of-state and returning home seeking recognition was unprece-
dented.  On one hand Paterson’s move should have been of little cause for 
celebration, but on the other it was the most sweeping affirmation of LGB 
equality available barring legislative action.  LGBT rights groups responded 
with great favor to the gubernatorial directive.  
Paterson’s move was seen, at least by the New York Civil Liberties Union 
(“NYCLU”), as a response to NYCLU litigation in state court, Martinez v. 
County of Monroe.605  The case arose from the refusal of Monroe Community 
College, a county-backed institution, to extend benefits to the same-sex 
spouse of a college employee.606  The New York appellate court ruled that a 
same-sex marriage celebrated in Canada should be recognized in New York 
	
 601 Michael Cooper, Pension System Recognizes Gay Spouses, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2004), www.ny-
times.com/2004/10/14/nyregion/pension-system-recognizes-gay-spouses.html?_r=0. 
 602 Michael R. Bloomberg, Statement by Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg On Pension Benefits for Spouses in Same-sex 
Marriages, NYC (Nov. 17, 2004), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/309-04/state-
ment-mayormie-of-the-mayor/news/309-04/statement-mayor-michael-bloochael-bloomberg-pen-
sion-benefits-spouses-same-sex-marriages#/0.  
 603 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006). 
 604 Jeremy W. Peters, New York Backs Same-Sex Unions from Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2008, at A17. 
 605 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); see also NCYLU Victory Prompts Gov. Paterson to Recognize 
Marriages Between Lesbian and Gay Couples, NYCLU (May 28, 2008), https://www.nyclu.org/en/ 
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 606 Id. at 741. 
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because the Canadian marriage did not violate New York public policy.607  
On May 6, 2008, New York’s court of last resort rejected an appeal on pro-
cedural grounds.608   On May 29, 2008, David Nocenti circulated the mem-
orandum to all state agencies’ counsel, writing: 
In Martinez, the Fourth Department held that legal same-sex marriages 
performed in other jurisdictions are “entitled to recognition in New York in 
the absence of express legislation to the contrary.”  This decision is consistent 
with the holdings of several lower courts. . . . 
In light of these decisions, agencies that do not afford comity or full faith 
and credit to same-sex marriages that are legally performed in other juris-
dictions could be subject to liability.609 
LGBT civil rights groups greeted the Paterson Administration’s pro-
nouncement with celebration.  Susan Sommer of Lambda Legal welcomed 
the clarity the Paterson Administration brought to the state bureaucracy say-
ing, “It shouldn’t be the burden of each lesbian or gay couple to have to 
advocate before an agency every time a new issue comes up.”610  
Donna Lieberman of the New York Civil Liberties Union called the 
memorandum “a milestone.”611  Lieberman embraced the stability the Ad-
ministration’s policy brought.  “For the first time, couples in New York who 
have never known true security for their families will be officially entitled to 
treatment by our state government that respects their rights.  They should 
now finally get a taste of the family protections other married couples and 
their children enjoy,” Lieberman said in a press release.612 
Others saw it as milquetoast measure.  Alan Van Capelle, executive di-
rector of Empire State Pride Agenda questioned what he saw as a “tempo-
rary, but necessary fix for a longer-term problem.”613  Van Capelle asked, “If 
you’re going to treat us as equals, why don’t you just give us the marriage 
license?”614  For Governor Paterson’s part, he saw it as an opportunity to take 
the courts’ decisions and use them to drive life into his agenda and enact 
marriage equality legislation.  Paterson recounted: 
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I felt like we should just continue to work on the legislation.  I didn’t want to 
get dragged into the marriage equality fight.  I wanted to be leading it.  And 
I think Governors Spitzer and Pataki supported it, but it just wasn’t a top 
priority.  I came from relative obscurity, but this, for me, was the first per-
sonal light that showed who I was and what I stood for.615 
4.  Rhode Island 
Given Rhode Island’s proximity to Massachusetts and requirements un-
der Massachusetts law restricting marriage licenses to out-of-state couples 
whose home state would recognize the marriage,616 the question of whether 
LGB Rhode Islanders could marry in Massachusetts was a significant one. 
In September 2006, a state superior court judge in Massachusetts ruled that 
same-sex couples that lived in Rhode Island could marry in Massachusetts.617  
On February 1, 2007, Jack Warner, Commissioner of the Rhode Island 
Board of Governors for Higher Education, wrote to Attorney General Pat-
rick Lynch asking whether the Board of Governors should recognize as mar-
ried state employees who had participated in same-sex marriage ceremonies 
lawfully performed in Massachusetts.  Lynch examined state law and con-
cluded that Rhode Island law would recognize an out-of-state marriage un-
less a marriage conflicted with the public policy of the state. 618   
As of 2007, Rhode Island had only enacted legislation expressly rejecting 
bigamous and incestuous marriages, as well as those “contracted” where one 
of the parties was incompetent to enter a marriage.619  Lynch also examined 
nondiscrimination protections embedded in Rhode Island law, which pro-
scribed invidious discrimination against LGB Rhode Islanders in public ac-
commodations, credit, housing, and employment.  Rhode Island law also al-
lowed same-sex couples to adopt children.620  
Given the state’s favorable landscape for sexual minorities, Lynch con-
cluded that state entities should recognize lawful same-sex marriages from 
Massachusetts.621  “Rhode Island will recognize same sex marriages lawfully 
performed in Massachusetts as marriages in Rhode Island.  Therefore, we 
	
 615 Telephone Interview with David Paterson, Former Governor of N.Y. (May 22, 2012). 
 616  See supra note 294 and accompanying text (discussing 1913 Massachusetts law banning marriage of 
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advise the Board of Governors that it should accord marital status to its em-
ployees who were lawfully married in Massachusetts under the ruling of that 
state’s highest court in Goodridge . . . .” the opinion concluded.622 
When interviewed about his formal opinion, Attorney General Lynch 
said, “This is about Rhode Island citizens who entered into a valid, legally 
recognized same-sex marriage and returned here to live and work. . . . There 
is no way, no law, no constitutional provision and, in my estimation, no right 
to allow the denial of basic human rights.”623  
When Lynch’s opinion came down in 2007, Rhode Island Governor Don-
ald Carcieri, a Republican, opposed same-sex marriage.624  Lynch’s opinion 
lacked binding authority, only an act of the legislature or an executive order 
from Governor Carcieri could give it the force of law.625  Despite lacking the 
force of law, a number of Rhode Island agencies intended to follow the Attor-
ney General Opinion including the agency that requested the opinion.626  
Though it never materialized, Lynch posited that the opinion might prompt 
new developments, saying, “Perhaps litigation will flow from it.”627 
Lynch’s action was important for Rhode Islanders hoping to marry in 
Massachusetts, but it also was cited in the run up to Vermont’s same-sex 
marriage debate as a reason to extend marriage rights to LGB Vermonters.  
One of the main arguments in favor of moving away from civil unions was 
that the term marriage was more portable across state lines.628  With neigh-
boring Massachusetts and nearby Rhode Island offering to recognize same-
sex marriages, the portability argument held more weight. 
In 2012, Governor Lincoln Chafee issued an executive order that the 
state would recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages.629 As a consequence, 
same-sex couples married outside of Rhode Island gained equal access to 
insurance markets, state employment benefits, presumptions of parentage, 
tax exemptions, and property rights.630  Though Chafee wanted to push 
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same-sex marriage legislation through, he faced an uphill battle with con-
servative Democrats in the Senate.631  Like Governor Paterson in New York, 
Chafee hoped to use an executive order to move the ball on marriage and 
communicate his support for an equal marriage bill.  Chafee said: 
The previous governor was staunchly anti-marriage equality.  I put it in 
my inaugural address and I said [legislating equal marriage] is something I 
wanted to do in Rhode Island.  We open our doors here to everyone.  I 
couldn’t get it passed my first year, so this was a fall back.  I wanted to send 
a message.632 
5.  Maryland 
In early 2009, openly gay Maryland State Senator Richard Madaleno 
wrote to Maryland Attorney General Douglas Gansler about the legal effect of 
same-sex marriages contracted outside in same-sex marriage jurisdictions.633  
At this point in time O’Malley supported civil unions, but had yet to 
endorse equal rights for LGB Marylanders.634  Gansler’s opinion and 
O’Malley’s response would take on potentially greater importance because 
neighboring Washington, D.C., was considering enacting a marriage equality 
law. In December 2009, Mayor Adrian Fenty signed marriage equality 
legislation that would take effect after a 30-work-day period for mandatory 
Congressional review.635 With Congress refusing to block same-sex nuptials 
in the District, same-sex couples were eligible to marry on March 3, 2010.636 
On February 23, 2010, Gansler published his formal opinion on the status 
of out-of-state marriages contracted by gay and lesbian couples.637  Gansler 
responded to Madaleno’s inquiry as to whether Maryland Governor Martin 
O’Malley could follow New York’s lead and issue an executive order 
mandating comity be given to out-of-state marriages.638   Gansler was careful 
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to distinguish the difference between New York and Maryland, noting that 
Governor Paterson’s administrative advisory was in response to court decisions 
mandating equal recognition for marriages celebrated outside of New York.639  
Maryland had no similar case that would support executive action.640 
The Attorney General’s opinion did, however, make clear that Maryland 
historically accepted non-Maryland marriages that were otherwise prohib-
ited from being contracted in the state.  The opinion described a 1916 deci-
sion, Fensterwald v. Burk, where the Maryland high court gave force to a mar-
riage between an uncle and niece who married legally in Rhode Island to 
circumvent Maryland law.641   
After examining the state’s legal backdrop on LGB rights issues, which 
protected Marylanders against sexual orientation discrimination, recognized 
same-sex couples’ right to adopt children, and afforded limited domestic 
partner benefits to same-sex couples, Attorney General Gansler concluded 
the state’s public policy did not disfavor recognizing same-sex marriages.642  
The Attorney General’s Opinion concluded: 
While the matter is not free from all doubt, in our view, the Court is likely 
to respect the law of other states and recognize a same-sex marriage con-
tracted validly in another jurisdiction.  In light of Maryland’s developing pub-
lic policy concerning intimate same-sex relationships, the Court would not 
readily invoke the public policy exception to the usual rule of recognition.643  
Governor O’Malley ordered state agencies to align policies with the 
Gansler opinion. 644  The Department of Budget and Management included 
married same-sex couples in the Department’s paid-leave and employee-
benefit policies.645  The Board of Regents of the University System of Mary-
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land ordered that its policies be revamped to ensure that they were “con-
sistent with the advice given by the Office of the Attorney General.”646  The 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene adopted a policy allowing the 
non-biological mother of an infant born to her spouse, the natural mother, 
to be listed as a parent without court order.647  
C.  Conclusion 
Executive and administrative actors responded to Lawrence and Goodridge in 
substantive acts and symbolic acts of disobedience.  A number of factors com-
plicate any attempt to glean an understanding of the motivation behind these 
actions.  However, timing, contemporary statements, and reflective interview 
statements suggest that the Supreme Court striking down state sodomy laws 
and the Massachusetts decision ending marriage discrimination played a cen-
tral role in fomenting national protests and setting off chain reactions. 
Among the more important early actions taken by state executives were 
the opinions rendered by the attorneys general in New York and Rhode 
Island.  The Rhode Island and New York opinions were necessary solely 
because of Goodridge and an attempt to bring clarity on the eligibility of New 
Yorkers and Rhode Islanders to marry in Massachusetts.  Cabining lawfully 
married same-sex couples to Massachusetts residents due to the preexisting 
1917 residency requirement law would have limited the reach of Goodridge.  
However, the neighboring attorneys general amplified the impact of Goodridge 
by ensuring it was a regional phenomenon.  If a metric of Goodridge’s success 
is the tangible benefits accrued by LGB persons, then it was more valuable 
because it yielded spillover benefits in neighboring states.  Indeed, same-sex 
couples married in Massachusetts could obtain direly needed recognition and 
marital benefits in these states.  Because these actions did not occur within a 
single jurisdictional hierarchy, they do not provide insight to the political 
reinforcement hypothesis.  
The chain of events described in this section gives credence to the rights 
consciousness thesis and legitimization hypothesis.  Governors and state 
attorneys general legitimized Goodridge and further legitimized same-sex 
marriage by buttressing the portability argument that was prominent in 
Vermont’s marriage debate between 2007 and 2009.  Further, these 
executive orders and attorney general opinions made same-sex marriage 
more salient—an important factor in the rights consciousness analysis—and 
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would not have been possible without Goodridge and subsequent spread of 
equal marriage jurisdictions. 
These opinions also boosted efforts to legalize same-sex marriage in Ver-
mont.  Of the many arguments put forward in Vermont to abandon civil 
unions for equal marriage, the concept of “portability” was among the most 
cited.  Proponents of marriage equality often derided the unwieldy language 
encumbering civil unions, which required lengthy explanations to non-Ver-
monters and carried hurdles for civil unionized couples seeking out-of-state 
recognition.  The merits of that argument would have been far weaker in 
2007—when they were first prominently raised—without Goodridge.  The 
portability argument gained even more credibility with New York and 
Rhode Island welcoming out-of-state gay marriages.  
In New York, Governor Paterson’s Administration took Eliot Spitzer’s 
attorney general opinion one step further by directing state agencies to 
recognize same-sex marriages lawfully contracted out-of-state.  Paterson’s 
directive was issued nearly three years before the state legalized equal marriage.  
The Paterson Administration’s undertaking to bring all state agencies under a 
uniform policy was a reaction to an intermediate appellate court decision 
mandating a county recognize an out-of-state gay marriage.  In one sense, the 
executive branch made Martinez more effective by lending the weight of 
executive authority and mandating uniform statewide compliance.  Thus, 
because the New York courts had a friend in a sympathetic governor, the 
Martinez decision’s efficacy was magnified.  Had the Paterson Administration 
shrugged at Martinez, same-sex couples would have had to potentially challenge 
any out-of-state marriage recognition denials on an agency-by-agency basis. 
In another sense, Martinez and the executive letter it prompted thrust the 
merits of legalizing same-sex marriage into the media and bubbling conver-
sations about enacting marriage equality.  The Paterson Administration used 
Martinez to bring additional gravitas to the campaign for equal marriage, 
though it would not come to pass for three years.  Thus, while Martinez and 
the prod to take executive action in its wake lowered administrative barriers 
for same-sex couples seeking equal treatment by state agencies, it did little to 
galvanize pro-marriage forces in New York political circles.  
The media attention Paterson’s move garnered trickled down to Mary-
land where it induced an inquiry from a state senator to the attorney general 
whether Maryland law could achieve a similar result.  The Maryland Attor-
ney General’s 2010 opinion that Maryland law compelled the same result as 
New York was the second positive advancement for same-sex marriage rights 
below the Mason-Dixon.  That opinion took on greater importance once the 
District of Columbia successfully waited out the congressional review period 
on the District’s marriage equality law and same-sex marriages commenced.  
After Gansler’s opinion a number of state agencies expanded the rights, priv-
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ileges, and benefits of marriage to same-sex couples wedded in other jurisdic-
tions—a position later ratified by the Maryland courts with finality in 2012. 
Unlike these aforementioned developments, the record evidences that 
many of the pivotal developments in this time period were ultra vires acts of 
civil disobedience by municipal officials.  These instances of rouge behavior 
seem to be by-and-large born out of a mindset preexisting Goodridge that dis-
crimination against LGB people was morally wrong.  Those engaging in acts 
of civil disobedience saw the moral objection towards discrimination as a 
necessary but singularly insufficient condition for resistance to the law.  This 
observation is substantiated by the repeated linking of unlawful marriage li-
censes to principles of constitutional equality and judicial directives mandat-
ing equal treatment of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.  
More than invoking constitutional and legal principles, the bold moves 
made by elected officials across the country set litigation in motion.  Orga-
nized interest groups planned on targeting California for litigation, but took 
to the courts well before they had originally anticipated in response to devel-
opments in San Francisco.  Litigation in New York, Oregon, and Washing-
ton can be linked directly to rebellious local officials—all three lawsuits, how-
ever, were unsuccessful.  Importantly, that litigation was swiftly organized, 
filed, and prosecuted because the necessary support-structures were already 
in place to undergird it.  Similarly, the second round of litigation out of Cal-
ifornia in federal court was bolstered by a well-funded organization formed 
for the express purpose of supporting marriage litigation.  
Ultimately, the high courts in New York and Washington rejected same-
sex couples’ constitutional claims while the Oregon Supreme Court was 
stripped of subject matter jurisdiction to rule on same-sex couples’ claims.  
Notably, the effort to remove same-sex marriage from Oregon’s state courts 
predated Multnomah County issuing same-sex marriage licenses, but the ef-
fort to amend the state constitution was an outshoot of Goodridge backlash.  
The great, but unsurprising, failure in the Oregon litigation was the litigants’ 
inability to persuade the Oregon Supreme Court to rule on the merits and 
mandate civil unions under state constitutional law in 2005.  Oregon argua-
bly saw the largest single legislative advancement of LGBT rights as a whole 
in this period, although falling short by having marriage removed from the 
regular political and judicial processes. 
In their totality, the events in Goodridge’s aftermath polarized Americans’ 
opinions on same-sex relationships, but not because the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court caused this result alone.  The decision to extend full 
marriage rights to LGB people in Massachusetts was met with rebuke by 
grassroots social conservatives and some conservative elites, including Presi-
dent George W. Bush.  That criticism, in turn, helped to fuel efforts by Gavin 
Newsom to celebrate same-sex unions through extralegal means.  Newsom’s 
actions in San Francisco subsequently fanned unsuccessful efforts to amend 
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the federal constitution to ban same-sex marriage.  In the short term, Goodridge 
sparked a structural shift in elites’ approach to state recognition of same-sex 
relationships.  This pattern of change is predicted by legitimization theory. 
The positive yields and newly created burdens was a mixed bag for the 
marriage movement.  In this vein, what constitutes “success” is important 
here.  As Rosenberg argued from the vantage point of 2008: 
If the goal is improving the lives of gay men and lesbians, then there is a 
good deal to celebrate.  On the other hand, if the goal of the litigation is 
marriage equality, then little has been achieved and major obstacles have 
been created.648  
Focusing squarely on marriage equality as the metric of victory in 2008, 
Rosenberg, described this early stage as “one step forward, two steps 
back.”649  Historian John D’Emilio straightforwardly called this period “a 
disaster” for the marriage campaign.650  Their assessments were not un-
founded at the time.  Indeed, in the aftermath of whatever gains the LGBT 
community made in terms of marriage, the community lost to the extent that 
27 state constitutions removed marriage from the legislative and judicial pro-
cess for same-sex couples.  Granted, the numbers alone by 2008 looked bleak. 
But, these evaluations were astray for two reasons.  First, implicit in these 
assessments is that every victory and every defeat is equally weighty.  Second, 
they failed to capture and appreciate (given their relatively limited hindsight) 
the smaller cracks each and every act of court-inspired disobedience opened. 
Indeed, what is lost in sweeping claims of defeat in assessing this period on 
its own, is that courts induced executive actors to press their cause in the court 
of public opinion and keep the issue alive,651 lay the groundwork for litigation, 
and leverage the dynamics of federalism to move the ball on marriage.  
Equally important, in nearly every case of mass civil disobedience or executive 
action, relevant actors used judicial opinions and jurisprudential rationales to 
legitimize their actions and, perhaps transitively, enhance the validity of the 
equal marriage rights cause, too.  This signals that the courts gave rise to a 
consciousness of rights that disobedient actors used as justification for their 
defiance thereby legitimizing their own push for same-sex marriage.  
Taken as a whole, many these early developments would not likely have 
occurred but for Goodridge.  Indeed, Gavin Newsom’s actions in San Francisco 
	
 648 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 
368 (2d ed. 2008). 
 649 Id. 
 650 John D’Emilo, Will the Courts Set Us Free?: Reflections on the Campaign for Same-Sex Marriage, in THE 
POLITICS OF SAME SEX MARRIAGE  45 (Craig A. Rimmerman & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2007).  
 651 This is consistent with other research on elite-driven coverage of Supreme Court decisions. See gen-
erally Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Media, Knowledge, and Public Evaluations of the Supreme 
Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS (Lee Epstein, ed., 1995) (arguing that significant public igno-
rance of the Court often means that executive actors can successfully pursue their issues through 
other avenues even after losses in courts).  
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while animated by mixed motivations—including Lawrence and Goodridge in 
addition to President Bush’s response to Goodridge—would not have hap-
pened without the Massachusetts litigation.  The ripple effect of Newsom’s 
civil disobedience in New York helped stoke litigation.  
More vitally yet, state officials’ response to fomenting acts of disobedience 
led to a clarification of New Yorkers’ eligibility to marry in Massachusetts 
before same-sex marriages commenced there, which also later buoyed efforts 
to move away from civil unions in Vermont.  Undoubtedly, supportive offi-
cials in state executive branches boosted whatever efficacy Goodridge had in 
expanding tangible benefits to same-sex couples and moving the public to-
wards accepting marriage equality.  These officials were under no binding 
obligation to lend support or take the mantle of Goodridge to move equal mar-
riage forward.  The Constrained Court Theory does not sufficiently take into 
account non-hierarchical relationships and cannot explain developments be-
tween neighboring sovereigns.  Contrary to legitimatization skeptics, the 
marriage movement gained profound momentum from Goodridge and the 
chain of spinoff events it caused. 
CONCLUSION: THE DIALECTICAL COURTS  
Do courts influence society?  This question was at the heart of the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in DeBoer v. Snyder.652  While upholding four same-sex mar-
riage bans, Judge Jeffrey Sutton waxed philosophical on the role of courts 
and social change, writing, “For all of the power that comes with the author-
ity to interpret the United States Constitution, the federal courts have no 
long-lasting capacity to change what people think and believe about new so-
cial questions.” 653  This Article examined Judge Sutton’s claim by assessing 
the extent to which social reform-minded litigation and courts brought mar-
riage equality into the American mainstream. 
Originating in the 1970s and gaining steam in the 1990s, same-sex mar-
riage advocates used social reform litigation as a vehicle to advance LGB 
rights.  The first round of litigation in the 1970s fell on deaf ears, but litigants 
made significant headway in the 1990s.  Americans overwhelmingly opposed 
same-sex couples’ freedom to marry early on.  That opposition quickly evap-
orated, however, within fifteen years of Vermont enacting civil unions.  
Courts and lawyers were largely responsible. 
For all it gets right, the Constrained Court Theory suffers because it is an 
oversimplification of reality.  It does not adequately account for non-
hierarchical relationships and interstate interactions.  The theory fails to 
incorporate courts’ legitimization power or leave room for a judicially 
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inspired rights consciousness effect.  The account presented in this Article 
evidences these shortcomings.  
Among the many takeaways is that precedent matters.  Judges are risk ad-
verse and, therefore, are hard-pressed to recognize new, emerging rights in 
the absence of precedent.  Conversely, judges are liberated to act swiftly and 
sweepingly when they are empowered by precedent to rule in favor of an 
asserted right.  When same-sex couples first initiated marriage litigation in 
the 1970s, they were all but laughed out of court.  The first marriage plain-
tiffs’ non-strategic litigation placed the cart before the horse.  These plaintiffs’ 
haphazard efforts failed to dismantle sodomy statutes or consider constitu-
tional challenges to regulations over same-sex sexual conduct before ap-
proaching the marriage question.  The legal landscape shifted over time as 
courts struck down anti-sodomy laws and legislatures liberalized restrictions 
on private sexual conduct.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s condemnation 
of federal marriage discrimination in Windsor v. United States relaxed the prec-
edential constraint considerably and freed judges to dismantle discriminatory 
state marriage laws in short order. 
Once courts warmed to same-sex couples and recognized their freedom 
to marry, those decisions were dependent on the political branches to rein-
force the decisions and public administrators to implement the necessary re-
forms.  Same-sex marriage rulings were successful because there was insuffi-
cient opposition in state legislatures to enact bills to undercut the decisions 
or refer constitutional amendments to overturn them.  Similarly, governors’ 
resistance to early court rulings was muted.  Because they were the first gov-
ernors to face the issue head on, Howard Dean and Mitt Romney had the 
greatest latitude to try to thwart the Vermont Supreme Court and Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court, respectively.  The Romney Administration, which 
was the most publicly opposed to same-sex marriage, took affirmative steps 
to ensure the smooth implementation of the Goodridge decision in early 2004.  
Public administrators and officials crucial for implementation fell in line with 
the courts’ mandates. 
Evidence supports the thesis that courts legitimized same-sex marriage.  The 
public’s acceptance of same-sex marriage was quick as the courts expanded 
rights for LGBT Americans. This remarkable rise in support was noticeable 
on the state and national level but is not explained away by changes in reli-
gious attitudes or personal connections with openly gay people.  Nor can 
these changes be chalked up to generational replacement as every genera-
tional cohort’s support for same-sex marriage increased while litigation per-
colated and legislation progressed. 
Most significantly, courts possessed an ability to spark a newfound awareness in 
observers of same-sex couples’ demands for equality as a fundamental, con-
stitutional right.  Herein lies the greatest finding of courts’ power to influence 
social movements and the political process—a phenomenon that cannot be 
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understood within a constrained court.  From legislators in Vermont author-
izing same-sex relationship recognition to Gavin Newsom defying state law 
to grassroots organizers forming new civil rights groups, courts induced per-
sons to take action to demand equal rights for the LGB community.  Court 
rulings increased same-sex marriage’s salience, fueled the passions of untold 
numbers of Americans (both in favor and against equal marriage), and man-
ifested an evolved consciousness of rights.  
Any conclusion that courts were the sole reason for the movement’s suc-
cess is too sweeping.  Postulations that courts were ineffective or insignificant 
in same-sex marriage’s advancement run contrary to the record.  Litigation 
and courts played an indispensable role in the early success of same-sex marriage.  The 
Baker and Goodridge courts accelerated the spread of relationship recognition 
by opening the door to an alternative step toward equal marriage and 
demonstrating the non-harm caused by expanding the freedom to marry.  
Goodridge sparked a chain of events that reverberated in states for years after 
it was handed down.  Federalism and the diffusion of family law across states 
allowed same-sex marriage’s rapid spread. 
When political actors are induced to take the mantle of a court ruling and 
advance an issue, like state attorneys general or local municipal officials, the 
power and efficacy of the courts are enhanced.  The decisions in Baker and 
Goodridge shaped the political process in Vermont and New Hampshire.  Liti-
gation raised marriage equality’s profile and fueled a consciousness of rights 
that placed same-sex marriage and interracial marriage on the same civil rights 
plane.  Courts played an important part in dislodging the institutional inertia working against 
same-sex couples by inspiring a new understanding of rights and legitimizing same-sex couples’ 
efforts.  Given public officials’ overestimation of the public’s opposition to same-
sex marriage,654 these early victories are all the more remarkable. 
The courts’ legitimizing power is not without limitations or costs.  Regard-
ing courts’ legitimacy-conferring function, there are two important takeaways.  
First, while courts can expend institutional capital to draw a weary public to-
wards judges’ preferred positions, they will more successfully win over the 
public if aided by outside actors.  Second, the emergence of discordant views 
and the polarization of opinions in the short-term wake of a controversial ju-
dicial decision should not surprise observers of judicial politics.  Scholars 
should properly understand this as a step in the legitimization process.  
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Courts’ legitimizing power benefits from the aid of the political branches.  
If executives, legislators, and bureaucrats uniformly work to suffocate a judi-
cial ruling quickly, they may be able to snuff out judicial progress.  By con-
stitutional design, rapid responses to shut down a decision are not possible in 
many jurisdictions, which helps court decisions have staying power.655  This 
was the instance in Massachusetts where the constitutional amendment pro-
cess takes place over multiple years versus California where the state consti-
tution can be amended in short order.  
Courts’ ability to risk institutional integrity on any given issue benefits 
from strategic lawyering, which can most easily come about through organ-
izational coordination.  As the marriage movement’s development demon-
strates, the power of courts was harnessed for maximum benefit, in part, be-
cause legal interest groups carefully targeted friendly jurisdictions.  More 
than just expertise for impact litigation venue selection, organization-sup-
ported litigation is crucial in the early stages of impact litigation where the 
prospect of attorneys’ fees is uncertain.656 
In the long run, courts can be effective agents of social change, but no 
court is an island and the danger of overreach is real.  Judges must be strate-
gic when investing courts’ capital of trust.  Courts are but one set of actors in 
the American polity and are most effective when the political branches sup-
port them.  Judicial institutions are well suited for an active, but dialectical 
role, in mediating social change between the political branches, federal and 
state government, and the general public.  Yes, courts can “appeal to men’s 
better natures [and] call forth their aspirations.”657  Judges can reflect higher 
republican principles and educate the public on deeply contested matters, 
but not without cost.  Even judicial schoolmasters require the assistance of 
friendly hands.   
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